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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters contributing to redistribution-driven market design and
sponsored link auctions.
Chapter 2 and 3 (co-authored with Charles Zheng) study redistribution-driven market design with endogenous buyers and sellers. Chapter 2 considers a large market environment
with each individual endowed with equal shares of limited resources and allowed to buy or
sell the shares. We characterize the interim (incentive-constrained) Pareto frontier subject to
market clearance and budget balance, and find that at most two prices are needed to attain any
(interim) Pareto optimum. Under robust conditions of the primitives, the Pareto optimal allocation is unique, and a single price — without the help of rationing or lump-sum transfer —
implements the optimal allocation. We find which types gain, and which types lose, when the
social planner chooses a rationing mechanism over the single-price solution, as well as which
type’s welfare weight is crucial to the choice. The finding suggests a market-like mechanism
to distribute Covid-vaccines optimally among the population that belongs to the same priority
group.
In Chapter 3, we study a quasilinear independent private values set-up to allocate a commonly desirable item (the good) and a commonly undesirable item (the bad). We prove a
necessary and sufficient condition for all interim Pareto optimal mechanisms to allocate the
bad with strictly positive probability, despite that not allocating it at all is part of an ex-ante incentive efficient mechanism. The condition holds when types near the low end carry sufficiently
high welfare densities. Replacing the welfare weight distribution by a second-order stochastically dominated one improves the prospect of the condition. The Kuhn-Tucker method in the
literature is inapplicable because when our condition holds, the monotonicity constraint the
method sets aside is binding unless the method su↵ers indeterminacy in admitting a continuum
of solutions to the relaxed problem.
Chapter 4 investigates a sponsored link auction game in which consumers search one set of
products (block) before the other, and sellers compete in bids to place their product links to the
first block. Consumers are assumed to be unaware of the products in the second block when
searching in the first block, search in each block optimally, according to Weitzman (1979), and
update the current best option during the search. I characterize consumers’ shopping outcomes
with block-by-block search behavior. Letting sellers choose product prices and auction bids
together, I find the equilibrium of the complete information second price auction with two
payment schemes: fixed payment and per-transaction payment. I find auction revenue and
consumer surplus are larger under the fixed payment, and seller profits are larger under the pertransaction payment because the latter distorts the winner’s pricing strategy. If a social planner
runs the platform, I find a consumer optimal positioning of products if sellers commit to prices
before the position allocation.

Keywords: Market Design, Redistribution, Interim Incentive Efficiency, Vaccine Distribution, Online Shopping, Advertising
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Summary for Lay Audience
A market allocates items to the individuals with the highest valuation. Since the valuations
are unknown (private information) to a planner, the planner needs to design the allocation
and payment rules to reveal the private information to achieve allocation efficiency. When
people value money di↵erently (i.e., the poor value a dollar more than the rich on average),
the payment rule in a market becomes a tool to redistribute among individuals. Price control is
often observed in markets with poor participants, e.g., price floor for agricultural products and
rent ceiling for student accommodation.
Chapter 2 and chapter 3 (co-authored with Charles Zheng) study the redistribution-driven
design problem. Chapter 2 considers a large market setting where individuals are endowed
with equal shares of limited resources and are allowed to buy or sell the shares. We find that
the optimal market structure has at most two prices. It is either a competitive market or involves
rationing on one side of the market. The finding suggests using a simple market structure to
allocate covid vaccine efficiently.
Chapter 3 studies the redistribution problem in an auction design setup. The planner has a
commonly desirable item (the good) and a commonly undesirable item (the bad) to allocate.
Although the bad itself imposes a cost to society and allocating it is not mandatory, we find a
planner can use the bad to achieve redistribution. A sufficient condition to allocate the bad with
a positive probability is when the planner sufficiently cares for the poor, because it increases
the transfer from the rich to the poor.
In Chapter 4, I study sponsored link auctions used by online shopping platforms like Amazon and eBay. The platforms use the auction to sell the top positions on their webpages as
advertisement spots, so how consumers search online is crucial to determine the value of the
top positions. I incorporate a flexible search behavior and find that the surplus split between
the participants (i.e., the platform, buyers, and sellers) depends on the payment rules of the
auction. The platform and the buyers prefer a fixed bid payment rule, while the sellers prefer a
transaction-based bid payment rule.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The fundamental role of a market is to allocate resources efficiently. Yet we often observe price
and transaction quantity regulations that potentially distort allocative efficiency. The government imposes regulations in markets where some participants are extremely poor. Standard
regulations include the price floor to sell agricultural products and the rent ceiling of apartments for students and the disabled. Conceptually, these regulations protect the poor by either
increasing their income or decreasing their spending. But less has been done theoretically on
how regulations should be designed based on the planner’s preference.
My thesis contains two chapters on redistribution-driven mechanism design. Chapter 2
and chapter 3 of my thesis, coauthored with Charles Zheng, study the problem with endogenous buyers and sellers. Recent literature on redistribution-driven market design started using
the techniques in mechanism design to explain why the government should impose price and
quantity control in specific markets to protect the poor. Relevant works include Akbarpour,
Dworczak and Kominers [1], Dworczak, Kominers and Akbarpour (henceforth DKA) [3], and
Kang [6]. They made sectorial restrictions such that an individual is predetermined as a buyer
or seller. In contrast, we consider a di↵erent setup where the buyer-seller role of an individual
is endogenous. Players’ endogenous role rises in markets when they share public resources,
like health care, road use, and stock shares (partnership dissolution). Chapter 2 considers a
large market environment where each individual is endowed with equal shares of a limited resource, and each is allowed to buy or sell the shares. Our goal is to characterize the interim
Pareto frontier subject to incentive compatibility, individual rationality, market clearing, and
budget balance.
An optimal mechanism in such a setting needs to stratify the space of type, which is the
player’s private information, into more than two tiers. And each tie is coupled with a price,
rationing that restrict the quality to supply or demand, and lump-sum transfer to achieve redistribution to a group of individuals. In DKA, the optimal allocation stratifies the type space into
at most five tiers, with rationing on at most two of the tiers and a potential lump-sum transfer.
In Kang [6], there exists an optimal allocation that stratifies the type space into at most four
tiers, and rationing is necessary to attain optimality. In contrast to the literature above with
sectorial restrictions, we find that the optimal mechanism with endogenous buyers and sellers
is simpler with at most three ties and rationing at most one side of the market. Thus, the optimal mechanism is either a posted price equilibrium with a single price clearing the market or
rationing on one side of the market.
1

2

Chapter 1. Introduction

The simplicity of our solution is driven by a new observation due to the players’ endogenous role as buyers and sellers. The observation is that any incentive-compatible and market
clearing allocation can always be implemented in a budget-balanced and individual rational
manner. Thus, the last two constraints of our problem can be ignored without loss. With
only incentive-compatible and market clearing valid, our problem is similar to a monopolist’s
second-price discrimination problem with a capacity constraint or the fundamental Bayesian
persuasion problem.
We summarize the conditions determining how the optimal mechanism moves on the Pareto
frontier when the primitives change. That is, which type gains, which type loses when the
planner changes the market structure from rationing to posted-price. When the mechanism
switches from the rationing to the posted-price one, all types sufficiently close to the marketclearing price are worse o↵. Moreover, if the type distribution is convex (concave) on the
rationed interval, switching from rationing to posted-price makes the low (high) types better
o↵. Thus, the planner prefers rationing to posted-price if she puts sufficiently high welfare
weight on the types close to the market-clearing price, and prefers posted-price to rationing if
she cares about the high types and the low types.
Our model is applicable to large-market exchange economies where individuals have equal
entitlements to a limited resource and are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for access
to the resource. For example, the planner may issue vaccine coupons to individuals in the same
priority group. Because of the shortage of vaccines, each coupon generates a positive but less
than one probability of getting vaccinated. Our findings suggest a market-like mechanism to
distribute the covid vaccine optimally.
Chapter 3 considers the problem of allocating a commonly desirable item, which we call
the good, and a commonly undesirable item, which we call the bad, to a finite number of individuals with quasi-linear independent private value (cost) of the good (the bad). Allocating a
bad happens when the government decides where to construct a Nimby (“Not in my backyard”)
type of facility, such as trash disposal plants and oil pipeline terminals, which is commonly perceived as undesirable to its host. A Nimby facility absorbs the environmental cost in a region
and lets the rest of the community enjoy its benefits. So it has a nature of private bad and
public good. The allocation of Nimby has been studied in a procurement auction setup by
Kunreuther and Kleindorfer [7]. But the question that remains is whether the planner can use
the private bad nature of the Nimby facility to facilitate the planner’s redistribution goal. And
if the planner can choose to decrease the cost of the bad, should the planner do so?
Charles and I answer the questions above in chapter 3. Similar to chapter 2, individuals
have the endogenous role of buyers and sellers. However, the mechanism design problem
with finitely many asymmetric players is more complicated than that in Chapter 2 because of
the existence of aggregate uncertainty of players’ type. We characterize the interim incentive
efficiency (IIE) mechanism in the spirit of Holmström and Myerson’s [4]. Characterizing IIE
with both a good and a bad requires us to handle the discontinuity of the virtual surplus function
at any type whose allocation switches from getting the bad in expectation to getting the good in
expectation. This makes the virtual surplus function deviate from the standard linear functional
of allocations.
Without the linear structure, the characterization of the optimal mechanism usually uses
the local Kuhn-Tucker method. However, the local Kuhn-Tucker condition can not solve our
problem as the method needs to be applied to a relaxed problem, setting aside the monotonicity

3
constraint (e.g., Ledyard and Palfrey [5]). When a bad needs to be allocated, we find the
monotonicity constraint is generically binding in our problem, and the Kuhn-Tucker condition
is not valid in our setup. Our paper thus adopts a global approach and characterizes the optimal
mechanisms by a saddle point condition, which is necessary and sufficient for any mechanism
to be Pareto optimal. We obtain the saddle point condition by formulating a two-part operator,
with one part integrating the positive part of an allocation and the other integrating the negative
part. We find a necessary and sufficient condition to allocate the bad, despite that not allocating
it at all is part of the ex ante incentive efficient mechanism. The condition holds when the types
close to the low end of the type space carry sufficiently high welfare weight.
Chapter 4 of my thesis studies the sponsored link auction. Online shopping platforms
like Amazon and eBay use the auction to sell the top positions on their web pages. Unlike a
standard auction selling concrete items, sponsored link auctions sell advertisement positions,
whose value depends on consumers’ search behavior during web browsing. My thesis contributes to the literature by introducing two novel elements in the sponsored link auctions.
First, I assume consumers have partial information on product values, observe product prices
during the search, and use the information to search optimally. Second, sellers in my model
choose both product prices and auction bids optimally to maximize their profits. The questions
are: How do sellers’ pricing strategies and bidding strategies interact in such an environment.
And how the interaction a↵ects the surplus split between consumers, sellers, and the shopping
platform.
I find that the split of surplus depends on the auction payment rule. If the auction winner’s
payment is fixed in a lump-sum manner, sellers’ pricing and bidding strategies are independent.
However, if the auction winner pays to the platform every time the winner’s product is sold,
product prices increase under the equilibrium. Thus, a shift from the fixed payment to the pertransaction payment decreases consumer surplus and increases the sellers’ profits. Moreover, I
find that sponsored link auction revenue falls from changing the payment rules.
Consumer search in my model is based on Weitzman’s [8] framework where an individual’s
value of an item is separated into two parts; one is known before the search, and the other needs
to be discovered from the search. However, the search outcome in Weitzman is independent
of product position since consumers are assumed to be aware of all options at the beginning of
the search. Such an assumption is unrealistic when consumers’ menu size is large, especially
in the context of online shopping.
I introduce the role of product position by introducing the concept of product blocks. A
block of products is a set of adjacent products on the search webpage. Blocks are ordered and
mutually exclusive, such that a higher block represents a higher position. For example, the
first block is the first page of the shopping web, and the second block is the second page. I
assume consumers search the first block before the second and update the current best option
during the search. The block-by-block search deviates from Weitzman’s well-known solution
in two ways: First, the search order gives higher priorities to products in the first block than
Weitzman’s solution would, because a consumer is unaware of any product in the second block
at the start of the search. Second, the search in the second block stops earlier than Weitzman’s
solution because the consumer’s fallback value is larger due to the search in the first block.
These make the demand for any product larger if its link is in the first block, and hence a
sponsored link position is valuable. I characterize consumers’ shopping outcomes by adapting Choi et al.’s (2018) [2] eventual purchase condition into the block-by-block search setup.
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Letting sellers choose product prices and auction bids together, I characterize the equilibrium
of the complete information second-price auction with two payment schemes: fixed payment
and per-transaction payment. If a social planner runs the platform, I find the consumer-optimal
positioning of products if sellers commit to their prices before the position allocation. Optimal
positioning requires placing products into the first block with high expected values and low
search costs.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Design for Redistributions among
Endogenous Buyers and Sellers
2.1

Introduction

Ever since Myerson and Satterthwaite [20] discovered the impossibility of fully efficient bilateral trades given asymmetric information, much has been done theoretically to characterize
the mechanisms that achieve the incentive-constrained Pareto frontier. New characterization
has been obtained by an emerging literature of redistribution-driven market design such as
Akbarpour, Dworczak and Kominers [2] (henceforth ADK), Dworczak, Kominers and Akbarpour [6] (henceforth DKA), and Kang [11].1 Despite their large-market assumption (continuum
of atomless individuals) that eliminates the market power of individuals, the general message
from this literature is that a single market price is insufficient to implement allocations on the
incentive-constrained Pareto frontier. An optimal mechanism needs to stratify the space of
types (private valuations) into more than two tiers through tier-specific prices, augmented with
rationing that restricts the quantity of demand or supply for individuals, as well as lump sum
transfers among individuals to achieve redistribution objectives. Meanwhile, they observe upper bounds for the number of such instruments. In DKA [6], there exists an optimal allocation
that stratifies the type space into at most five tiers, implemented through rationing on at most
two of the tiers together with a lump sum transfer and tier-specific prices. In Kang [11], there
exists an optimal allocation that stratifies the type space into at most four tiers, and rationing is
necessary to attain optimality.2
However, all the studies cited above impose on the market some kind of sectorial restrictions, predetermined exogenously before the realization of types. An individual is exogenously
1

Kang and Zheng [10], and Reuter and Groh [23], consider redistribution-driven mechanism design without
the large-market assumption.
2
DKA [6] observe that there exists an optimal mechanism whose allocation for the buyers, and allocation for
the sellers, are each a monotone step function such that their total number of jumps or drops is at most four.
In other words, if the lowest tier among the buyers and that among the sellers are combined into one tier (both
excluded from trading), the total number of tiers, from the highest tier among the buyers to the highest tier among
the sellers, is at most five.
Kang [11] observes that there exists an optimal mechanism that partitions the public-sector buyers into at most
three tiers. This combined with the private-market buyers means four tiers.
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assigned the role of a buyer or that of a seller in DKA [6] and Myerson and Satterthwaite [20],
or exogenously assigned to a group in ADK [2]. In Kang [11], where individuals choose between the public and the private sectors to trade, the private sector is restricted to be operated
under a competitive market price. If such exogenous restrictions are removed, with individuals
free to choose a sector conditional on their types, would the policy instruments necessary to
attain the Pareto frontier be simplified so that merely a single market price could suffice, or
would they get complicated because the endogenous grouping of individuals now becomes an
additional dimension in the policymaker’s choice variable?
We therefore consider a large market with endogenous buyers and sellers. It is a continuum
of individuals each allowed to buy or sell a good at a marginal utility or marginal cost equal to
one’s type. The planner has the same set of instruments for the buyers and for the sellers. As in
the aforementioned studies on redistribution-driven market or mechanism design, we consider
the entire incentive-constrained Pareto frontier through examining the optimization problem of
a social planner who can take as primitive any type-dependent welfare weight. The welfare
weight may vary with the type in whatever fashion because a social planner with redistributive
motives may favor one type against another. In allowing for such arbitrary welfare weights the
observations would then be applicable to the various social welfare criteria according to which
the planner designs her mechanism.
Across such arbitrary welfare weights our characterization of optimal mechanisms turns
out to be simpler than those in the above cited. We find a tighter upper bound, three, of the
number of tiers that optimal mechanisms have to stratify the type space into (Theorem 2).
Furthermore, given a robust condition of the primitives, we obtain the exact number of tiers,
rather than only an upper bound thereof, in any optimal mechanism. Given such primitives, the
optimal allocation is unique, and the associated optimal number of tiers is equal to either two
or three (Theorem 3). The two results combined, we obtain a robust condition of the primitives
under which a competitive price alone—o↵ering a single price to all types, be they sellers
or buyers, without any other instrument such as rationing, lump sum transfers or tier-specific
prices—implements the optimal allocation. In particular, this is true even when the virtual
surplus function is non-monotone. In the related literature, by contrast, the only case where
a single price is known to implement interim Pareto optimality is the exogenous buyer-seller
bilateral trade model of DKA [6], where the conditions they require together imply that the
endogenous virtual surplus functions in their model be monotone.3 Our optimality observation
of a single market price without rationing is also opposite to the finding in Kang’s [11] model
that rationing is in general necessary.
The simplicity of our characterization is due to a new observation, mainly driven by the endogeneity of one’s buyer- or seller-role. The observation is that any incentive compatible and
market-clearing allocation can always be implemented in a budget-balanced (BB) and individually rational (IR) manner (Theorem 1). Thus, in contrast to the models of DKA [6], Kang [11],
and Myerson and Satterthwaite [20], the BB and IR constraints can be removed without loss
in our model. That eliminates the two-sidedness (buyer- and seller-sides) of the information
asymmetry, a main driving force of the Myerson-Satterthwaite impossibility theorem. Then,
3

DKA’s Theorem 2 requires quasi-convexity of virtual surplus functions and positive derivative of the virtual
surplus function at the minimum type (“low same side inequality” in their language). The two together imply that
the virtual surplus function is monotone for both buyers and sellers.
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as in a monopolist’s capacity-constrained second-degree price discrimination problem (Bulow
and Roberts [3], or the one-group special case in ADK [2]), or in the basic Bayesian persuasion
problem (Kamenica and Gentzkow [9]), rationing is needed to attain optimality only when the
market-clearing cuto↵ type is interior to an interval on which the virtual surplus function has
to be ironed.4 If that happens, rationing is needed only on that interval, and the type space is
stratified to at most three tiers. If that does not happen, a single market price suffices optimality,
and the type space is stratified into only two tiers, one being all the buyers (the “haves”), the
other all the sellers (the “have-nots”).
An implication of the characterization result is that the welfare weight of the types near the
buyer-seller cuto↵ in the posted-price system is crucial to the social planner’s choice between
rationing versus posting a single price. We find that such types are better-o↵ in a mechanism
with rationing than given a posted price, and the planner prefers the former to the latter if the
welfare weight on such types is sufficiently heavy. We can also tell which among the other types
are definitely worse-o↵ under rationing than under the posted price based on the curvature of
the type-distribution on the types near the said buyer-seller cuto↵ (Theorems 4 and 5). Our
model can also be modified to capture a kind of externalities without altering any of the results
(Corollary 2).
With endogenous buyers and sellers, our model is applicable to large-market exchange
economies where individuals have equal entitlements to a limited resource and are heterogeneous in their willingness to pay for the access to the resource. Applied to such situations, our
finding implies that, given any redistributive preferences, the social planner can attain optimality through a market-like mechanism for individuals to trade their shares. It would issue to each
eligible individual a coupon that represents the person’s initial equal access to the limited resource, and the coupon trading would eventually stratify the individuals into at most three tiers
in terms of their final shares of the limited resource, those who give up their shares completely,
those who max out their acquisition of shares, and those in between. Given robust conditions
of the primitives, the coupon-trading mechanism reduces to a single competitive price for the
coupon. We illustrate this application in the context of Covid-vaccine allocation within a group
of individuals of the same priority (Section 2.6.2).
Our model is similar to partnership dissolution models in that the roles of buyers and sellers
are endogenous (e.g., [4], [5], [12] , [17], [18], [21], and [25]). Theorem 1 can be extended
to those models provided that the values are private and partners are not overly asymmetric ex
ante (though we find no precedent thereof in that literature).5 That is consistent with Cramton,
Gibbons and Klemperer’s [2] observation that full efficiency can be attained in some partnership dissolution cases where the initial ownership is nearly equal across partners. However,
the full efficiency result in partnership dissolution is based on a particular welfare weight that
is neutral across types, while the counterpart in our model is valid for a nondegenerate set of
welfare weights that may favor one type or another in various manners. In our model, it is
trivial that a single market price implements optimality if our design objective is fixed to be the
4

The Bayesian consistency condition in Bayesian persuasion models corresponds to the market clearance in
Bulow and Roberts’s [3] second-degree price discrimination problem, with the prior probability that a sender is
supposed to split in the former corresponding to the market equilibrium quantity in the latter. If BB is binds under
optimal mechanism, the solution contains at most four tiers as that in Le Treust and Tomala [16].
5
The extension requires that the sets of no-trade types according to an allocation should have nonempty intersection across all ex ante asymmetric partners.
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neutral welfare weight. Recently, full efficiency is shown to be implementable by Yang, Debo
and Gupta [28] in their endogenous buyer-seller queuing model, where customers can trade
their queuing positions.6 Our model di↵ers from their work in a similar way that ours di↵ers
from the partnership dissolution models.
Our design objective, maximizing the integral of agents’ interim expected payo↵s across
all types measured by any welfare weight distribution, is in the spirit of Holmström and Myerson’s [8] notion of interim incentive efficiency. This notion has been considered by a long
strand of literature including Gresik [7], Laussel and Palfrey [13], Ledyard and Palfrey [14, 15],
Pérez-Nievas [22], Wilson [23] and, recently, ADK [2], DKA [6], Kang and Zheng [10],
Kang [11], and Reuter and Groh [23]. Our focus is the endogenoeity of an agent’s buyer- or
seller-role, which has not been the focus of the literature except Kang and Zheng [10].7 In [10],
we consider a design problem with finitely many players and without the market-clearing condition.
A main perspective of the above literature is that the welfare weight according to which the
social planner maximizes the social welfare should be allowed to vary with individuals’ types.
The importance of this perspective is renewed by recent works on redistributional mechanisms
such as ADK [2], DKA [6] and Kang [11], where the social planner’s redistributive preferences
need not be aligned with the distribution of types across individuals. Moreover, as DKA [6]
have shown recently, even if the social planner is neutral across the fundamental characteristics
of individuals, the planner would still be biased for some types against others when the type is
not a sufficient statistic of the fundamental characteristics (cf. Section 2.2.1).
Allowing for all continuous welfare weight distributions, our characterization of the optimal mechanisms has the merit of being relatively value-free. Without making the absolute continuity assumption of the welfare weight distribution in the literature ([2], [6], [14] and [15]),
our model allows for a larger variety of welfare weight distributions.
The next section defines the model. Section 2.3 observes that the budget balance constraint
is never binding in our model. Section 2.4 characterizes the optimal mechanisms. Section 2.5
shows which types gain and which types lose when the planner chooses rationing over the
posted-price solution, and whose welfare weight is crucial to the planner’s choice between the
two. Section 2.6 presents two examples, one to illustrate theoretical generality with the CantorLebesgue function being the welfare weight distribution, the other to demonstrate applicability
with the aforementioned Covid-vaccination distribution mechanism. Section 2.7 concludes.

2.2

The Model

There is a continuum of individuals, each characterized by a type. The type is distributed among
the population according to a cdf F with support [0, 1] and density f positive and continuous
on the support. An individual of type t can produce up to one unit of a good at a marginal
cost equal to t, and can acquire up to B units of the good at a marginal utility equal to t, with
parameter B 2 R++ . (The case B = 1 is considered in Appendix A.10.)
6

A model of exogenous buyers and sellers of queuing positions has been considered by Yang, Wang and
Cui [29].
7
The model of [15] allows for such endogeneity but focuses on other topics.
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By the revelation principle, a mechanism is modeled as a measurable function (q1 , q2 , p) :
[0, 1] ! [0, B] ⇥ [0, 1] ⇥ R such that q1 (t) is the expected quantity of the good that an individual
of type t acquires, q2 (t) the expected quantity that the individual supplies, and p(t) the expected
value of the net money transfer from the individual to others. We assume that each individual
is risk neutral with preferences quasilinear in the net possession of the good and money. That
is, a type-t individual acting as type t0 gets an expected payo↵ equal to (q1 (t0 ) q2 (t0 )) t p(t0 )
or, more succinctly, tQ(t0 ) p(t0 ) with the notation
Q := q1

q2 .

Of particular interest is a kind of payment rules such that p(t) is a piecewise affine function
of Q(t) with the same constant term. That is, there exist c 2 R, integer n and mutually distinct
k1 , . . . , kn 2 R such that for any t 2 [0, 1], p(t) = c + ki Q(t) for some i 2 {1, . . . , n}. Given
such a payment rule, c is the lump sum transfer to all types, and n is the number of prices. The
payment rule is called posted price i↵ n = 1, namely, it o↵ers a constant per-unit price to all
types, be they buyers or sellers. If Q is equal to a constant on some nondegenerate interval S
of [0, 1] and the constant is neither 1 nor B, the mechanism is said to entail rationing on S .8
By welfare weight distribution we mean a cdf W with support [0, 1] that is continuous on R.
Given any welfare weight distribution W, the design problem is to maximize
Z 1
(tQ(t) p(t)) dW(t)
(2.1)
0

among all mechanisms (q1 , q2 , p), with Q = q1 q2 , subject to incentive compatibility (IC) that
tQ(t) p(t) tQ(t0 ) p(t0 ) for any t, t0 2 [0, 1], individual rationality (IR) that tQ(t) p(t) 0
for all t, budget balance (BB) that
Z 1
p(t)dF(t) 0,
0

and market clearance that

Z

0

1

Q(t)dF(t) = 0.

Any solution (Q⇤ , p⇤ ) to this design problem is called optimal mechanism, and Q⇤ optimal
allocation.

2.2.1

Comments on the Welfare Weight Distribution

The welfare weight distribution W reflects the social planner’s redistributive preferences across
types. It corresponds to the supporting hyperplane at a point on the interim incentive-constrained
Pareto frontier, as in the interim incentive efficiency literature initiated by Holmström and Myerson’s [8]. DKA [6] interpret the Radon-Nikodym derivative of W (with respect to the type
8

The term rationing makes sense because, by the envelope formula, the constancy of Q on S implies that p(t)
is an affine function of t, and so the per-unit price is constant, on S . Thus, for almost all types in S , marginal
utilities are not equal to the (per-unit) price, while the individual is restricted from buying or selling up to the full
capacity.

2.3. The Budget Balance Condition

11

distribution F) at any type t as the expected value of an individual’s marginal utility of money
(MUm ) conditional on that the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) of the good relative to
money is equal to the type t. They show that a social planner whose objective is (2.1) subject to
such welfare weights is equivalent to the planner who is neutral across the underlying individual characteristics that determine the MUm and MRS. Thus, the planner prefers redistributions
from types with low MUm in expectation (“the rich”) to types with high MUm in expectation
(the “poor”).
The continuity assumption of the welfare weight distribution W is consistent with the
continuum-type (or large-market) model, as each type is supposed to be atomless. The assumption is weaker than its counterpart in the literature. For example, Ledyard and Palfrey [14, 15]
and DKA [6] assume absolute continuity of W. Allowing for singular W, we can consider
situations where the planner cares only about a measure-zero set of types.

2.2.2

Incorporation of Externalities

We can modify the model to incorporate a kind of externalities without altering any of our
results. Let : [0, 1]2 ! R be a measurable function. Suppose that, when an individual’s net
acquisition of the good is equal to a quantity Q(t0 ) 2 [ 1, B] (through acting as type t0 given
allocation Q), the externality of this acquisition spilled over to any other individual of type t,
for any t 2 [0, 1], is equal to (t, t0 )Q(t0 ). This corresponds to a situation where the externality
spilled over to an individual from the others’ actions is evaluated according to the type of both
players. For instance, in the context where the good is the access to Covid-vaccines, it is
plausible that the more one is willing to get himself inoculated, the more strongly he believes
that his health is a↵ected by a person who is less willing to get inoculated since the latter cares
less about the covid consequences and is more likely to spread the virus. In that case, (·, ·)
is increasing in the first term and decreasing in the second term. However, the model does
not apply to situations where an individual’s evaluation of the externality spilled over to him
depends on some other personal characteristics in addition to his willingness to pay.9
In this model with externalities, the
R 1 aggregate externality spilled over to an individual of
type t, given allocation Q, is equal to 0 (t, t0 )Q(t0 )dF(t0 ), which is a function of the player’s
own type t. The design constraints remain the same as in the original model since externalities
are not controlled by any individual, and the social planner’s objective becomes
!
Z 1
Z 1
0
0
0
tQ(t) p(t) +
(t, t )Q(t )dF(t ) dW(t).
(2.2)
0

2.3

0

The Budget Balance Condition

As is well-known in the market or mechanism design literature of bilateral trades (Myerson
and Satterthwaite [20], Ledyard and Palfrey [15], DKA [6], etc.), the main source of complication in characterizing the optimal mechanisms is the budget balance (BB) constraint. In the
literature, the possibility that the constraint is binding cannot be ruled out a priori. When it
is binding, characterization of the optimal mechanisms depends on endogenous variables and
9

See Akbarpour et al. [1] for a model that applies to such a situation.
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hence cannot be generally described purely in terms of the primitives. In our model, by contrast, the constraint is never binding, as long as the allocation is incentive compatible (namely,
weakly increasing) and market clearing:
Theorem 1 For any weakly increasing allocation Q : [0, 1] ! R that satisfies the market
clearing condition, there exists a payment rule p : [0, 1] ! R with which (Q, p) satisfies IR, IC
and BB.
Proved in Appendix A.1, Theorem 1 is driven by our assumption that each individual is
free to choose between buying and selling. To understand the theorem, let us rewind the complication in the previous literature, where an individual is assumed to have no such freedom.
Consider any IC allocation in the previous literature. Let c1 be the highest type among those
who get to sell a positive quantity of the good, and c2 the lowest type among those who get
to buy a positive quantity of the good, according to this allocation. If c1  c2 then the social
planner can easily implement this allocation in a manner that satisfies BB and IR. For example, she can use the payment rule that maximizes her profit among those that implement the
allocation in a manner that satisfies IR. Given this payment rule, one can show that the per unit
price o↵ered to any buyer is no less than c2 . The intuitive reason is that, by the definition of c2 ,
almost every buyer’s type—marginal utility of the good—is above c2 . Likewise, the payment
rule does not pay a seller a unit price more than c1 , as a seller’s type—marginal cost—is below c1 . Thus the planner’s profit is no less than c2 times the aggregate demand subtracted by c1
times the aggregate supply. With market clearance and c1  c2 , this profit is nonnegative and
hence the planner’s budget is balanced.
The problem, however, is that c1  c2 cannot be guaranteed when individuals are not free
to choose between buying and selling. Had they been free to do so, c1 > c2 would violate IC,
as the buyer-types in (c2 , c1 ) value the good less than some seller-types in (c2 , c1 ) and so such
buyers and sellers would rather switch roles. When individuals are not free to choose between
buying and selling, by contrast, they cannot undo c1 > c2 by switching between buying and
selling. When c1 > c2 , the planner may need to pay more per unit of procurement than she
charges per unit of sales. But that would break her budget unless the planner compromises
on some other aspects of the allocation. Thus the BB constraint may be binding at an optimal
mechanism. In our model, by contrast, individuals are free to switch between buying and
selling and hence only allocations with c1  c2 can be IC. Thus, as in the previous paragraph,
the BB constraint is automatically satisfied.
In a nutshell, Theorem 1 comes from the simple fact that, in a market where everyone is
free to switch between buying and selling, any buyer’s marginal value of the good is higher
than any seller’s marginal cost of supplying it. The social planner can therefore profit from
buying the good from the sellers and selling it to the buyers.
Due to Theorem 1, our design problem is reduced to an optimization among allocations
without the IR and BB constraints:
Corollary 1 A mechanism (Q⇤ , p⇤ ) is an optimal mechanism if and only if Q⇤ solves
R1
maxQ 0 QVdF
s.t. Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, B] is weakly increasing
R1
QdF = 0,
0

(2.3)
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where V : [0, 1] ! R is the virtual surplus function defined by, for any t 2 [0, 1],
V(t) := t

W(t) F(t)
.
f (t)

(2.4)

To prove the corollary, use the usual routine of envelope theorem and integration by parts to
show (Lemma 11, Appendix A.2) that a mechanism (Q⇤ , p⇤ ) is an optimal mechanism
(a soluR1
⇤
tion to the design problem defined in Section 2.2) if and only if Q maximizes 0 Q(t)V(t)dF(t)
among all weakly
increasing allocations Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, B] subject to two conditions: (i) marR1
ket clears ( 0 QdF = 0), and (ii) there exists a payment rule that implements Q with respect to
the IR and BB constraints. Condition (ii), by Theorem 1, is guaranteed by Condition (i) and the
monotonicity of the allocation. Thus, the maximization problem is equivalent to Problem (2.3),
and hence the corollary follows.
Following the same routine, one can prove (Appendix A.3) that the planner’s problem is
exactly the same as (2.3) in the modified model with externalities defined in Section 2.2.2.
Corollary 2 In the modified model with externalities such that the social planner’s objective
is (2.2) instead of (2.1), an allocation is optimal
if and only if it solves Problem (2.3) with the
R1
virtual surplus function be Ṽ(t) := V(t) + 0 (t, t0 )Q(t0 )dF(t0 ).

2.4

Optimal Mechanisms

Problem (2.3), with a harmless change of variables, is the same as the single-market monopoly
problem considered by Bulow and Roberts [3] subject to the market clearing constraint. As
has been understood in the literature, the virtual surplus V(t) corresponds to the monopolist’s
marginal revenue extracted from type-t individuals. The problem can be solved by the standard
ironing method.
If a single price ⌧ per unit is o↵ered to all individuals without quantity restrictions, so that
every type above ⌧ would buy B units of the Rgood, and every type below ⌧ would sell
⇣ one
⌘ unit
1
B
1
thereof, then the market clearing condition 0 QdF = 0 is satisfied i↵ ⌧ = F
. Thus
B+1
⇣ ⌘
B
we call F 1 B+1
market-clearing price. With the marginal revenue interpretation of V(t), it is
clear that a posted price equal to the market clearing price attains the optimality of (2.3) if the
marginal revenue of any type below the market-clearing price is no higher than the marginal
revenue of any
the market-clearing price. In other words, the posted price is optimal
⇣ type
⇣ above
⌘⌘
B
1
if V(·) V F
is single-crossing on [0, 1].
B+1
Without the single-crossing condition, there may be a type below the market-clearing price
that contributes a larger marginal revenue than some type above the price does. To exploit the
larger marginal revenues of such lower types without violating the monotonicity (IC) condition of the allocation, the planner needs to find an appropriate interval [a, b] that contains the
market-clearing price and treat the types in [a, b] equally. As long as the average marginal
revenue in [a, b] is not less than the average marginal revenue in [0, a), and not greater than
that in (b, 1], the planner can attain optimality through stratifying the types into at most three
tiers:10 Types in [0, a) sell and types in (b, 1] buy, each in full capacity, while types in (a, b) are
10

By a tier in an incentive compatible (and hence monotone) allocation Q : [0, 1] ! R, we mean the inverse
image Q 1 (s) of some s in the range of Q such that Q 1 (s) is a nondegenerate interval.
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rationed a constant quantity that clears the market. This characterization is formalized by the
next theorem, proved in Appendix A.5.
Theorem 2 (i) There exists an optimal mechanism consisting of an allocation
8
>
1
if 0  t < a
>
>
>
< F(a) B(1 F(b))
⇤
if a < t < b
Q (t) := >
F(b) F(a)
>
>
>
: B
if b < t  1,
where 0  a  F

1

⇣

B
B+1

(2.5)

⌘

 b  1, and a payment rule that has at most two prices and entails
⇣
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
rationing only on (a, b). (ii) If the function V(·) V F 1 B+1
is single-crossing on [0, 1], then
8
⇣ ⌘
B
1
>
>
< 1 if 0  ⇣t < F⌘
B+1
Q (t) = >
>
: B if F 1 B < t  1,
B+1
⇤

and the payment rule becomes a posted price equal to F
rebate.

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘

(2.6)

without rationing or lump sum

Theorem 2 implies that an optimal allocation exists and it is a tiered allocation
⇣ consisting
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
of at most three tiers. Moreover, when the single crossing condition of V V F 1 B+1
is
satisfied, the optimal
has only two tiers and is implemented by o↵ering the market⇣ allocation
⌘
B
clearing price F 1 B+1
to everyone. Allocating the full capacity ( 1 or B) to each buyeror seller-type, the optimal allocation does not entail rationing. It is easy to check that the
posted price yields zero profit for the planner (since the allocation satisfies the market clearing
condition), and hence the optimal mechanism has no lump sum rebate. Note that the singlecrossing condition can be satisfied by even non-monotone virtual surplus functions.
For the three-tier allocation (2.5), the interval (a, b) can be constructed from the primitives
with the definition of ironing. As shown in the proof (Appendix A.5), when (2.6) is not⇣ op-⌘
B
timal, the interval (a, b) for (2.5) to be optimal contains the market-clearing price F 1 B+1
as an interior point. From the envelope formula one can derive the optimal payment rule that
implements (2.5), described by the next corollary (proved in Appendix A.6).
⇣ ⌘
B
Corollary 3 For any a, b 2 [0, 1] such that a < F 1 B+1
< b, the mechanism that consists of
allocation (2.5) and any optimal payment rule that implements (2.5) transfers a positive lump
sum constant to all types and entails rationing only on (a, b) with the rationed quantity
x :=

F(a) B (1 F(b))
,
F(b) F(a)

(2.7)

and the payment rule can be replaced without loss by the combination of the said lump sum
transfer and two distinct per-unit prices specified below:
i. if x 0, each type in [0, a) sells one unit at the price equal to a, each in (a, b) buys the
quantity x at the price equal to a per unit, and each in (b, 1] buys the quantity B at the
price b (b a)x/B per unit;
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ii. if x  0, each type in [0, a) sells one unit at the price equal to a (b a)x per unit, each
in (a, b) sells the quantity |x| at the price equal to b per unit, and each in (b, 1] buys the
quantity B at the price b per unit.
The next theorem (proved in Appendix A.7) says that the optimal allocation characterized
above is unique given a nondegenerate set of parameter values. Thus, not only is there no need
to stratify the types into more than three tiers, often it is also suboptimal to do so. Combined
with the single-crossing condition in the previous theorem, Theorem 3 implies that under robust conditions of the primitives—allowing for some cases of non-monotone virtual surplus
functions—there exists a unique optimal allocation and it is implemented by a single posted
price without the help of rationing or lump sum transfers.
Theorem 3 If there exists no positive-measure subset S of [0, 1] such that V is constant on S ,
the optimal allocation is unique (modulo measure zero).
To see the role played by the non-constancy assumption of V, consider a case where the
rationed interval (a, b) in (2.5) is a proper subset of another interval (a0 , b0 ) in [0, 1] such that V
restricted on (a0 , b0 ) \ (a, b) happens to be constantly equal to the average marginal revenue
on (a, b). Then the rationed interval can be extended from (a, b) to any (a00 , b00 ) for which
a0  a00  a < b  b00  b0 without undermining the optimality of the allocation, as it is the
average marginal revenue within a set of types that determines how much the planner would
prioritize the set. Such cases are ruled out by the non-constancy assumption.
Whether there can be multiple optimal allocations or not, any optimal allocation requires
stratifying the type space into at least two tiers:
Corollary 4 Egalitarian allocations (Q = 0 a.e. [0, 1], or autarky) are never optimal.
The proof of the corollary (Appendix A.6) uses an observation in the proof of Theorem 2.
The intuition is simply that there is always a gain of trade between the sufficiently low types
and the sufficiently high ones. When a type t near zero supplies a unit of the good, the cost to
the society is V(t) ⇡ 0. When a type t0 near the supremum type acquires a unit of the good, the
social benefit is V(t0 ) ⇡ 1.

2.5

Posted Price versus Rationing

The previous section shows that any optimal mechanisms—supported as a Pareto frontier point
by some continuous welfare weight distribution—can be simplified to one of only two alternatives: It is either the posted-price system, implementing the two-tier allocation (2.6), or a
rationing system that implements a three-tier allocation (2.5) and entails rationing on the middle tier. This section shows who gains, and who loses, when the mechanism switches from one
kind to the other, each being Pareto optimal. We shall also see whose welfare weight plays a
crucial role in the social planner’s choice between the two alternatives.
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2.5.1

Who Gains and Who Loses from Rationing

It is intuitive that the types near the market-clearing price F

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘

gain when the mechanism
⇣ ⌘
B
switches from the posted price to rationing. Given the posted price, which is equal to F 1 B+1
,
⇣ ⌘
B
the type F 1 B+1 gets zero net payo↵ whether it buys or sells the good, as its valuation of the
good is equal to the type. The type has no other source of surplus because the posted-price
system, essentially a competitive equilibrium, yields no profit for the planner to rebate to the
individuals. Given rationing, by contrast, the type has at least a positive lump sum rebate
as part of its surplus. The lump sum is positive because the planner gets a positive
⇣ ⌘ profit from
B
1
rationing on the middle tier (a, b) that contains the market-clearing price F
as an interior
B+1
point: The planner hexploits⇣ her⌘⌘monopsony power in squeezing the range of her full-capacity
B
procurement from 0, F 1 B+1
to [0, a), and monopoly power in squeezing the range of her
h
⇣ ⌘ i
⇣ ⌘
B
B
1
1
full-capacity sales from F
,
1
to
(b,
1].
Thus,
the
type
F
gains strictly when the
B+1
B+1
mechanism changes from the posted price to rationing. By continuity, so do the nearby types.
The more complicated question is which types get hurt in order for such middle types to
gain. While the general answer may depend on the parameter values, we can tell whether the
high or the low types are definitely worse-o↵ based on the curvature of the type distribution F
around the market-clearing price. According to the next theorem, if the distribution F of types
is convex on the middle tier in a rationing mechanism, the low types—those who get to sell at
full capacity in both mechanisms—are definitely worse-o↵ when the posted price is replaced
by the rationing mechanism: In Figure 2.1, on the set [0, a) of low types, the red dotted line—
the surplus given rationing—lies below the blue solid line—the surplus given the posted price.
If F is concave on the middle tier, by contrast, the high types—those who get to buy at full
capacity in both mechanisms—are definitely worse-o↵: In Figure 2.2, the red dotted line lies
below the blue solid line on (b, 1], the set of high types.
Theorem 4 If the allocation in an optimal mechanism switches from the⇣ two-tier
(2.6) to a
⌘
B
1
three-tier (2.5) that entails rationing on some (a, b) for which 0 < a < F
< b < 1, then:
B+1
⇣ ⌘
B
a. all the types sufficiently near to the market-clearing price F 1 B+1
are better-o↵;
b. if F is convex on (a, b), any type in [0, a) is worse-o↵;

c. if F is concave on (a, b), any type in (b, 1] is worse-o↵.
Theorem 4 is proved in Appendix A.8. To understand the less intuitive parts, Claims (b)
and (c), let us consider a stochastic counterpart to the rationing allocation (2.5): For each
individual, the allocation is randomly selected independently so that it is
(
1 if t 2 [0, a]
Qa (t) :=
B if t 2 (a, 1]
with probability (1 + x)/(B + 1), and
Qb (t) :=

(

1 if t 2 [0, b]
B if t 2 (b, 1]
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Surplus

0

a

⇣
⌘
B
F 1 B+1

Type
b

1

Figure 2.1: Posted-price (blue solid) vs. rationing (red dotted) given convex F

with probability 1 (1+ x)/(B+1), where x is determined by (2.7). By the choice of x, F(a)(1+
x)/(B + 1) + F(b) (1 (1 + x)/(B + 1)) = B/(B + 1). That is, from the ex ante or the social
planner’s viewpoint, the expected quantity to procure from the individual is equal to B/(B + 1).
By the same token, the expected quantity to sell to the individual is equal to B/(B + 1). Thus,
when the same lottery is run independently for all individuals, supply is equal to demand in the
aggregate level. Note that from each (privately informed) individual’s viewpoint, the stochastic
allocation is equivalent to the rationing allocation (2.5).
The stochastic allocation can be implemented by the corresponding stochastic payment
rule: To each individual, if the lottery picks Qa then o↵er to him a price equal to a per unit for
the individual to buy or sell the good in full capacity; if the lottery picks Qb then analogously
o↵er him the price b per unit for buying and selling. One readily sees that this stochastic
payment rule cannot generate any positive expected profit for the social planner, as a posted
price leaves no rent to the planner.11
Thus, under any optimal mechanism that implements the stochastic allocation, which is
required to be budget balanced, the payment rule di↵ers from the stochastic payment rule, in
expectation, only by a lump sum transfer to the individuals that is a nonpositive constant across
types. Consequently, each individual’s expected revenue under any optimal mechanism of the
stochastic allocation, or equivalently the rationing allocation, is bounded from above by the
expected revenue he receives from the stochastic payment rule, as the latter has yet to count
the nonpositive lump sum transfer. In other words, the expected revenue for a type in [0, a) is
bounded from above by the convex combination between a and b according to the probability
mix in the lottery. This convex combination is labeled by the red dot in Figure 2.3. As shown
1
in Figure 2.3, when F is convex ⇣on (a,
⌘ b) and hence F concave on (F(a), F(b)), the conB
vex combination is less than F 1 B+1
. This is simply due to Jensen’s inequality. Intuitively
⇣ ⌘
B
speaking, if F is the uniform distribution, the market-clearing cuto↵ value F 1 B+1
would be
equal to the cuto↵ quantile B/(B + 1). Now make F convex around the cuto↵. That means
moving a mass of types from below the cuto↵ to above the cuto↵. Consequently, the cuto↵
11

Furthermore, the expected profit generated by the stochastic payment rule is negative. To see that, notice
there exists excess supply under the market with the high price b and excess demand under the market with the
low price a. Thus, the planner buys the excess supply at a high price and sells the excess demand at a low price,
so she must earns a negative profit with the market clearing condition.
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Surplus

a

0

F

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘

Type
b

1

Figure 2.2: Posted-price (blue solid) vs. rationing (red dotted) given concave F
Type
F

1

⇣

b⌘

B
B+1

F

1

a
Quantile
0

F(a)

B
B+1

F(b)

1

Figure 2.3: The red dot: Expected revenue upper bound for low types
⇣ ⌘
B
value F 1 B+1
, whose quantile is supposed to B/(B + 1), needs to be adjusted upward. Since
⇣ ⌘
B
F 1 B+1
is the revenue for any type in [0, a) under the deterministic posted-price system without rationing, the type receives less expected surplus in the rationing mechanism than in the
posted-price system, as claimed in Part (b) of the theorem. Part (c) of the theorem is analogous
from the perspective of the high types in (b, 1].

2.5.2

The Welfare Weight of the Market-Clearing Price

Since the middle types around the market-clearing price gain from rationing (Part (a) of Theorem 4), it is natural that the heavier is the welfare weight on such middle types, the more is
the social planner leaning towards a rationing mechanism. To formalize that, for any welfare
weight distributions W and W⇤ , let us say—
⇣ ⌘
h
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
B
• W⇤ is a spread of W away from F 1 B+1
i↵ W⇤ W on 0, F 1 B+1
and W⇤  W on
⇣
⇣ ⌘ i
B
F 1 B+1
,1 ;
⇣ ⌘
h
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
B
• W⇤ is a contraction of W towards F 1 B+1
i↵ W⇤  W on 0, F 1 B+1
and W⇤ W on
⇣
⇣ ⌘ i
B
1
F
,1 .
B+1
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Intuitively speaking, a spread away from F

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘

moves some welfare weights around the
⇣ ⌘
B
market-clearing cuto↵ type to the higher and lower types, and a contraction towards F 1 B+1
does the opposite. The next theorem shows that the two operations have opposite e↵ect on the
optimality of the posted-price system.
Theorem 5 Suppose that the posted-price system is optimal given a welfare weight distribution W. Then:
⇣ ⌘
B
a. if W⇤ is a spread of W away from F 1 B+1
, then the posted-price system is optimal
given W⇤ being the welfare weight distribution;
⇣ ⌘
B
b. for any ✏ > 0 there exists a contraction W⇤ of W towards F 1 B+1
such that kW⇤
Wkmax  ✏ and the posted-price system is not optimal given W⇤ being the welfare weight
distribution.
Theorem 5 is proved in Appendix A.9. Its intuition, as mentioned above, has been suggested by Part (a) of Theorem 4. We can get a more explicit intuition by adopting DKA’s [6]
rich-vs-poor interpretation of the welfare weight distribution. According to DKA, the density of the welfare weight distribution at a type t corresponds to the average marginal utility of
money among the individuals whose marginal rate of substitution of the good relative
⇣ ⌘ to money
B
is equal to t (cf. Section 2.2.1). When W spreads the weight away from F 1 B+1
, the types
⇣ ⌘
B
near F 1 B+1
are having lower marginal utilities of money in average and hence there is less
a need for redistributing money transfers to such types through deviating
from the zero-rebate
⇣ ⌘
B
1
posted-price system. When W contracts the weight towards F
, by contrast, the nearby
B+1
types value money more in average, which strengthens the need to make money transfers to
them through moving away from the posted-price system.

2.6
2.6.1

Examples
The Cantor Welfare Weight Distribution

Suppose that the type distribution F is the uniform distribution U[0, 1] on [0, 1], and that the
welfare weight distribution W is the Cantor-Lebesgue function ', so the support of the distribution is the (ternary) Cantor set.12 By the well-known properties of the Cantor-Lebesgue
function, ' is a continuous cdf that assigns positive welfare weights only to the (ternary) Cantor
set, which is of zero (Lebesgue) measure, and ' increases at unbounded rates on the Cantor set.
Thus the social planner cares only about a set of types of zero measure, and her redistributive
preferences cannot be described by welfare densities (or the “Pareto weights” in DKA [6]).
Plug W = ' and F = U[0, 1] into (2.4) to obtain the virtual surplus function V:
V(t) = 2t

'(t)

for all t 2 [0, 1]. It is obvious that V is not monotone, whose graph is depicted in Figure 2.4.
Nonetheless, our result applies. There are countably many intervals in [0, 1] on which
12

See Royden and Fitzpatrick [24, Section 2.7] for the definition and properties of the Cantor set and the
Cantor-Lebesgue function.
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Figure 2.4: The virtual surplus given the Cantor welfare weight distribution

Figure 2.5: The ironed virtual surplus given the Cantor welfare weights
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V = V because V is single-crossing at any point in those intervals. Examples of such monotone intervals are the one in the middle which is approximately [0.4, 0.6], the one to the left,
approximately [0.15, 0.2], the one to the right, approximately [0.825, 0.875], and so on (FigB
ure 2.5). If the market-clearing price B+1
belongs to any of such monotone intervals, the optimal
B
B
allocation is uniquely the two-tier stratification with B+1
being the buyer-seller cuto↵. Else, B+1
is interior to an interval where V needs to be ironed, and a three-tier allocation is optimal. Furthermore, this is the unique optimal allocation by Theorem 3, as the inverse image V 1 (x) is of
zero measure for any x 2 [0, 1].
Although almost all types carry zero welfare weight according to the Cantor-Lebesgue
function, one readily
⇣ ⌘ sees that the optimal mechanism gives positive surpluses to all types (exB
cept type F 1 B+1
when the posted-price system is optimal). That is because the IC condition
⇣ ⌘
B
requires that the surplus for any type be at least as large as the surplus for type F 1 B+1
, the
buyer-seller cuto↵.

2.6.2

Queuing for Covid-Vaccination

Our model is equivalent to the following exchange economy up to normalization. Every (atomless) individual is endowed with one unit of the good, individuals can sell any fraction of their
endowments for money, and each can consume up to B + 1 units of the good. The good can be
interpreted as the access to a limited public resource an equal share of which everyone is initially entitled to. Individuals’ types are their willingness to pay for the access to the resource.
The social planner’s welfare weight distribution W need not be aligned with the distribution F
of the willingness to pay. Our model then applies and the planner’s optimality can be achieved
by a market-like mechanism where individuals trade their shares of the public resource given
a menu containing at most three price-quantity contracts.
To be explicit, let us apply the idea to the allocation of Covid-vaccines. While a social
planner often has explicit preferences over who should receive the vaccines before others and
hence might want to prioritize vaccine allocation according to the groups (Akbarpour et al. [1];
Sömet et al. [26]), it has often been reported that individuals of the same priority level (e.g.,
healthcare workers) are heterogeneous in their vaccine willingness or hesitancy. Thus, let us focus on the issue about the limited supply of Covid-vaccines on one hand and the heterogeneous
willingness to vaccination within the same priority group on the other.13
For a stylized model to capture this issue, normalize to one the measure of the population
in a priority group, and suppose that the quantity of Covid-vaccines available to this population
is equal to ↵ 2 (0, 1). (In other words, with the available quantity, only up to a fraction ↵ of the
population gets to be inoculated.) Suppose that an individual’s willingness to get vaccinated is
represented by a type t 2 [0, 1], drawn from a cdf F. Assume that, if q is the probability for an
individual to get a full inoculation, m his net monetary receipt, and each individual of type t0 is
allocated a probability q̃(t0 ) of getting fully inoculated, then the type-t individual’s gross payo↵
13

Akbarpour et al. [1] consider both the issue of within-group heterogeneity and the planner’s cross-group
preferences in vaccine distributions. We consider only the within-group heterogeneity issue to focus on how it can
be solved by simple market mechanisms once the quantity of vaccines available to a group has been determined.
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is equal to
qt + m + (t)

Z

0

1

q̃(t0 )dF(t0 ).

That is, we adopt the modified model with externalities in Section 2.2.2, with the caveat noted
in that section. For instance, a strictly increasing corresponds to situations where the more
individuals are willing to get vaccinated themselves the more they wish to push others to get
vaccinated.
Since the population is of the same priority group, at the outset everyone is entitled to an
equal access to vaccination. That is, any individual is entitled to a probability ↵ of getting
inoculated. Implicitly, each member of the population is initially issued a coupon, so that one
coupon gives a person the probability ↵ of getting vaccinated.
The Covid-vaccine distribution system in the real world often rely on individuals to sign up
and wait for the call, or to search for available vaccination stations themselves. That, roughly
speaking, corresponds in our stylized model to a mechanism that bans individuals from trading
their coupons and rations the vaccines to those who show up after each having borne a sunk
cost c. Consequently, only the types above c show up. Either the mass 1 F(c) of those who
show up exceeds the available quantity ↵ of vaccines, or 1 F(c) < ↵. In the former case, some
of those who show up do not get inoculated and their sunk cost is wasted. In the latter case, the
excess quantity of vaccines is wasted because Covid-vaccines, at least up to this time, cannot
be stored for long.
Alternatively, the government could minimize the signup and search cost c to a negligible
level—as the US government did in issuing the stimulus checks to taxpayers—and consider allowing eligible individuals to trade their entitled access to the vaccine. If trade is not allowed,
with c reduced to zero, the entire population shows up and the vaccines are rationed to them
randomly, which is not optimal (Corollary 4). To allow for trade, the government could issue
digital coupons to individuals, one unit to each, to represent their initial entitlements to inoculation. Then individuals can trade any fraction of their coupons so that a person who shows
up with a quantity q of coupons gets to be inoculated with probability equal to q↵. To ensure
vaccination for sure, a person needs only to hold a quantity 1/↵ of coupons. Thus, the quantity
of coupons that a person needs to acquire, in addition to the one unit the person is endowed
with, does not need to exceed 1/↵ 1. That is,
B=

1
↵

1.

A mechanism can be represented by (Q, P) such that Q(t) is the quantity of coupons that
a type-t person acquires from others, and P(t) his net payment.14 Then a type-t individual’s
expected gross payo↵ from claiming to be type t0 is equal to
Z 1
0
0
Q(t ) + 1 ↵t P(t ) + (t)
↵ (Q(s) + 1) dF(s)
0
!
Z 1
1 0
0
= ↵ Q(t )t
P(t ) +↵t + ↵ (t) + ↵
(t)Q(s)dF(s).
↵
0
|
{z
}
u(t0 ,t|Q,P)

14

Negative Q(t) means selling the corresponding quantity, and negative P(t) means being paid.

2.6. Examples

23

Thus, any type t’s decision is equivalent to maximizing the expected net payo↵ u(t0 , t|Q, P)
among all t0 . This, coupled with Corollary 2, implies that the social planner’s design objective
is equivalent to an integral of the truthtelling expected net payo↵ u(t, t|Q, P) across all types t
measured by some welfare weight distribution W. Thus our result applies and, if it entails
(Q⇤ , p⇤ ) as the mechanism, the planner would construct the payment rule P⇤ by P⇤ := ↵p⇤ .
If W = F, namely, the social planner is neutral across types, then V(t) = t for all ⇣t and⌘
B
the optimal mechanism is a single posted price equal to the market-clearing price F 1 B+1
(= F 1 (1 ↵)). That is, if the planner has no redistribution bias across types, she would opt
for the free-market solution to distribute vaccines within the same priority group. In reality,
however, the planner often puts heavier welfare weights on some types than on others. For
instance, suppose that individuals’ types represent their comorbidity-rates of Covid and that
the type-distribution F is concave (say due to the Omicron variant, higher comorbidity occurs
less frequently). Meanwhile, suppose that the social planner puts heavier weights on types of
higher comorbidity rates, because higher comorbidity entails heavier social costs to healthcare,
so much so that the welfare weight distribution W is convex.15 Thus, F is concave and W
convex. This, coupled with a technical condition that the Radon-Nikodym derivative w of W
is bounded from above by 2, implies that the virtual surplus function is increasing and so
the social planner would stay with the free-market solution (Theorem 2.ii). Even without the
technical condition of w and the global concavity of F, as long as F is concave around the
market-clearing cuto↵ type, Part (c) of Theorem 4 would still imply that the planner is unlikely
to forgo the free-market solution, because any other mechanism, entailing rationing, would
hurt the high-comorbidity types that she cares about.
Even when the free-market solution (posted-price system) is not optimal, the planner can
still achieve optimality through a market-like mechanism that uses at most two distinct prices
and entails rationing on only one tier among the types (Theorem 2 and Corollary 3). For
example, when the rationed quantity x in the optimal allocation (2.5) is positive, the planner
can set the price for coupons to be a dollars each for those who want to sell their coupons, and
o↵er to those who want to acquire coupons a menu of two options, one to buy B coupons at
the unit price equal to b x(b a)/B (thereby guaranteeing vaccination for sure), the other to
buy x coupons at the unit price a (thereby getting vaccinated with probability (x + 1)↵).
Contrary to the vaccine wastefulness problem of the mechanisms in current practice, none
of the optimal allocations prescribed above leaves any vaccine unused. That is due to the
market clearing condition satisfied by the optimal allocations. According to (2.5), the total
quantity of demand for vaccination within the priority group is equal to
((B + 1) (1 F(b)) + (x + 1) (F(b) F(a))) ↵
= (B (1 F(b)) + x (F(b) F(a)) + 1 F(b) + F(b) F(a)) ↵
= (1 · F(a) + 1 F(b) + F(b) F(a)) ↵ (market clearing)
= ↵,
which is equal to the total quantity of vaccine supply available to the group.
The bottom line is: A market-like Covid-vaccine distribution mechanism, which sets at
most two prices for vaccination entitlements to stratify the population of a same priority group
15

We thank the associate editor for suggesting comorbidity as a direction to interpret the welfare weights.
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into at most three tiers and uses rationing to at most one of the three, would outperform the
current within-group egalitarian rationing mechanism.

2.7

Conclusion

It is common that individuals start on an equal footing and end with di↵erent outcomes, just
because of the idiosyncrasy in one’s ability, taste or pure luck. It is also common that such inequality in the outcomes, like it or not, is often class-oriented, grouping individuals into several
tiers and treating the members of each roughly indiscriminately. This paper provides a mathematical fable for such stratification among humanity. It says that, even in the idealized situation
where the society is framed in an interim incentive-constrained Pareto optimal manner, stratification is still unavoidable and, in fact, necessary for the social wellbeing. Meanwhile, our
finding implies that stratification of more than three tiers is unnecessary, and often suboptimal.
Consequently, while the people should be stratified into at least two tiers and, due to the market
clearing condition, there should be at least one tier for the haves and another for the have-nots,
oftentimes there should not be more than two subdivisions in either category. Thus, while the
bisection of the rich into East Egg and West Egg, under the penetrating pen of F. Scott Fitzgerald, may be understood as part of a three-tier optimal allocation, any further subdivision of
either Egg is likely suboptimal.
An insight from this study is that, in a large market where individuals are free to choose
between buying and selling, a single competitive market price—without the help from any
other instruments such as rationing, redistribution or tier-specific prices—is often capable of
implementing interim Pareto optimality despite the presence of asymmetric information. It
should be emphasized that such robustness of the competitive market is not an artifice of any
specific social welfare criterion say a pro-market value system; but rather it holds true for a
wide variety of welfare weight distributions that may favor one type or another, as long as
the welfare weight is not overly contracted towards the market-clearing cuto↵ type. From
such a relatively value-free perspective, one could understand the institutional evolution in
the United States regarding the allocation of the radio frequency spectrum, from hearings and
lotteries to market-like auctions, as a movement towards the Pareto frontier that should still
have happened even if the policymaker’s objective is something other than to raise revenues or
to develop the wireless industries. From the same perspective one could see a robust normative
force towards market-oriented solutions to problems of prioritizing citizens for the access to
limited resources, be they Covid vaccines or magnet schools.
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Chapter 3
Pareto Optimality of Allocating the Bad
3.1

Introduction

The decision on where to locate a Nimby—a “not in my backyard” type of noxious facility—
has been considered as a procurement auction by Kunreuther and Kleindorfer [8], with alternative locations treated as bidders for the contract of hosting the Nimby. What has not been
considered theoretically is why the Nimby should exist at all and be located somewhere. An
answer to this question in general would require comparison between the Nimby’s public good
to the society and its private bad to its host. While the private bad is usually apparent, its public
good is far from obvious. Debates about the net public benefit of a Nimby are often contentious (e.g., the location of an oil pipeline terminal in Canada), and the conclusion thereof
results more from endogenous politics than exogenous nature. In this paper we treat a Nimby
as purely a private bad to its host, assuming away its public good and allowing the planner to
do away with a Nimby at no cost. Since our conclusion is that it is interim Pareto optimal to
allocate such a pure bad to someone sometimes, the argument for the necessity of a Nimby can
only strengthen if its public benefit is taken into account.
We thus abstract a Nimby into a bad, an item that gives its recipient a utility below the
outside option and has no e↵ect on the utility of anyone else. Other than Nimbies, a bad can
also be the status of being excluded from an otherwise publicly available service that has been
taken for granted. This paper develops a mechanism design method to characterize the set of
primitives given which allocating a bad to some society members is necessary to achieve social
optimality.
To reduce the arbitrariness in parameters, we assume quasilinear preferences and independent private values (IPV) as usual in mechanism design. Suppose that receiving the bad means
a negative payo↵ ti to player i whose realized type is ti 2 R+ and, if in addition i receives a
money transfer m, i’s payo↵ is equal to ti + m. For anyone to be willing to receive the bad, the
society needs to compensate the recipient with money. To raise funds for such compensation,
there needs to be a good available for allocation as well that gives its recipient a utility above
the outside option. An example can be the privilege of hosting a popular game (whose externalities to other regions we assume away as we do to the Nimby). To minimize the departure
from the standard, unidimensional-type framework, we assume that if player i gets the good
with probability qA and the bad with probability qB , combined with net money receipt m 2 R,
27
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i’s expected payo↵ is equal to (qA qB )ti + m.1
Nothing in this setup forces the allocation of the bad. In fact, one readily sees that never
allocating the bad, coupled with allocating the good to the highest realized type, is ex ante
incentive efficient.2 However, even if they have agreed on this allocation ex ante, some players
may have second thoughts during the interim, when each is privately informed of one’s own
type. In the context of universal healthcare coverage, for instance, a player who turns out to be
extremely healthy would rather opt out of the coverage in return for money and may push for
such an alternative. Thus the allocation that the society ends with depends on the bargaining
power across player-types during the interim. In the spirit of Holmström and Myerson’s [5] interim incentive efficiency (IIE), let us think of any idealized outcome of this interim bargaining
process as if it were an optimum chosen by a social planner whose objective, or social welfare,
is a weighted sum of the interim expected payo↵s across player-types, with the various welfare weights of player-types capturing their bargaining power relative to one another.3 Thus
the question becomes, in an environment where never allocating the bad is part of an ex ante
incentive efficient allocation, under what condition of the welfare weight distribution is the bad
allocated with strictly positive probabilities in all mechanisms that maximize the social welfare
subject to incentive compatibility (IC), individual rationality (IR) and budget balance (BB)?
IIE has been investigated in various models by Dworczak, Kominers and Akbarpour [3],
Gresik [4], Laussel and Palfrey [9], Ledyard and Palfrey [10, 11], Pérez-Nievas [20] and Wilson [23]. Although the bad has no counterpart in these models except [11], and allocation of
the bad is not the focus in [11],4 from their characterizations one could get an intuition that
introducing a bad might enlarge the social welfare. The typical pattern is that types are ranked
according to their virtual surpluses, with types of higher ranks getting the good with higher
probabilities, provided that their virtual surpluses are nonnegative and the incentive constraints
non-binding. Thus, it appears natural that types with negative virtual surpluses should be allocated a bad, if available, since the bad is opposite to the good.
For this intuition to lead to a primitive condition under which the bad is allocated, however,
one needs to handle the discontinuity of the virtual surplus function at any type whose allocation switches from getting the good in expectation to getting the bad in expectation. Thus,
if the designer allocates the bad to the types whose virtual surpluses from getting the good
are negative, she may be making a mistake because the virtual surpluses of these types from
getting the bad should have been calculated di↵erently. The complication comes from the endogenous buyer-seller role for each player. If a player’s type is likely to be allocated the good
in the mechanism under consideration, the player acting as a buyer of the good would understate his type. By contrast, if his type is likely a recipient of the bad, the player acting as a
1

The paper can be easily generalized to the case where (qA qB )ti + m is replaced by (qA ↵i qB )ti + m for
some commonly known, player-specific parameter ↵i 2 (0, 1).
2
See Footnote 14 or Corollary 7 for a proof on the ex ante incentive efficiency of this allocation. That implies
the allocation is also interim and ex post incentive efficient given appropriate welfare weight distributions (cf.
Holmström and Myerson’s [5]).
3
Ledyard and Palfrey [10] provide a forceful motivation for such positive interpretations of IIE. Even from a
purely normative viewpoint, one can readily relate to real-world situations where the social planner favors some
types against others—such as transferring money from the rich to the poor—and wants to choose an optimal
allocation according to her biased value judgement, a particular welfare weight distribution.
4
Ledyard and Palfrey [11] use the Kuhn-Tucker method. Due to its limitation according to our Theorem 8
(explained later), this method could not have led to our result that the bad is needed for social optimality.
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seller of such a costly service would exaggerate his type. Consequently, the operation of integrating a player’s surplus from an allocation bifurcates between di↵erent measures, depending
on whether the player is in expectation allocated the good—so his reduced form allocation is
positive—or in expectation allocated the bad—with reduced-form allocation negative. In other
words, the expected surplus is not a linear functional of allocations.
Without a linear structure, the method to characterize optimal mechanisms is usually a local
one à la the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, but the method is usually limited by its local nature and,
as part of our results shows, cannot address our question. Since the virtual surplus intuition
corresponds to the first-order condition derived from such methods, they cannot warrant its
validity here.
This paper thus adopts a global approach. We characterize the optimal mechanisms by a
saddle point condition, which is not only sufficient but also necessary for any mechanism to
be optimal (Theorem 6). We obtain this condition through formulating the aforementioned
integration into a two-part operator on the allocations. The operator integrates the positive
part of an allocation with one measure and integrates the negative part thereof with another
measure. The positive part of an allocation is defined on the types that are more likely to get
the good than the bad, and the negative part, more likely to get the bad than the good. Albeit
nonlinear, this operator is always concave on the space of allocations. This drives the necessity
of the saddle point condition.
From the saddle point condition we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition, in terms
of the distribution of types and that of welfare weights, for every optimal mechanism to allocate the bad with a strictly positive probability (Theorem 7). One corollary is that, if the
welfare weight distribution is replaced by a second-order stochastically dominated one, the
bad is allocated with strictly positive probabilities in all optimal mechanisms if it is so before
the substitution (Corollary 5). Another corollary is an unrestrictive condition sufficient for all
optimal mechanisms to allocate the bad with strictly positive probabilities: all that we need
is that the welfare density (Radon-Nikodym derivative of the welfare weight distribution with
respect to the type distribution) around the infimum of the type support be more than twice the
average welfare density (Corollary 6). Thus, the social optimality of allocating the bad is not at
all sensitive to the particular forms of the welfare density or the type distribution. In particular,
a social planner would still allocate the bad even when she assigns most of the welfare weight
to high types.5
As our model does not force the necessity of the bad, Corollary 7 says that no optimal
mechanism allocates the bad at all if the welfare weight distribution second-order stochastically
dominates the exogenous distribution of types. Hence a social planner allocates the bad only if
she favors the low and high types against the middle ones.
To demonstrate the generality of our method, and to gain understanding of all optimal
mechanisms that need the bad as an instrument, we prove that the Kuhn-Tucker method used
in the literature could not have led to our finding: The literature applies the method to a relaxed
problem that is valid only if its solution happens to satisfy a monotonicity condition—the
second-order part of IC—set aside by the relaxed problem. We find that if the bad is allocated
5

For example, suppose that almost the entire welfare weight is assigned to a small interval at the supremum
type 1, with a tiny weight say 3✏ uniformly distributed to the elements of a tiny interval [0, ✏] at the infimum.
Then Corollary 6 says that the social planner would still allocate the bad with a strictly positive probability.
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with strictly positive probabilities in all optimal mechanisms then the relaxed problem has only
two alternatives: either it admits no optimal mechanism as a solution, or it su↵ers indeterminacy in admitting a continuum of solutions to the relaxed problem (Theorem 8). Furthermore,
the first alternative, which means that any solution to the relaxed problem violates the monotonicity constraint, is generic (Corollary 8). Thus, generically speaking, when the bad is needed
for social optimality, the condition derived from the Kuhn-Tucker method is vacuous, and any
optimal mechanism entails rationing across some types because the monotonicity constraint is
binding.
Theorems 7 and 8 are established on the saddle point condition (Theorem 6) of any optimal
mechanism. The complication is that the associated Lagrangian is a two-part operator acting
on reduced-form allocations with the aforementioned, sign-specific measures. To exploit the
saddle point condition despite the complication, we develop a perturbation method. The idea is
to perturb an allocation without altering the sign of its reduced form at any type (nonnegative
for buyer types, and nonpositive for seller types) so that the measure acting on the reduced form
remains unchanged. Then the Lagrangian becomes linear in the perturbations. That allows us
to characterize any maximizer of the Lagrangian through perturbations along the direction of
the measure, as long as the desired direction can be achieved in an ex post feasible manner.
To that end, we formulate a family of ex post feasible, sign-preserving perturbations, thereby
obtaining conditions necessary for any maximizer of the Lagrangian associated with the saddle
point condition (Section 3.4.2 and Appendix B.6.2).
By the monotonicity condition of the IC constraint, if the bad is allocated at all, it is allocated to low types. Thus, Corollaries 5 and 6 imply that a social planner should allocate the
bad to low types if she either spreads more welfare weights to low types in general, or cares
enough about the extreme low types in particular. For instance, since a player’s type is equal
to his marginal rate of substitution between consumption and money, one may think of a low
type as a financially constrained consumer. In such a context, an implication is that a social
planner who cares enough about the extreme poor should buy the poor out of the coverage of
the benefit under consideration.
We are aware of two other global methods to handle nonlinear problems in mechanism
design. One is Toikka’s [22] generalized ironing technique to maximize a concave functional
of monotone real functions. This could be relevant to the Lagrange problem associated with
our saddle point condition, which has absorbed the budget balance constraint of our original
problem. However, the Lagrangian does not satisfy the di↵erentiability assumption in Toikka
(nor the discreteness assumption in the online supplement). Moreover, it remains to be seen
whether the single-agent assumption of the method can be removed to accommodate the ex
post feasibility constraint in an auction model such as our Lagrange problem.
The other method is to turn the set of ex post feasible IC reduced form allocations into a
family of monotone real functions majorized by a known function and characterize the maxima
of a convex functional on this family as its extreme points (Kleiner, Moldovanu and Strack [7]).
In our model, since the Lagrangian is not convex, the only case to which this method could be
applicable is our original optimization problem subject to an additional restriction that mechanisms be symmetric across players (so that each allocation corresponds to a real function).
However, we also require the budget balance condition, and a bad is to be allocated alongside
with a good (rather than two goods to be allocated). It remains to be seen whether ex post
feasibility can be captured by a single majorization relation and whether the choice set can be
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equal to a majorization family with respect to such a relation.
Our model shares a similar feature with the partnership dissolution literature in that the
buyer or seller role of a player is endogenous (Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [2], Chien [1],
Loertscher and Wasser [13], Lu and Robert [14], Mylovanov and Tröger [19], and Segal and
Whinston [21]). Selling one’s partnership share in that framework corresponds to being allocated the bad in our model. However, since partnership dissolution requires market clearance
in the trading of shares, it is out of the question in that framework whether a bad should be allocated at all. Nevertheless, our saddle point characterization, giving a necessary and sufficient
condition for any interim Pareto optimal mechanism subject to IC, IR and BB, is applicable
to partnership dissolution given independent private values (Remark B.7, Appendix B.7). Another di↵erence is in the design objectives. We consider interim Pareto optimality (namely,
IIE), which allows for any welfare weights varying across player-types. By contrast, the design objective regarding partnership dissolution is a sum of surpluses with welfare weights
uniform across types. It has been the simple sum of surpluses across players with uniform
welfare weights in much of the literature.6 Recently, the objective is a weighted average—with
type-independent weights—between the expected revenue and the winner’s surplus in Lu and
Robert and in Loertscher and Wasser, and the ex ante surplus of one of the players (informed
principal) in Mylovanov and Tröger.
With both the buyer and seller roles possible to each player, a player’s type at which the participation constraint binds is not determined a priori. Thus our model is somewhat related to the
countervailing incentives literature such as Lewis and Sappington [12], Maggi and Rodrı́guezClare [16], and Jullien [6]. Their focus is to address the issue that full participation may cause
loss of generality and to exploit the curvature of the agent’s reservation utility function for
explanations of various pooling properties in the principal’s optimal mechanism. By contrast,
there is no loss to assume full participation in our model, and our focus is to resolve the nonlinearity problem caused by the endogenous buyer-seller role in an otherwise linear structure. In
addition, given the endogenous discontinuity of the virtual surplus functions, the Hamiltonian
technique in [6] is inapplicable to our model.

3.2
3.2.1

The Model
The Good, the Bad, and n Players

There are two items, named A and B, and n players (n 2), each of whom can be allocated
one or both or none of the items. Each player i’s private information at the outset, or type ti , is
independently drawn according to the same cumulative distribution function F with density f
strictly positive on the support [0, 1].7 Given type ti , if player i gets item A with probability xiA ,
item B with probability xiB , and delivers money transfer in the amount yi 2 R (negative yi
meaning i being the recipient of money), player i’s payo↵ is equal to
(xiA
6

xiB ) ti

yi .

(3.1)

Much of the partnership dissolution literature focuses on the implementability of one particular winnerselection rule, the efficient allocation, which is optimal only if it is implementable and only if the design objective
is the simple sum of the surpluses across players.
7
See Appendix B.7 for a generalization that allows for player-specific distributions.
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Hence item A is interpreted as a good, and item B a bad, to all players; ti corresponds to the
intensity of player i’s preference for the good over the bad.

3.2.2

Allocations and Mechanisms

An ex post allocation means a list (qiA , qiB )ni=1 of functions such that qiA , qiB : [0, 1]n ! [0, 1]
for each i and, for each t 2 [0, 1]n ,
X
X
qiA (t)  1 and
qiB (t)  1.
(3.2)
i

i

An ex post payment rule means a list (pi )ni=1 of functions such that pi : [0, 1]n ! R for each i. By
the revelation principle, any equilibrium-feasible mechanism corresponds to a pair of ex post
allocation (qiA , qiB )ni=1 and ex post payment rule (pi )ni=1 , with qi j (t) interpreted as the probability
with which item j ( j 2 {A, B}) is assigned to player i, and pi (t) the net money transfer from
player i to others, when t is the profile of alleged types across players.
For each player i, denote F i for the product measure on [0, 1]n 1 generated by F on each
subspace [0, 1]. A mechanism (in reduced form) means a list (Qi , Pi )ni=1 , often abbreviated
as (Q, P), of functions Qi : [0, 1] ! R and Pi : [0, 1] ! R (8i = 1, . . . , n) such that, for
some ex post allocation-payment rule (qiA , qiB , pi )ni=1 , Qi is the marginal of qiA qiB , and Pi the
marginal of pi , onto the ith dimension. That is, for any i and any ti 2 [0, 1],
Z
(qiA (ti , t i ) qiB (ti , t i )) dF i (t i )
Qi (ti ) =
(3.3)
[0,1]n

1

R
and Pi (ti ) = [0,1]n 1 pi (ti , ·)dF i for any ti and any i. The part (Qi )ni=1 in (Qi , Pi )ni=1 is called
(reduced-form) allocation. Call (Qi )ni=1 the reduced form of (qiA , qiB )ni=1 if and only if (3.3)
holds for all i and all ti .

Remark Eq. (3.3) is the construct that sets our model apart from the existing optimal auction
framework. The feature of (3.3) is that the reduced form allocation to a player can be positive
or negative, and the sign thereof is endogenous. As we will see in Section A.2, such endogenous
signing of the allocation results in a nonlinear structure. This feature of endogenous signing
stems from the assumption that the two items up for allocation point to opposite directions
with respect to a player’s nonparticipation payo↵—which we normalize to zero without loss of
generality—with the good generating a payo↵ larger than, and the bad less than, the nonparticipation payo↵. That is why the role of the bad in our model cannot be replaced by a lesser
good as long as the utility of the lesser good is still larger than the nonparticipation payo↵.

3.2.3

Constraints

Given any (reduced-form) mechanism (Qi , Pi )ni=1 , it follows from the quasilinear utility function
postulated previously that the interim expected payo↵ for any type ti of player i to act as a
type tˆi , given truthtelling from others, is equal to Qi (tˆi )ti Pi (tˆi ). Denote
Ui (ti | Q, P) := max Qi (tˆi )ti
tˆi 2[0,1]

Pi (tˆi ).

(3.4)
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As is routine in auction theory, incentive compatibility (IC) of (Qi , Pi )ni=1 is equivalent to simultaneous satisfaction of two conditions for each player i: (i) Qi is weakly increasing on [0, 1];
(ii) for any ti , ti0 2 [0, 1],
Z ti
0
Pi (ti ) Pi (ti ) =
sdQi (s).
(3.5)
ti0

We assume that each player can opt out of a mechanism before it operates thereby getting
zero as the outside payo↵. Thus (Qi , Pi )ni=1 is said individually rational (IR) if and only if
Ui (ti |Q, P) 0 for all i and all ti 2 T i .
For the society consisting of the n players to transfer wealth among themselves without relying on outside subsides, we require that a mechanism be budget-balanced: (Qi , Pi )ni=1 satisfies
P R1
budget balance (BB) if and only if i 0 Pi (ti )dF(ti ) 0.8

3.2.4

Interim Incentive-Constrained Pareto Optimality

While our method applies to cases where players may weigh di↵erently in the social welfare
(Appendix B.7), to focus on transfers across types, the main text presents only welfare weights
that are neutral across players, who are assumed ex ante symmetric (again for notational
simR1
plicity). Thus, by welfare density we mean a function w : [0, 1] ! R++ for which 0 wdF = 1.
Given any welfare density w, the mechanism design problem is to maximize
n Z
X
i=1

0

1

Ui (ti | Q, P)w(ti )dF(ti )

(3.6)

among all mechanisms (Q, P) that are IC, IR and BB.9 It is obvious that any solution say (Q⇤ , P⇤ )
to this problem is interim incentive-constrained Pareto optimal.10 That is, there does not exist another IC, IR and BB mechanism (Q, P) for which Ui (·|Q, P) Ui (·|Q⇤ , P⇤ ) a.e. on [0, 1]
for all players i and, for some player i, Ui (·|Q, P) > Ui (·|Q⇤ , P⇤ ) on a positive-measure subset
of [0, 1].11

3.3

Saddle Point Characterization

To state the saddle point characterization for all optimal mechanisms (maximizers of (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB), we need to introduce a notation for a nonlinear, two-part operator on
allocations. A crucial property of this operation is its concavity, which drives the necessity of
8

There is no substantive di↵erence between such ex ante condition for budget balance and its ex post counterpart. Mimicking the proof of Lemma 4 of Cramton, Gibbons and Klemperer [2], one can prove that if
P R1
P (t )dF(ti ) 0 then (Pi )ni=1 is the profile of the marginals of an ex post payment profile (pi )ni=1 for which
Pi 0 i i
0 for all t 2 [0, 1]n .
i pi (t)
9
By definition, any mechanism is ex post feasible in the sense of being the reduced form of some ex post
allocation-payment rule (Section 3.2.2).
10
Interim incentive-constrained Pareto optimality is the same as interim incentive efficiency (IIE) if the IR and
BB constraints are added to the IIE framework, which usually considers only IC.
11
Since F is absolutely continuous in Lebesgue measure by assumption, the notion of measure zero with respect
to F is equivalent to that with respect to Lebesgue measure restricted to [0, 1].
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the saddle point condition. Section A.2 motivates the notation from the endogenous discontinuity of the virtual surplus function in our model. Section 3.3.2 defines the notation.

3.3.1

Nonlinearity from Having Both a Good and a Bad

Given any welfare density w and any IC mechanism (Q, P), the objective (3.6) is equal to
XZ 1
XZ 1
Qi (ti )ti dW(ti )
Pi (ti )dW(ti ),
(3.7)
0

i

i

where we define
W(ti ) :=

Z

ti

0

0

w(s)dF(s)

(3.8)

for any ti 2 [0, 1]. Note that W is a cdf with support [0, 1]. We shall call W welfare weight
distribution.
By the routine of envelope theorem and integration by parts, one obtains that (Appendix B.2),
for any t0 2 [0, 1] and any IC mechanism (Q, P),
Z 1
Z 1
Z t0
Z 1
Pi (ti )dW(ti ) =
Qi (ti )ti dW(ti ) +
Qi (ti )W(ti )dti
Qi (ti ) (1 W(ti )) dti
0

0

t0

0

0

Ui (t |Q, P).

(3.9)

To keep track of the IR and BB constraints, this equation is useful only when Ui (t0 |Q, P) =
min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, P). By IC and the envelope equation (3.5), Ui (·|Q, P) is convex and its derivative
is equal to Qi a.e. Thus, if Ui (·|Q, P) attains its minimum at t0 then Qi  0 on [0, t0 ), and Qi 0
on (t0 , 1]. Hence (3.9) implies
Z 1
Z 1
Z 1
Z 1
Pi dW =
Qi (ti )ti dW(ti ) +
Qi (ti ) W(ti )dti +
Q+i (ti ) ( 1 + W(ti )) dti
0

0

min Ui (·|Q, P),

0

0

[0,1]

(3.10)

where
Qi (s) := max{ Qi (s), 0}

and

Q+i (s) := max{Qi (s), 0}.

Eq. (3.10) reveals that the cdf W acts on an allocation Qi in a bifurcated manner. When Qi
is positive (player i acting like a buyer in expectation), the marginal utility ti is reduced by
1 W(ti ); when Qi is negative (i acting like a seller in expectation), the marginal cost ti is
increased by W(ti ). Thus, 1 W(ti ) and W(ti ) correspond to a type-ti player’s information rent,
bifurcated between the player’s buyer and seller roles, that takes into account the weight w(ti )
in the social welfare.12 It is important to note that this action of W, or the right-hand side on
the first line of (3.10), is not a linear functional on the space of Qi unless the space is restricted
by either nonnegativity (availability of only goods) or nonpositivity (availability of only bads).
Such nonlinearity is precisely the e↵ect of having both a good and a bad for allocation in our
otherwise linear, standard model.
12

In the special case where w = 1 on [0, 1], W = F and 1 W(ti ) and W(ti ) become the recognizable information
rents in the optimal auction and optimal procurement models.
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Two-Part Operators

To focus attention to the nonlinear action of W, and to apply the same kind of actions to other
distributions, we abstract from (3.10) a two-part operator defined below. For any function
' : R ! R2 denoted by ' := ('+ , ' ) such that '+ , ' : R ! R, denote
Z 1
Z 1
+
Qi (s)'+ (s)ds +
Qi (s) ' (s)ds.
hQi : '| :=
0

0

Note that the operator Qi 7! hQi : '| acts on the function Qi in two parts, one on the positive
part Q+i , the other on the negative part Qi . Hence we call h· : '| two-part operator. The
asymmetric bracket of Qi and ' is to highlight the asymmetry between the two arguments:
hQi : '| is a nonlinear functional of Qi and yet a linear functional of '.
The ' in hQi : '| corresponds to the information rent density derived from an underlying
distribution. In general, by distribution on [0, 1] we mean a function G : R ! R+ that is
weakly increasing, right-continuous, vanishing on ( 1, 0), and equal to maxR G on [1, 1). For
any distribution G on [0, 1], define a function ⇢(G) : R ! R2 by
⇢(G) := (⇢+ (G), ⇢ (G))
such that, for all s 2 R,
⇢+ (G)(s) := G(1) + G(s)

and ⇢ (G)(s) := G(s).

(3.11)

Thus, for any distribution G on [0, 1] and any Qi : [0, 1] ! R, the above notation implies
Z 1
Z 1
+
Qi (s)⇢+ (G)(s)ds +
Qi (s) ⇢ (G)(s)ds.
(3.12)
hQi : ⇢(G)| =
0

0

By (3.12), we generalize (3.10) to all distributions G on [0, 1] and all IC mechanisms (Q, P):
Z 1
Z 1
Pi dG =
Qi (ti )ti dG(ti ) + hQi : ⇢(G)| G(1) min Ui (·|Q, P).
(3.13)
0

0

[0,1]

Comparing (3.13) with (3.10), we see that ⇢+ (G) reflects i’s information rent density when i
acts as a buyer in expectation, and ⇢ (G), i’s information rent density when i acts as a seller in
expectation, had i’s type been measured by G.13

3.3.3

The Lagrangian

Denote Q for the space of all reduced-form allocations (Qi )ni=1 (each being the reduced form of
an ex post allocation according to (3.3)). Denote Qmon for the set of (Qi )ni=1 2 Q such that Qi is
weakly increasing on [0, 1] for any i. For any welfare density w, define W according to (3.8).
For any Q := (Qi )ni=1 2 Q and any 2 R+ , define
!
XZ 1
X
W(ti ) F(ti )
L (Q, ) :=
Qi (ti ) (1 + )ti
dF(ti ) +
(3.14)
hQi : ⇢(F)| .
f (ti )
0
i
i
13

In the main text, G can be W as in (3.10), or F as in the next section. In general (Appendix B.7), G can be
any multiple of F or W.
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Theorem 6 Given any welfare density w, there exists a payment rule P⇤ with which a mechanism (Q⇤ , P⇤ ) maximizes (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB if and only if there exists 2 R+ such
that, for all Q 2 Qmon and all 0 2 R+ ,
L (Q⇤ , 0 )

L (Q⇤ , )

L (Q, ).

(3.15)

Proof First, the problem of maximizing (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB is equivalent to
XZ 1
max
Qi (ti ) (ti f (ti ) W(ti ) + F(ti )) dti
(3.16)
Q2Qmon

s.t.

i

0

XZ
i

0

1

Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +

X
i

hQi : ⇢(F)|

0.

(3.17)

The domain Qmon captures the ex post feasibility requirement (that Q 2 Q) and the secondorder part of IC (monotonicity of Q). Ineq. (3.17) is the joint constraint of IR, BB and the
first-order part of IC (Lemma 20, Appendix B.3.1). It is obtained through applying (3.13) to
the case G = F for all players i, summing such equations across i, and then use IR and BB.
The objective (3.16) is obtained through calculating the social welfare (3.6) generated by a
mechanism (Q, P) that takes into account of the optimal choice of the payment rule among
those that implement any given Q. The proof amounts to calculating the optimal amount of
lump sum transfers to be redistributed (Lemma 21, Appendix B.3.2).
Second, the set of all (Qi )ni=1 2 Qmon that satisfy (3.17) is a convex set. That is because the
P
domain Qmon is convex (Appendix B.3.3), and the mapping (Qi )ni=1 7! i hQi : ⇢(F)| a concave
functional on Q (Lemma 22, Appendix B.3.4). Such concavity is driven by the fact that a
player tends to shade the marginal value by a price discount ⇢+ (F) when acting like a buyer
(when Qi = Q+i ), and exaggerate the marginal cost by a price markup ⇢ (F) when acting like a
seller (when Qi = Qi ). One can also show that there exists a (Qi )ni=1 2 Qmon such that (3.17)
is satisfied strictly (Appendix B.3.5). Consequently, the conditions corresponding to those in
Luenberger [15, Corollary 1, p219] are satisfied. Hence the saddle point condition is necessary
and sufficient for any solution to Problem (3.16)–(3.17).
Remark To appreciate the succinct two-part operator notation, consider the counterparts
of (3.17) in the literature. In the bilateral trade model of Myerson and Satterthwaite [18],
where a player’s buyer or seller role is exogenous, the counterpart to this constraint is their
Ineq. (2), the right-hand side of which can be split into two integrals, one being an integral
of the valuations v2 and v1 , the other an integral of the information rents (1 Fi (vi ))/ fi (vi )
and Fi (vi )/ fi (vi ). The first integral corresponds to our first integral in (3.17), and the second
integral, our two-part operation (3.17). Note, however, that their counterpart to our two-part
operation is a linear functional of their allocation p. That is because a player in their model
is a priori either a buyer or a seller, hence the two-part operation reduces to
Z
Z
⇣
⌘
Qbuyer (tbuyer ) 1 + Fbuyer (tbuyer ) dtbuyer
Qseller (tseller )Fseller (tseller )dtseller ,

which is linear in (Qbuyer , Qseller ). By contrast, in the partnership dissolution model of Cramton
et al. [2], where a player’s buyer or seller role is endogenous, the counterpart to our (3.17)
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is their Ineq. (I), which is nonlinear in their allocation S i . It is nonlinear in S i because their
integration depends on the upper or lower limit v⇤i , which depends on S i . Their counterpart to
the first integral in (3.17) is zero because of their market clearance condition.
Remark For any

⇣
⌘
2 R+ , define V+ , V : [0, 1] ! R2 by, for any ti 2 [0, 1],
W(ti ) F(ti )
1 F(ti )
·
,
f (ti )
f (ti )
W(ti ) F(ti )
F(ti )
+ ·
.
f (ti )
f (ti )

V+ (ti ) := (1 + )ti
V (ti ) := (1 + )ti
The counterpart when

(3.18)
(3.19)

= 0 is, for any ti 2 [0, 1],
W(ti ) F(ti )
.
f (ti )

V(ti ) := ti

(3.20)

Denote (V+ , V ) f := (V+ f, V f ). Then Eq. (3.14) is equivalent to
L (Q, ) =

XD

Qi : (V+ , V ) f .

(3.21)

i

Hence the vector-valued function (V+ , V ) is the virtual surplus in our model.
Remark When the constraint (3.17)—the joint constraint of IR, BB and the first-order part
of IC—is non-binding, = 0 and the virtual surplus is reduced to the real-value function V
in (3.20), which is similar to those in standard models except for the influence W(ti ) from the
welfare weights.14 When the constraint (3.17) is binding, however, > 0 and the meaning of
virtual surplus is enriched by (3.18) and (3.19): The marginal contribution of type ti is equal to
i)
1 + times its marginal gain ti of trade subtracted by its net information rent W(tif)(tiF(t
and plus
)
its marginal contribution ⇢(F)(ti ) to budget balancing, with the information rent skewed by
the welfare weight W, and the budget-balancing contribution determined by the vector-value
function ⇢(F).

3.4

The Condition for the Bad to Be Needed

Given any welfare density w, we say that the bad is needed if and only if, for any (Q⇤ , P⇤ )
that maximizes (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB, Q⇤i < 0 on a positive-measure subset of [0, 1]
14

To illustrate the impact of the welfare weights, suppose that the welfare density is uniform across
types, namely, w = 1 on [0, 1]. In that case, W = F by (3.8), and the Lagrangian (3.14) becomes
P
P R1
(1 + ) i 0 Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +
i hQi : ⇢(F)|. Consequently, if the constraint (3.17) were set aside, the optimal allocation given the fact ti > 0 for all ti 2 (0, 1] is to allocate the good to a player with the highest realized
type and never allocate the bad at all. Auctioning o↵ only the good and not at all the bad, the allocation satisfies (3.17) and hence is indeed optimal (Lemma 2). This confirms the intuition that the bad is not needed at all if
the welfare density is constant across types. That is, not allocating the bad at all is ex ante efficient.
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for some player i. In other words, the bad is needed if and only if every socially optimal
mechanism given welfare density w allocates the bad with a strictly positive probability.15
Theorem 7 The bad is needed if and only if
Z
9ti 2 (0, 1) :

0

ti

V(s)dF(s) < 0.

(3.22)

The “if” part of Theorem 7 is proved in Section 3.4.1, and the “only if” part in Section 3.4.2.
Before proving it, we present three corollaries of the theorem, each proved in Appendix B.4.
Condition (3.22) both necessary and sufficient, we obtain a sharp comparative statics result
regarding the prospect that the bad Ris needed for social optimality. From any welfare density
1
function w : [0, 1] ! [0, 1] (with 0 wdF = 1), the corresponding welfare weight distribue W is
tion W is derived according to (3.8). For any such welfare weight distributions W and W,
e if and only if
said to second-order stochastically dominate W
Z r
Z r
e
8r 2 [0, 1] :
W(s)ds
W(s)ds.
(3.23)
0

0

Corollary 5 If the bad is needed given welfare weight distribution W and if W second-order
e then the bad is also needed given W.
e
stochastically dominates W,

The corollary implies that, if the social planner moves some welfare weight from the middle
types to the low and high types, she would allocate the bad to someone if she did so previously.
Corollary 6 shows how little the condition (3.22) requires for the bad to be needed. All that
it takes is for the types near 0 to carry welfare densities above twice the average density:
Corollary 6 If f is di↵erentiable at 0, the welfare density w is continuous at zero, and w(0) >
2, then the bad is needed.
We see from both Corollaries 5 and 6 that the bad is allocated when the welfare densities
on low types are sufficiently high. The intuition is that we can think of a player’s type as the
player’s marginal rate of substitution between the net utility from the items and the money
transfer, and hence low types value money transfers more than the cost of receiving a bad.
Given the IC and IR constraint, whenever a bad is allocated, it is allocated to some low types
with positive money transfers. Thus, when the planner puts a relatively high weight on low
types, a bad should be allocated.
It should be noted that our model does not force the result that the bad is needed. As
the next corollary shows, the model allows for a nondegenerate set of welfare densities given
which the bad is not needed at all. It says that any welfare distribution that second-order
15

The definition rules out the uninteresting case where an optimal mechanism allocates the bad with a strictly
positive probability just to cancel out any such allocation outcome by simultaneously allocating the good so that
Q⇤i = 0 whenever the bad is allocated. To see why this case does not count as the bad being needed, modify the
mechanism so that it allocates neither item to i whenever Q⇤i = 0. The modification is ex post feasible, and it
preserves the reduced form of the original mechanism. Thus it is an optimal mechanism that does not allocate
the bad at all. That violates the condition that every optimal mechanism allocates the bad with a strictly positive
probability.
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stochastically dominates the exogenous distribution of types renders the bad unnecessary for
social optimality. The corollary follows from Corollary 5 and the fact that a social planner who
weighs all types uniformly does not need the bad for optimality.16
Corollary 7 If the welfare weight distribution W second-order stochastically dominates the
exogenous distribution F of types, the bad is not needed.

3.4.1

Why the Bad Is Needed if (3.22) holds

The argument that (3.22) implies the necessity of the bad is a proof by contrapositive. Suppose
that an optimal mechanism does not allocate the bad at all. Then there is no need to raise funds
to pay someone to receive the bad. Thus budget balancing becomes a nonissue. That is, the
constraint (3.17) is non-binding (Lemma 2) and so the Lagrangian (3.14) reduces to a linear
form. It then follows from the saddle point characterization that the mechanism is a solution
to a linear programming problem. Thus, one can apply the optimal auction technique to show
that the mechanism would allocate the bad with a strictly positive probability unless the ironed
copy of the virtual surplus is not negative enough for (3.22) to hold.
To formalize this argument, let us recall the notations of hierarchical allocations and ironing
in the optimal auction theory. For each item j (which can be the good or the bad) and any
function : [0, 1] ! R, an allocation of item j is said hierarchical according to if and only
if, for almost every (tk )nk=1 2 [0, 1]n , item j is allocated to player i if (ti ) > max {0, maxk,i (tk )},
and the item is not allocated if (ti ) < 0 for all players i.
For any integrable function g : [0, 1] ! R, define Hg : [0, 1] ! R by
Z r ⇣
⌘
Hg (r) :=
g F 1 (s) ds
(3.24)
0

bg for the convex hull of Hg on [0, 1]. The function g : [0, 1] ! R
for all r 2 [0, 1] and denote H
such that
d b
g(ti ) =
Hg (r)
(3.25)
dr
r=F(ti )
a.e. ti 2 [0, 1] is called ironed copy of g.
Note that the V defined by (3.20) is integrable, with both W and F continuous. Hence its
ironed copy V is well-defined. The next lemma is a straightforward extension of Myerson’s [17,
§6] ironing technique. Hence we omit its proof.

Lemma 1 If Q⇤ maximizes L (Q, 0) among all Q 2 Qmon , then Q⇤ is the reduced form of an ex
post allocation (q⇤iA , q⇤iB )ni=1 such that (q⇤iA )ni=1 is a hierarchical allocation of the good according
to V, and (q⇤iB )ni=1 a hierarchical allocation of the bad according to V.
The next lemma, proved in Appendix B.5, formalizes the aforementioned intuition that if
the bad is not allocated at all then budget balancing becomes a nonissue.
Lemma 2 If Q 2 Qmon and if Qi 0 on [0, 1] for any i, then Q satisfies (3.17). If, in addition,
Q solves Problem (3.16)–(3.17), then Q satisfies (3.17) strictly.
16

This fact is verified in the proof of Corollary 7 (Appendix B.4) succinctly, and in Footnote 14 intuitively.
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Proof of the “If” Part of Theorem 7 First, suppose (3.22) and, to the contrary of the claim,
that for some optimal mechanism (Q⇤ , P⇤ ), Q⇤i 0 a.e. on [0, 1] for all players i. Then Lemma 2
implies that Q⇤ satisfies the constraint (3.17) strictly. Thus, by the saddle point condition in
Theorem 6, = 0 and Q⇤ maximizes L (·, 0) on Qmon . Then Lemma 1 implies that Q⇤ entails
a hierarchical allocation of the bad according to V. That is, for almost every (t1 , . . . , tn ) 2
[0, 1]n , Q⇤ awards the bad to a player i if V(ti ) < min {0, mink,i V(tk )}. Thus, Q⇤ allocates the
bad with a strictly positive probability if V < 0 on a nondegnerate interval of [0, 1] (as F is
assumed strictly increasing on [0, 1]). By (3.22) and the definition of HV ((3.20) and (3.24)),
HV (F(ti )) < 0 for some ti 2 (0, 1). This, coupled with the fact HV (0) = 0 (due to (3.24)) implies
bV of HV is negatively sloped on [0, F(ti )]. Then, by (3.25), V < 0 on the
that the convex hull H
nondegnerate interval [0, ti ]. Thus, in the positive-probability event where some player’s type
belongs to [0, ti ], the bad is allocated to someone. This contradicts the supposition that Qi 0
a.e. on [0, 1] for all i. ⌅

3.4.2

Why (3.22) Is True if the Bad Is Needed

Suppose that (3.22) does not hold and yet the bad is needed. We shall derive a contradiction
from this hypothesis through perturbing any optimal mechanism that allocates the bad with a
strictly positive probability. The perturbation either enlarges the Lagrangian or renders another
optimal mechanism that does not allocate the bad at all, hence a contradiction obtains in either
case. The complication is that the Lagrangian is a two-part operation that switches between
two integrations (V versus V+ , cf. (3.21)) depending on the signs of the reduced forms. Thus
we want the perturbation to preserve the sign of each player’s reduced-form allocation. Hence
we start with Section 3.4.2 to formalize such perturbations.
Sign-Preserving Perturbations of Allocations
For any Q := (Qi )ni=1 2 Q, a vector (ci )ni=1 2 [0, 1]n is called crossing point of Q if and only
if, for each i, Qi  0 a.e. on [0, ci ] and Qi 0 a.e. on [ci , 1]. Obviously, if Q 2 Qmon , then
a crossing point of Q exists, each Qi being weakly increasing. If Q 2 Q has a crossing point
(ci )ni=1 2 [0, 1]n then, for any
0, Eqs. (3.18), (3.19) and (3.21) together imply that
L (Q, ) =

XZ
i

0

ci

Qi (ti )V (ti )dF(ti ) +

XZ
i

ci

1

Qi (ti )V+ (ti )dF(ti ).

(3.26)

For any Q 2 Q with any crossing point c 2 [0, 1]n , we are interested in perturbing the
negative part of Q without upsetting its crossing point or the second sum in (3.26). Such
perturbations transform Q into an element of—
⇥
⇤
Q(Q, c) := (Q0i )ni=1 2 Q | 8i Q0i  0 on [0, ci ), Q0i = Qi on (ci , 1] .
(3.27)
For now, we need only to define one kind of such perturbations (more in Appendix B.6.2):

Reservation Ri,T : For any player i, any T ✓ [0, 1]n , and any Q 2 Q that is the reduced form
of an ex post allocation (qkA , qkB )nk=1 , define Ri,T (Q) to be the reduced form of the ex post
allocation (q̃kA , q̃kB )nk=1 that is the same as (qkA , qkB )nk=1 except q̃i j (t) := 0 for any t 2 T
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and any item j 2 {A, B}. That is, when T occurs, the planner keeps any item to herself
whenever the original allocation would award it to player i.
Denote ⇡i for the projection of any n-vector (t1 , . . . , tn ) onto its ith component ti . The next
lemma follows directly from the definition of Ri,T and hence we omit its proof:
Lemma 3 For any Q 2 Q with crossing point c := (ci )ni=1 2 [0, 1]n , any player i and any
T ✓ [0, 1]n for which ⇡i (T ) ✓ [0, ci ], if Q0 := Ri,T (Q), then:
a. Q0i = 0 on ⇡i (T ), Q0i = Qi on [0, 1] \ ⇡i (T ), and Q0k = Qk on [0, 1] for all k , i;
b. Q0 2 Q(Q, c) and, if in addition Q 2 Qmon and ⇡i (T ) ◆ [0, ci ], Q0 2 Qmon ;
c. Eq. (3.26) holds when Q is replaced by Q0 .
Proof of the “Only If” Part of Theorem 7
Suppose, to the contrary, that the bad is needed and yet (3.22) does not hold. Then
Z ti
8ti 2 (0, 1) :
V(s)dF(s) 0.
0

(3.28)

Pick any optimal mechanism (Q⇤ , P⇤ ). The saddle point condition in Theorem 6 implies that Q⇤
maximizes L (·, ) on Qmon for some
0. By (3.19) and (3.20),
(
= V on [0, 1] if = 0
V
(3.29)
> V on (0, 1] if > 0.
Thus (3.28) implies
8 > 0 : 8ti 2 (0, 1) :

Z

ti
0

V (s)dF(s) > 0.

(3.30)

By hypothesis, Q⇤ allocates the bad with a strictly positive probability. Thus Q⇤i < 0 on a
positive-measure subset of [0, 1] for some player i. Since Q⇤ 2 Qmon , Q⇤i is weakly increasing,
hence this subset is an interval [0, ci ) or [0, ci ] for some ci 2 (0, 1]. Without loss of generality,
let ci be the maximum among all such upper bounds so that Q⇤i < 0 on [0, ci ), and Q⇤i
0
⇤
on (ci , 1]. For any k , i, with Qk weakly increasing, there exists ck 2 [0, 1] for which c :=
(ci , (ck )k,i ) is a crossing point of Q⇤ .
Consider an alternative allocation Ri,T (Q⇤ ) for which T = {(tk )nk=1 2 [0, 1]n | ti 2 [0, ci ]}.
That is, modify Q⇤ by reserving both items from player i when i’s type belongs to [0, ci ]. By
Lemma 3.b, Ri,T (Q⇤ ) 2 Qmon and also has c as a crossing point. Thus, given the same c, (3.26)
holds whether Q = Ri,T (Q⇤ ) or Q = Q⇤ . Then by Lemma 3.a,
Z ci
⇤
⇤
L (Q , ) L (Ri,T (Q ), ) =
Q⇤i (ti )V (ti )dF(ti ).
(3.31)
0

Since Q⇤i is weakly increasing, by Fubini’s theorem we have
! Z ci
Z ci
Z ci Z s
⇤
⇤
Qi (ti )V (ti )dF(ti ) = lim Qi (s)
V (r)dF(r)
V (r)dF(r)dQ⇤i (s).
0

s"ci

0

0

0

(3.32)
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By (3.28), (3.29) and (3.30), together with Q⇤i being weakly increasing, the right-hand side
of (3.32) is nonpositive. This coupled with (3.31) implies that
L (Ri,T (Q⇤ ), )

L (Q⇤ , ).

(3.33)

Furthermore, if > 0, the right-hand side of (3.32) is negative. That is because, by the choice
of ci , either (i) lim s"ci Q⇤i (s) < 0 or (ii) lim s"ci Q⇤i (s) = 0. In Case (i), the first term on the righthand side of (3.32) is negative due to (3.30). In Case (ii), lim s"ci Q⇤i (s) Q⇤i (0) = 0 Q⇤i (0) > 0
(since Q⇤i < 0 on [0, ci )) and so Q⇤i as a distribution assigns a positive measure on [0, ci ); hence
the double integral on the right-hand side of (3.32) is positive. Thus, by (3.31),
> 0 ) L (Ri,T (Q⇤ ), ) > L (Q⇤ , ).

Consequently, by the saddle point condition that Q⇤ maximizes L (·, ) on Qmon , = 0. This
coupled with (3.33) means that Ri,T (Q⇤ ) is a maximizer of L (·, 0) on Qmon .
If there is another player k , i to whom Ri,T (Q⇤ ) allocates the bad with a strictly positive
probability, perturb Ri,T (Q⇤ ) by the reservation operator Rk,Tk such that T k = {(tl )nl=1 2 [0, 1]n |
tk 2 [0, ck ]}. By the previous reasoning, Rk,Tk Ri,T (Q⇤ ) is a maximizer of L (·, 0) on Qmon .
Repeating this reservation procedure, we eventually obtain an allocation Q̃ that allocates the
bad with zero probability and maximizes L (·, 0) on Qmon . Since Q̃ is entirely nonnegative (c
a crossing point of Q⇤ ), the left-hand side of (3.17) is nonnegative (Lemma 2) and so = 0 is
a minimum of the Lagrangian L (Q̃, ·) on R+ . Thus (Q̃, 0) is a saddle point and hence, by the
sufficiency part of Theorem 6, Q̃ constitutes an optimal mechanism subject to IC, IR and BB.
Since Q̃ does not allocate the bad at all, we obtain a contradiction to the premise that the bad
is allocated with a strictly positive probability in every optimal mechanism. ⌅

3.5

Why the Kuhn-Tucker Method Does Not Deliver

To solve a constrained optimization problem such as (3.16) with the Kuhn-Tucker theorem,
a typical approach is to apply the theorm to a relaxed problem, which sets aside the monotonicity constraint (the second-order part of IC). For the solution thereby obtained to be valid
to the original problem, the method would have to assume that any solution obtained through
this method happens to satisfy the set aside monotonicity constraint (e.g., Ledyard and Palfrey [11], who refer to this assumption “regular case”). Could this method have delivered some
counterpart to Theorem 7 such as the bad being needed given a nondegenerate set of parameter
values? The answer is No. The next Theorem 8 says that if the bad is needed then either every
solution to the relaxed problem violates the monotonicity constraint, or the relaxed problem
su↵ers indeterminacy in the sense that it has a continuum of solutions.
To state the theorem, recall that an optimal mechanism means any maximizer of (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB. As shown in Section 3.3, maximizing (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB is
equivalent to maximizing (3.16) among all Q 2 Q subject to (3.17) and the monotonicity constraint Q 2 Qmon . Call an allocation optimal if and only if it is a solution to this maximization
problem. The relaxed problem, by contrast, is to maximize (3.16) among all Q 2 Q subject to
only (3.17). Explicitly put, the relaxed problem is
P R1
maxQ2Q
Qi (ti ) (ti f (ti ) W(ti ) + F(ti )) dti
i
(3.34)
P R01
P
s.t.
0.
i 0 Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +
i hQi : ⇢(F)|
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The next lemma, proved in Appendix B.6.1, provides the basis for the theorem.
Lemma 4 Given any welfare density w:
a. Q⇤ is a solution to (3.34) if and only if there exists 2 R+ such that (Q⇤ , ) is a saddle
point with respect to (L , Q) in that (3.15) holds for all Q 2 Q and all 0 2 R+ ;
b. if Q⇤ maximizes L (Q, ) among all Q 2 Q, then:
i. if
ii. if

= 0 then, for almost all (s, s0 ) 2 [0, 1]2 , V(s) > V(s0 ) ) Q⇤i (s) > Q⇤i (s0 );
> 0, then Q⇤i (s)Q⇤j (s)

0 for all players i and j and almost every s 2 [0, 1];

iii. if Q⇤i < 0 on [0, ci ) for some ci 2 (0, 1] and some player i, then V  0 on (0, ci ).

Theorem 8 Assume that f is di↵erentiable on [0, 1]. For any welfare density w given which
the bad is needed, the relaxed problem (3.34) either (i) does not have any optimal allocation
as a solution or (ii) has a continuum of solutions.
Alternative (ii) in Theorem 8, where the relaxed problem admits a continuum of solutions,
corresponds to a condition that the virtual surplus is constantly zero on a nondegnerate interval
(0, c⇤ ). This condition can be violated with slight perturbations of the type-density f or the
welfare density w near 0. Thus the next corollary obtains (proved in Appendix B.6.4).
Corollary 8 In the parameter space consisting of all pairs ( f, w) of type-density function f and
welfare density w such that f is di↵erentiable, it is generically true that if the bad is needed
then the constraint Q 2 Qmon is binding for any optimal mechanism.
Proof of Theorem 8 It suffices to prove that if statement (i) is not true then statement (ii) is
true. Thus, let Q⇤ be an optimal allocation that is also a solution to (3.34), and we shall prove
that (3.34) has a continuum of solutions. As part of the definition of optimality, Q⇤ 2 Qmon .
With Q⇤ a solution to (3.34), there exists a 2 R+ for which (Q⇤ , ) is a saddle point with
respect to (L , Q) (Lemma 4.a). Thus, Q⇤ maximizes L (·, ) on Q.
We claim that > 0. Suppose not, then Lemma 4.b.i implies that Q⇤i (ti ) is a strictly increasing function of V(ti ) a.e. ti 2 [0, 1]. Since the bad is needed by hypothesis, Theorem 7
implies that (3.22) holds, which in turn implies V < 0 somewhere in [0, 1]. This, coupled with
the fact that V(0) = 0 and V is di↵erentiable (as f is di↵erentiable), implies that V is negative
and strictly decreasing on (a, b) for some 0  a < b  1. Then Q⇤i is strictly decreasing a.e.
on (a, b), contradicting the monotonicity condition Q⇤ 2 Qmon .
By the hypothesis that the bad is needed and the fact Q⇤ 2 Qmon , Q⇤i < 0 on [0, x) for some
x 2 (0, 1] and some player i. Let
c⇤ := max sup x 2 [0, 1] : Q⇤i < 0 on [0, x) .
i=1,...,n

Note c⇤ > 0. Let i0 be a player that attains this maximum, so Q⇤i0 < 0 on [0, c⇤ ). Since > 0,
Lemma 4.b.ii applies. Thus, for any player k , i0 , Q⇤k Q⇤i0 0 a.e., and hence Q⇤k  0 a.e. on
[0, c⇤ ). The definition of c⇤ , coupled with Q⇤ 2 Qmon , also implies Q⇤k
0 on (c⇤ , 1] for all
players k. Thus c := (ck )nk=1 defined by ck := c⇤ for all k is a crossing point of Q⇤ .
There are only two possible cases: (i) V (x) < 0 for some x 2 (0, c⇤ ), or (ii) V
0 on
(0, c⇤ ). The rest of the proof is to establish two observations:
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a. Case (i) implies that Q⇤ violates the monotonicity constraint and hence (3.34) admits no
optimal allocation as a solution.

b. Case (ii) implies that (3.34) has a continuum of solutions.
Both observations are based on the fact that Q⇤ maximizes L (·, ) on Q(Q⇤ , c), where Q(Q⇤ , c),
according to (3.27) and the definition of c here, is the set of Q 2 Q that result from some signpreserving perturbations of Q⇤ that leave the positive part of Q⇤i (8i) unchanged. Note, for any
Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c), (3.26) holds and
X Z c⇤
⇤
L (Q, ) L (Q , ) =
Qi (s) Q⇤i (s) V (s)dF(s).
(3.35)
0

i

⇣ ⌘
Thus, plug “Qi = Qi and Q⇤i = Q⇤i on [0, c⇤ )” into (3.35) to get that Q⇤ solves
max⇤

Q2Q(Q ,c)

XZ
i

c⇤

0

Qi (s)

⇣

⌘
V (s) dF(s).

(3.36)

In Case (i), since V is di↵erentiable and V (0) = 0, there is a nondegenerate interval
I ✓ (0, c⇤ ) on which V is negative and strictly decreasing. Since Q⇤ is a solution to (3.36),
it does not allocate the good to any player-type in I, nor the bad to any player-type in (c⇤ , 1];
furthermore, if the bad is to be allocated to some player-types in [0, c⇤ ], the bad goes to the
one whose V -value is the lowest among all negative ones. If these three properties are not
all satisfied, one can construct a Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c) that outperforms Q⇤ in terms of the objective
of (3.36) (Lemma 24 in Appendix B.6.2, where g = V ). Thus, by (3.3), for any i and any
ti 2 I, Q⇤i (ti ) is equal to the negative of the marginal of the ex post allocation q⇤iB (ti , ·) of the bad,
and Q⇤i (ti ) is strictly increasing in V (ti ) for a.e. ti 2 I (Lemma 25 in Appendix B.6.2, where
g = V ). But then Q⇤i is strictly decreasing a.e. on I, violating the monotonicity constraint.
Hence Q⇤ cannot be an optimal allocation.
In Case (ii), V = 0 on [0, c⇤ ) by Lemma 4.b.iii and the definition of c⇤ . Then (3.35) implies
L (Q, ) = L (Q⇤ , ) for any Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c). Thus, any Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c) is also a maximizer
of L (·, ) on Q. By Lemma 4.a, any such Q is a solution to the relaxed problem if minimizes L (Q, ·) on R+ , which is true if the constraint in the relaxed problem (3.34) is binding
for Q. By the definition of hQi : ⇢(F)|, the constraint being binding for Q is equivalent to
XZ

1

0

i

Qi (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) dF(s) =

XZ
i

1

0

Q+i (s) (s f (s) + F(s)

1) dF(s).

Since c is a crossing point for all Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c), this equation is the same as
XZ
i

0

c⇤

Qi (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) dF(s) =

XZ
i

=

c⇤

XZ
|i

1

1

c⇤

Q+i (s) (s f (s) + F(s)
Q⇤i (s) + (s f (s) + F(s)
{z
=:z

1) dF(s)

(3.37)

1) dF(s),
}
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with the second line due to the fact that Qi (s) = Q⇤i (s) whenever Q⇤i (s) > 0 (by the definition
of Q(Q⇤ , c)). Thus, any Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c) for which
X Z c⇤
Qi (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) dF(s) = z
(3.38)
i

0

is a solution to the relaxed problem. Since c⇤ > 0, Q(Q⇤ , c) is a convex set with nonempty
interior. The left-hand side of (3.38) is a linear functional on Q(Q⇤ , c). Thus one can show
that the set of Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c) that satisfies (3.38) is a hyperplane intersection of the interior
of Q(Q⇤ , c) (Lemma 26, Appendix B.6.3). Hence there is a continuum of solutions to the
relaxed problem, as asserted. ⌅

3.6

Conclusion

This paper asks a novel question: Under what primitive condition in a quasilinear independent private values model is a commonly undesirable item needed as an instrument to achieve
interim Pareto optimality? The answer is a necessary and sufficient condition, which holds
if the extreme low types weigh in the social welfare more than twice the average weight, or
if the welfare weight distribution spreads out sufficiently. This result holds regardless of the
particular functional forms of the social welfare distribution and the type distribution. The
finding sheds a new light on policy issues regarding the location decision of Nimbies. Even
if the public good e↵ect of a Nimby were assumed away and there were no cost to do away
with the Nimby completely, the Nimby is still needed to optimize the social welfare when the
welfare weights of the high and low types are sufficiently large. Put di↵erently, if we think of
welfare weights as the bargaining power among various players in the interim, in any idealized
outcome of the interim bargaining process, some low types have to end with the bad if the low
and high types are sufficiently powerful relative to the middle types.
It is important to note that the purpose of this paper is not to find a tractable model where a
bad is needed for social optimality. Our purpose, rather, is to identify the condition under which
the bad is needed in an environment that does not at all force the usage of the bad, with never
allocating the bad part of an ex ante incentive efficient allocation. Nevertheless, some models
where the usage of the bad arises more easily are also interesting to study and could also use our
method. For example, consider the provision of healthcare with congestion such that everyone
is endowed with a basic amount of healthcare service. If someone wants a premium service,
someone else has to give up the basic service thereby freeing up the facility for the former. The
latter’s action can be interpreted as receiving a unit of the bad, and this setup is subject to the
market clearing condition that the quantity of the good (premium service) awarded be equal to
the quantity of the bad received. Ex ante incentive efficiency would then entail assignment of
the bad to some types. Given such a setup, our saddle point characterization remains valid.
This paper contributes a new method to the mechanism design problems where a player’s
role in the market is not exogenous but rather determined by the mechanism and the player’s
action. Such endogeneity upsets the linearity of a player’s ex ante surplus as a function of the
allocation in the mechanism. We restore the structure to a tractable, concave two-part operator
thereby characterizing all the optimal mechanisms with a saddle point condition. Furthermore,
to derive properties of all optimal mechanisms from the saddle point condition, we develop
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a perturbation method that uses a family of ex post feasible, sign-preserving perturbations of
any optimal allocation. Preserving every player’s endogenous role in the market in a typeby-type manner, such perturbations a↵ect the associated Lagrangian linearly, because they do
not alter the measure with which the two-part operator acts on the allocation. Considering
such perturbations in the direction of the fixed measure, we obtain necessary conditions for
all—rather than only for some—optimal mechanisms. Our method proves more applicable
than the Kuhn-Tucker method given our environment, as it is generically impossible for the
Kuhn-Tucker method to obtain a counterpart to our result.
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Chapter 4
Sponsored Link Auctions with Conusmer
Search
4.1

Introduction

Amazon and eBay place “sponsored links” at the top of the webpages where customers can
spot them immediately. Top positions on the product search results provide an instant visibility
boost to customers. Sellers who own the sponsored link positions are determined by auctions.1
Sponsored link auctions are important and fast-growing channels for online shopping platforms
to collect revenues. Amazon reports auction revenues of 14.08 billion dollars in 2019 and
21.48 billion dollars in 2020. Unlike auctions selling concrete items, sponsored link auctions
sell advertisement positions. The value of a sponsored link position thus depends on how it
increases the auction winner’s profit by a↵ecting consumers’ search outcomes.
This chapter contributes to the literature by introducing two novel elements in the sponsored
link auctions. First, I assume consumers have partial information on product values, observe
product prices during the search, and use the information to search optimally. Second, sellers
in my model choose both product prices and auction bids optimally to maximize their profits.
The questions are: How do sellers’ pricing strategies and bidding strategies interact in such
an environment. And how the interaction a↵ects the surplus split between consumers, sellers,
and the shopping platform. My main finding is that the answers depend on the payment rule
of the auction. If the auction winner’s payment is fixed in a lump-sum manner, sellers’ pricing
and bidding strategies are independent. However, if the auction winner pays to the platform
every time a product is sold, product prices increase under the equilibrium. Thus, a shift from
the fixed payment to the per-transaction payment decreases consumer surplus and increases
the sellers’ profits. Moreover, I find that sponsored link auction revenue decreases from such a
change of the payment rules.
I consider an oligopoly market where the value of a product is separated into two parts:
one is known prior search, the other needs to be discovered from search.2 To be specific, a
1

The auction rules used by Amazon and eBay are di↵erent. Amazon uses second price auctions, and the
payments are made based on the number of clicks of product links. eBay uses first price auctions, and the
payments are made based on the number of transactions. Criteria about the quality of the product exist to be
placed on a sponsored link.
2
The definition of search good, and how it distinguishes from experienced good is well-documented by Nelson
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consumer’s payo↵ from purchasing a product i is vi + zi pi , where vi (prior value) and pi
(product price) are known before the search but a search cost si has to be paid in order to
learn zi (match value).3 The payo↵ setting fits into the online shopping context reasonably
well, as the shopping procedure can be described as follows. First, a consumer chooses a
shopping platform and types the keywords the product. Second, based on the input keywords,
the platform produces a webpage of multiple product links, with the corresponding product
prices (pi ) and brief product descriptions (vi ). Third, the consumer sequentially clicks a set of
links based on the prior information (vi , pi and belief on zi ), spends time (pays search cost si )
to collect detailed information (learns zi ) on the product description page. If the product does
not fit the consumer’s preference, the consumer continues searching until a decision (purchase
or quit) is made.4
Weitzman’s (1979) [19] solution fully characterizes the optimal search rule in such an environment, with the optimal search order and the stopping rule. However, because a consumer
is assumed to be aware of the existence of all products when the search starts, the consumer
search is not a↵ected by the product position. Awareness of all products initially thus makes
product demands irrelevant to product positions on a webpage. Such an assumption is realistic
in small markets, in which consumers view all the products immediately after they input the
keywords. However, the search result of a particular keyword on Amazon usually consists of
hundreds of links. Consumers need to read the search results in a top-to-down manner, scroll
down, and flip pages to know the products’ existence at lower positions.5 With limited memory
and the belief that links are sorted from high to low quality, most consumers only glance at the
first few pages before stopping.
To capture the online search behavior and justify why sellers pay for sponsored link positions, I introduce the concept of block, which is a set of adjacent products in the keyword
search result. For example, the first block is the first page, or the set of products that a consumer can see immediately (top of the first page), which consists of the sponsored links and
the “best sellers.” The second block consists of the products that a consumer needs to scroll
down or flip the webpage to see. Blocks are mutually exclusive, such that one product belongs
to one block. I assume all consumers search block-by-block, apply Weitzman’s optimal search
rule within each block and update the current best option when switching blocks. For instance,
when searching the second block, consumers use the value of the best product searched in the
first block as the new outside option, conditional on it being better than the original outside
option.
Intuitively, block-by-block search distorts both search order and stopping rule compared to
the case without blocks (Weitzman). The search order is distorted since consumers are unaware
of any product in the second block at the beginning of the search, even if some products in the
second block have a high priority to search. The stopping rule is distorted since consumers
(1970) [16].
3
This payo↵ is also used in Armstrong and Zhou (2011) [1], Haan et al. (2017) [12] and Choi, Dai and Kim
(2018) [7].
4
Quit the search is equivalent to taking an outside option, which can be purchasing from another platform or
purchasing in-store.
5
Joachims et al. [13] provide experimental evidence supporting the block-by-block search by monitoring
browser users’ eyeballs movement when they glance over google search results online. They find users “first
scan the viewable results quite thoroughly before resorting to scrolling”.
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update the best option according to the search outcome in the first block and thus search fewer
products in the second block. Thus, the block-by-block search behavior increases the demand
for products in the first block, decreases the demand for products in the second block, and
creates incentives for sellers to win the sponsored link position in the first block.
For tractability, I focus on the environment with two blocks and one sponsored link position
in the first block. Despite the limited number of blocks, the setup captures the critical features
of sellers’ pricing and bidding competition with consumer search. Having only two blocks
is not an unreasonable abstraction from reality. First, to guarantee good users’ experiences,
Amazon and eBay impose a set of prerequisites, regarding product quality, on the participants
of the sponsored link auction. Since the online platform ranks products from high quality to
low quality in general, the sellers competing for the sponsored link position are likely from
higher positions. Second, most consumers only search among the first few pages of a selling
website.6 Thus, focusing on the first two blocks does not a↵ect the underlying implications the
paper intends to study.
The timing of my model is the following. First, sellers bid the top position first. Second,
given the position determined by the auction, sellers set prices optimally via oligopoly price
competition. Last, given the position and prices, consumers search optimally. I solve the
model by backward induction by characterizing consumer demand first, then sellers pricing
equilibrium, and lastly the bidding equilibrium. The solution concept is subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Characterization of demand functions relies on the eventual purchase theorem by Choi,
Dai and Kim [7] (henceforth CDK), who summarize the conditions of purchase outcomes in
Weitzman under a discrete choice formulation. I adapt CDK’s eventual purchase theorem to
the context of block-by-block search (Theorem 9). With the revised eventual purchase theorem, I characterize the product demands under any product position. By assuming log-concave
densities of product values, the demand functions are log-supermodular, and pricing equilibrium is uniquely pinned down by first-order conditions (Theorem 10). Hence, the equilibrium
profit of any seller is uniquely determined under any auction outcome. Sellers then bid for the
sponsored link position to increase their equilibrium profits.
I study the complete-information second price auctions with two payment schemes: fixed
payment and per-transaction payment. Under fixed payment, the winner pays the secondhighest bid once in a lump-sum manner. Under per-transaction payment, the winner pays the
second-highest bid whenever a product is sold. Since sellers can update their bids frequently
and experiment with them, the sponsored link auction is treated as a complete information
game. Under both payment schemes, the unique pure strategy pricing equilibrium exists given
the winner’s identity and the corresponding bid payment (Theorem 10 applies). This is because
the bid payment is independent of the winner’s pricing strategy under the fixed payment, and
can be regarded as the additional marginal cost paid by the winner to produce a product under
per-transaction payment. I characterize the pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of
the bidding game under both payment schemes (Theorem 11 and Theorem 12).
In the comparative statics analysis with symmetric sellers, I find the fixed payment leads
to a higher auction revenue and consumer surplus, while the per-transaction payment provides
6

Using detailed online browsing and transaction data of the book market, Delossantos et al. (2012) [9] find it
is likely that consumers choose a fixed and small sample size to search when entering the market.
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more seller profits (Theorem 13). The reason is that the per-transaction payment distorts the
winner’s optimal pricing rule and increases the prices of all products. Since a seller’s profit
increases if a competitor sets a higher price, and a product’s equilibrium price increases in its
marginal cost, non-winners in the per-transaction payment auction have incentives to increase
their bids to increase the winner’s marginal cost.
The paper also provides the consumer-optimal positioning of products if sellers commit to
price before the position is allocated (Theorem 14). Intuitively speaking, the platform needs
to help consumers find a high payo↵ product with a low search cost paid. Thus, allocating all
products with high expected values into a higher position may fail to be optimal, because the
search friction prevents consumers from purchasing the best option in general. Surprisingly,
low search cost can be more important: Under an extreme situation where it is costlessly to
learn the value of all products in the first block, consumer surplus equals that without blocks,
which is the highest attainable surplus in the search environment.
Compiani et al. (2021) [8] find a consumer optimal positioning, called “diamonds in
rough,” in a di↵erent setup. Instead of assuming consumers search block-by-block, they assume that the reservation value, which determines the optimal search order, has an additive
separable term decreasing in product position (larger for higher position). They find to maximize consumer surplus, platforms need to put products whose utility indexes exceed search
indexes into higher positions. Their search environment is more general as the utility index and
the search index are independent. In my model, subject to Weitzman’s search framework, the
counterparts of the utility index and search index are correlated through the prior and match
values. Moreover, their model does not consider search cost explicitly. So the results are not
directly comparable.
A mass body of literature studies sponsored link auctions under di↵erent setups, but most
papers study auctions run by online search engines (e.g., Google and Yahoo!). Some of the
di↵erences between my paper and past papers are caused by the di↵erent auction contexts,
especially that product prices are not observable on Google’s search results. So I emphasize
that the paper is not arguing that the sponsored link auction model with flexible search behavior
is a superior one. Rather, I think it provides a di↵erent perspective to analyze the auction when
consumers have more or less prior information. Varian (2007) [20], and Edelman, Ostrovsky,
and Schwarz (2007) [11] study the generalized second price auction, in which the winner of
the k’s position pays the k 1th highest bid. In contrast to modeling the positions as blocks,
positions in their paper are strictly ranked, and a higher position always have a higher number
of clicks. Both papers assume a seller’s payo↵ from a click depends only on the seller’s identity
but not on the seller’s position, and the number of clicks received by a seller depends only on
the seller’s position but not on the seller’s identity. They characterize a local condition for the
equilibrium and find truth-telling is not an equilibrium in the generalized second price auction.
Börgers et al. (2013) [4] extend the generalized second price auction by allowing both the
value of a click and the expected number of clicks to be seller-position specific. They find
a multiplicity of equilibria exist in general. By explicitly modeling consumer search behavior
and letting sellers compete in prices, I capture the “allocative externality” that is not considered
by the previous literature. Allocative externality is within block competition and exists when
a seller’s payo↵ depends not only on the position but also on other sellers’ identities. For
example, a seller gets more clicks if the competitors on the same webpage are weakly than if
surrounded by well-known brands.

4.2. The Model
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Chen and He (2006) [5] and Athey and Ellison (2011) [2] incorporate search behavior
into sponsored link auction games in a di↵erent context. They assume the value of any link
is draw from the same distribution, and consumers have no prior information on the value
before clicking a link. Search is driven by consumers’ belief in the links’ qualities, which are
the probabilities of satisfying a consumer’s need, independent of the links’ realized values.
With no prior information on product values and prices, consumers always search for the first
product that satisfies their needs. Identical value distribution implies that consumers have the
same expected payo↵ from any link and that all sellers set the same equilibrium price and
receive the same profit from a transaction. So the interaction between price and bid studied
in this paper is not valid in their setup. By allowing heterogeneous consumer preferences and
sellers’ strategic pricing, the paper analyzes consumer surplus from a di↵erent perspective and
studies how price and bid interact in the sponsored link auction.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the model and consumer’s optimal search rule. Section 4.3 characterizes product demands in two blocks respectively. Section 4.4 establishes the existence and uniqueness of pricing strategy under any
position outcome. The existence of pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the
bidding game is established in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 analyzes comparative statics that compares di↵erent bid payment schemes. Section 4.7 provides the consumer optimal positioning
of products. The last section concludes.

4.2

The Model

A market consists of n sellers indexed by i 2 N := {1, . . . , n}. Each seller i can produce a
product at a marginal cost ci and zero fixed cost. All products are in the same category and are
horizontally di↵erentiated. Each seller produces one type of product, so the index i also refers
to seller i’s product.
To sell their products, sellers need to put product links on an online shopping platform. A
platform allocates all sellers into two blocks, indexed by k 2 {1, 2}. Let Nk ⇢ N be the set of
sellers in block k, with N1 [ N2 = N and N1 \ N2 = ;. I call (N1 , N2 ) the position of sellers.
Sellers in the same block share the same position and the size of the two blocks are fixed, such
that |N1 | = n1 and |N2 | = n2 .
The platform sells one position in N1 through a second price auction. Before the auction,
the platform determines the status quo position of sellers, (N10 , N20 ), and a positioning function
l : N20 ! N10 . The positioning function l decides which seller in N10 to be moved to block 2
if i 2 N20 wins to maintain the sizes of the two blocks. If seller i 2 N20 wins the auction, the
position is (N1 , N2 ) = (N10 + i l(i), N20 i + l(i)).7 If seller i 2 N10 wins, the position stays the
same as the status quo, i.e., (N1 , N2 ) = (N10 , N20 ). Without loss of generality, let N10 = {1, . . . , n1 }
and N20 = {n1 + 1, . . . , n}, so the index i is generated such that the first n1 sellers are in N10 and
the rests are in N20 .
7

I use + and

as set operators: (N10 + i

l(i), N20

i + l(i)) = (N10 [ {i} \ {l(i)}, N20 \ {i} [ l(i)).
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position
N10
N20

seller
1
2
3
4

position seller
1
N1
3
2
N2
4

Table 4.1: status quo position (left) and the position
when seller 3 wins the auction with l(3) = 2 (right).
After positions are determined by the auction, all sellers simultaneously announce their
prices. Define the price of product i as pi . If i 2 N10 wins the auction, the price vector of
products in block 1 is p1 := p1 , . . . , pn1 and that in block 2 is p2 := pn1 +1 , . . . , pn . Else,
if i 2 N20 wins the auction, the price vectors are p1 := p1 , . . . , pl(i) 1 , pi , pl(i)+1 , . . . , pn1 and
p2 := pn1 +1 , . . . , pi 1 , pl(i) , pi+1 , . . . , pn .
There is a unit mass of consumers with unit demands. A consumer’s random utility from
consuming product i is Vi + Zi , where Vi is the prior value for product i, and Zi is the additional
value the consumer discovers from visiting product i’s selling page. For each consumer, the
realization of Vi and Zi , denoted as vi and zi , are drawn from distributions Fi (·) and Gi (·) independently, with continuously di↵erentiable densities fi (·) and gi (·), and supports [vi , vi ] and
[zi , zi ]. For all i, Fi (·) and Gi (·) are common knowledge among consumers and sellers.8 I define
vk and zk as the vectors of prior value and match value in block k 2 {1, 2} in the same way as
how pk is defined.
With product position and prices, a consumer searches in the following way:
1. A consumer starts the search and sees all products in block 1. The consumer knows v1
and p1 immediately.
2. The consumer can visit any product i 2 N1 ’s selling page and learn zi at a search cost si
on the first visit. Based on the realized zi , the consumer either ends the search in block
1, or continues searching in block 1.
3. If the consumer finds no more product in block 1 worth visiting, he/she sees all the
products in block 2 and knows v2 and p2 immediately. The consumer repeats the search
process as that in block 1.
4. Recall a product is costless after the first visit. The consumer compares all visited products and makes the purchase decision.
The underlying assumption of the search behavior is that consumers are unaware of products
in block 2 when search in block 1. Searching block 1 before block 2 is non-strategic, as block
1 is always shown to consumers before block 2.
e be the set of products whose links are clicked by a consumer before the purchase
Let N
decision is made. The consumer who eventually purchases product i gets a payo↵:
X
e = vi + zi pi
U(vi , zi , pi , N)
s j.
8

e
j2N

A single consumer does not make decisions based on Fi , since vi is realized from the consumer’s point of
view. Thus, assuming Fi is unknown to consumers does not change any result in this paper.
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Amazon

the winner pays

Sellers

pay product price

Consumers

set prices

allocates

search

Block 1
Block 2
Sponsored Link Auction

u0

Consumer Search

Figure 4.1: Interactions between sponosred link auction and search

If a consumer chooses to purchase nothing from the platform after search, the payo↵ is u0
P
e s j , where u0 is the outside option value and is assumed to be identical to all consumers.
j2N
Consumers search the two blocks to maximize their expected payo↵s, under the restriction that
they can search block 2 only if they finish searching in block 1.
Figure 4.1 shows how the platform, sellers and consumers interact in my model.
Weitzman (1979) [19] characterizes the optimal search rule under the environment where
consumers are aware of all products initially (without blocks). When two blocks exist, the
optimal search rule in each block remains the same as that in Weitzman. The key di↵erence is
that when searching in the second block, consumers update the outside option according to the
search outcome from the first block. The following lemma states the optimal search strategy.
Lemma 5 For any consumer, given (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , the optimal search strategy is as follows: for
each i, let z⇤i be determined by:
si =

Z

zi

z⇤i

(1

Gi (zi ))dzi .

(4.1)

• Order: In each block k 2 {1, 2}, the consumer clicks the products in the descending order
of vi + z⇤i pi .
ek ✓ Nk be the set of visited products in
• Stopping: At any point during the search, let N
block k.If k = 1, the consumer stops searching block 1 and switches to block 2 if and only
if
(
)
max u0 , max{vi + zi
e1
i2N

pi } > max {v j + z⇤j
e1
j2N1 \N

p j }.

If k = 2, the consumer stops searching and takes the current best option if and only if
(
)
max u0 , max {vi + zi pi } > max {v j + z⇤j p j }.
e1 [N
e2
i2N

e2
j2N2 \N

Lemma 5 shows consumer’s optimal search rule depends on product price and two types of
value: true value, vi + zi , and reservation value, vi + z⇤i . I define the corresponding net value as
the value minus price, e.g., the net true value of product i is vi + zi pi . The ordering rule in
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Lemma 5 says, for any consumer with realized value (vk , zk )2k=1 and price ( pk )2k=1 , the product
with a higher net reservation value in each block has a higher priority to search, as it is more
likely to have a higher net true value. Given block k is under search, the stopping rule says
that a consumer stops searching block k if the value of the current best option
h is larger thani
the net reservation values of all products not visited in block k. Since si = E max{Zi z⇤i , 0}
(by Eq. (4.1) and integration by parts), the stopping rule can be intuitively explained as that
the expected additional value discovered from one more visit is less than the search cost. For
instance, if the current best option has a value u, and i is the next product to visit according to
the order rule, the expected gain from an additional visit is
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤
E max {vi + Zi pi u, 0} E max{Zi z⇤i , 0} ,
|
{z
}
=:si

which is strictly negative if u > vi + z⇤i pi and positive otherwise.
Given that all consumers search optimally, the mass of consumers who purchase product i
is Dki ( p1 , p2 ), which depends on the product position and product prices. The platform runs a
second price auction to sell the sponsored link position (details in Section 4.5). Sellers simultaneously decide product prices and auction bids to maximize their expected profits net from
auction payments.

Limitations / Alternative modelling choice Though consumer search behavior is more flexible comparing to past sponsored link auction literature, it is worth emphasizing the imposed
assumptions and limitations.
First, all consumers search the first block before the second. This assumption is relatively
intuitive and is supported by eye-tracking experiments in Joachims et al. [13].
Second, search costs are constant across all consumers, and consumers have to pay the
search cost before purchasing. When shopping online, some consumers may have target items
before the search. Namely, they may learn product characteristics o✏ine (from friends’ recommendations or past experiences) and not need to read the product description and pay the
search cost before purchasing. A recent paper by Chen et al. [6] studies this scenario which
they call “blind buying”. This paper aims to build a tractable model to study the interaction
between consumer search, sellers’ pricing, and bidding in the sponsored link auction.
Third, I assume that one seller produces only one type of good. In reality, if a seller produces di↵erent products and owns more than one link on the platform, they can set prices
and bid to maximize the joint profits from all her products. Studying the joint maximization
problem is out of the scope of the paper. I leave the extensions for future research.
Lastly, consumers may find it costly to read through the search list and thus stop at some
point without scrolling down. Stoping without reading all links is less likely to happen when
the search list is short. And intuitively, adding this additional layer to stop the search would
make higher positions more valuable but should not change the key results in this chapter.

4.3

Demand Characterization

Given (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , CDK define the e↵ective value of product i as wi := vi + min{zi , z⇤i }, which
is the minimum between i’s true value and reservation value. CDK find the eventual purchase
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condition without blocks: consumers eventually purchase the product with the highest net
e↵ective value wi pi among all i 2 N, conditional on the net e↵ective value is larger than the
outside option value u0 . I adapt CDK’s Theorem 1 into the context where consumers search
block 1 first and update the outside option value according to the search outcome from block 1
when searching block 2.
Theorem 9 For a consumer with (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , let i⇤ = arg maxi2N1 {wi pi } and j⇤ = arg maxi2N2 {wi
pi }.9
• The consumer purchases product i 2 N1 if and only if i = i⇤ , wi pi > u0 , and vi +zi pi >
w j⇤ p j⇤ .
• The consumer purchases product i 2 N2 if and only if i = j⇤ and wi
u1 := u0 if wi⇤ pi⇤ < u0 and u1 := vi⇤ + zi⇤ pi⇤ if wi⇤ pi⇤ u0 .

pi > u1 , where

Proof Since the search rule in each block follows Weitzman, CDK’s eventual purchase theorem applies in each block. Consumers always search block 1 before block 2 and update the
current best option when switching blocks, so they compare the net realized value of i⇤ and the
e↵ective value of j⇤ to make the final purchase decision.
Demand for product i is the probability that the purchase conditions in Theorem 9 are
satisfied. Theorem 9 says the product with the highest e↵ective value in each block is the
candidate product to purchase in that block. The consumer compares the outside option value,
the net true value of the candidate product in block 1, and the net e↵ective value of the
candidate product in block 2 to make the purchase decision. The asymmetry between how
consumers make the purchase decision in block 1 (using true value) and block 2 (using e↵ective
value) is the underlying force making a position in block 1 valuable.
Since consumers select the candidate product in each block based on the net e↵ective value,
it is useful to set up the distribution of the e↵ective value of product i, Wi = Vi + min{Zi , z⇤i }, to
characterize the demands. Denote the distribution of Wi as Hi (·):
Z zi
Hi (wi ) :=
Fi (wi min{zi , z⇤i })dGi (zi ).
(4.2)
zi

Notations Before proceeding, I introduce some notations to formulate demand functions.
Define ki := max j2Nk \{i} {W j p j } be the consumer’s (random) net e↵ective value of the best
alternative to product i in block k, and define k0 := max j2Nk {W j p j } be the (random) net
e↵ective value of the candidate product in block k. The table below summarizes notations used
to characterize demand:
random variable distribution realization support
e1 (·)
Xi := max{u0 , 1i }
H
xi
[xi , xi ]
i
2
2
e
Yi := max{u0 , i }
Hi (·)
yi
[y , yi ]
i
1
1
X0 := 0
H⇤ (·)
x0
[x0 , x0 ]
Y0 := 20
H⇤2 (·)
y0
[y , y0 ]
0

9

Since both fi and gi are continuous, the event wi

pi = w j

p j for i , j happens with zero probability.
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4.3.1

Demand in Block 1

When product i belongs to block 1 (i 2 N1 ), for any (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , xi is the largest e↵ective
value in block 1 besides i. By Theorem 9, if xi y0 , a consumer never purchases from block
2, since according to the optimal search rule, the consumer cannot find any product in block 2
better than the candidate product in block 1. Thus, the sufficient condition for the consumer to
purchase product i is wi pi > xi , so i is the candidate product in block 1. However, if y0 > xi ,
wi pi > xi alone is no longer sufficient to guarantee the purchase of i, since the consumer
may find a product better than i in block 2 if the net realized value of i is not large enough (i.e.,
vi + zi pi < y0 ). The next lemma states a simple condition under which product i 2 N1 is
purchased.
Lemma 6 Given (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , the consumer purchases product i in block 1 if and and only if
vi + min{zi , z⇤i + (y0
where (y0

xi )+ := max{y0

xi )+ }

pi > max{xi , y0 },

(4.3)

xi , 0}.

Lemma 6 is proven in Appendix C.1. Given Lemma 6, it is useful to define the the distribution of Wi (q) := Vi + min{Zi , z⇤i + q} for q 0, which is the distorted e↵ective value of product i
that stems from the block-by-block search behavior. Lemma 6 thus says a product in block 1 is
purchased if its distorted e↵ective value is larger than the e↵ective value of all other products.
Remark One can regard the change of e↵ective value to the distorted e↵ective value of product
i as if the reservation value of i increases from vi + z⇤i to vi + z⇤i + q. When there is no block, a
consumer searches in the descending order of the net reservation values among all products. So
an increase of i’s reservation value means the consumer searches i earlier. Hence, the distorted
e↵ective value reflects that search order is distorted such that products in block 1 are searched
earlier.
The distribution of the distorted e↵ective value, Wi (q), is
Z zi
bi (wi , q) :=
H
Fi (wi min{zi , z⇤i + q})dGi (zi ).
zi

(4.4)

bi (·, q) becomes more first order stochastically dominant when q
Lemma 7 below states that H
increases.
Lemma 7 For any q0

q

bi (·, q0 ) first order stochastically dominates (FOSD) H
bi (·, q).
0, H

Proof For any realized (vi , zi ) and any q0
q
0, wi (q0 )
wi (q) by definition. The the
0
b q ) and H(·,
b q) is
di↵erence between H(·,
Z zi
⇥
⇤
0
b
b
Hi (wi , q ) Hi (wi , q) =
Fi (wi min{zi , z⇤i + q0 }) Fi (wi min{zi , z⇤i + q}) dGi (zi ),
zi

which is non-positive as Fi is a distribution and is increasing.
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Let p := ( p1 , p2 ) be the price vector of all products. Given xi and yi , Ineq. (4.3) holds with
bi max{xi , y0 } + pi , (y0 xi )+ . Thus, the demand for product i in block 1 is:
probability 1 H
Z y0 Z x i ⇣
⌘
1
bi max{xi , y0 } + pi , (y0 xi )+ d H
ei1 (xi )dH⇤2 (y0 ).
Di (p) :=
1 H
(4.5)
y

0

xi

To compare the e↵ect of block-by-block search on product demand to that without blocks, denote Di ( p) as the demand function without blocks, such that consumers are aware of all products when search starts. CDK’s Eventual Purchase Theorem says consumers always purchase
the item with highest net e↵ective value. Thus,
Z y0 Z xi
ei1 (xi )dH⇤2 (y0 ),
(1 Hi (max{xi , y0 } + pi )) d H
Di (p) :=
(4.6)
y

0

xi

which is the probability of wi pi > max{xi , y0 }.
Taking the di↵erence between (4.5) and (4.6), a position in block 1 increases product i’s
demand by:
Z y0 Z x i ⇣
⌘
bi max{xi , y0 } + pi , (y0 xi )+ d H
ei1 (xi )dH⇤2 (y0 ),
Hi (max{xi , y0 } + pi ) H
y

0

xi

bi (·, 0), is non-negative and is strictly positive if the event
which, by Lemma 7 and that Hi (·) = H
Y0 Xi > 0 occurs with a strictly positive probability.

4.3.2

Demand in Block 2

A block-1 product’s demand depends on the product’s distorted e↵ective value. In contrast, a
block-2 product’s demand involves net true value of the candidate product in block 1, which is
treated as the updated outside option value when consumers search in block 2.
For any (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , I use the notations in Theorem 9 and let i⇤ := arg maxi2N1 {wi pi }. I
call “the consumer finds a candidate product in block 1” if wi⇤ pi⇤ u0 . That is, the consumer
finds a better option than the original outside option after searching block 1. For any consumer
searching in block 2, let u1 denotes the updated outside option value from searching block 1.
Thus, u1 equals u0 if the consumer does not find a candidate product in block 1 and equals
vi⇤ + zi⇤ pi⇤ otherwise. Theorem 9 says that product i in block 2 is purchased if and only if
wi pi > max{u1 , yi }. I denote U1 as the random variable of u1 , since the updated outside option
value is random from block-2 sellers’ perspective.
To derive demand for products in block 2, it is essential to characterize the cumulative
density function of U1 , denoted as J(·). For a fixed block-1 candidate product i, J(u) is the
probability of that i 2 N1 is the candidate product and that i’s net true value is less than u,
which is Pr({Wi pi > Xi } \ {Vi + Zi pi < u}), or equivalently,
Pr (Wi

pi > Xi )

Pr ({Wi

pi > Xi } \ {Vi + Zi

p1 > u}) .

Given xi (the e↵ective value of the best alternative of i in block 1), the former probability in
bi (u + p1 , u xi ), conditional on
the above expression is 1 Hi (xi + pi ) and the latter is 1 H
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u > xi .10 As u1 = u0 if and only if a consumer does not find a candidate product in N1 , we have
J(u0 ) = H⇤1 (u0 ). Thus, the probability of u0 < U1 < u can be formulated as:
XZ uh
i
1
bi (u + pi , u xi ) Hi (xi + pi ) d H
ei1 (xi ).
J(u) H⇤ (u0 ) :=
H
(4.7)
i2N1

u0

The summation is taken as every block-1 product is possible to be the candidate product. Notice
b q)  H(x) for any x and q 0, H(u
b + p, u x) H(u + p) for any u x, so the
that while H(x,
integrand in (4.7) is positive for all i.
By Theorem 9, the demand for a product i 2 N2 is:
Z yi Z u 1
2
ei2 (yi ),
(1 Hi (max{u1 , yi } + pi )) dJ(u1 )d H
Di ( p) :=
(4.8)
y

i

u0

which is the probability that Wi pi is larger than max{U1 , Yi }. By definition, given (vk , zk , p)2k=1 ,
if wi⇤ pi⇤ u0 , u1 := vi⇤ + zi⇤ pi⇤ vi⇤ + min{zi⇤ , z⇤i⇤ } pi⇤ =: x0 ; else, u1 = u0 = x0 . So
J(·) FOSDs H⇤1 (·). Notice that for any u > u0 , H⇤1 (u) H⇤1 (u0 ) can be written as (shown in
Appendix C.2):
#
X "Z u
1
1
ei1 (xi ).
H⇤ (u) H⇤ (u0 ) =
Hi (u + pi ) Hi (xi + pi ) d H
(4.9)
i2N1

u0

Comparing (4.7) and (4.9), for any u > u0 , the di↵erence between H⇤1 and J is
K(u) := H⇤1 (u) J(u),
XZ uh
=
Hi (u + pi )
i2N1

u0

bi (u + pi , u
H

i
ei1 (xi ),
xi ) d H

(4.10)

for any u
u0 . K has an intuitive meaning: conditional on i is the candidate product in
N1 , K(u) is Pr({Wi pi < u < Vi + Zi pi }). That is, the probability of that u lies between i’s
e↵ective value and true value. This is because the integrand in (4.10) is
bi (u + pi , u Xi )) (1 Hi (u + pi ))
(1 H
= Pr ({Wi pi > Xi } \ {Vi + Zi pi > u}) Pr (Wi
= Pr({Xi < Wi pi < u < Vi + Zi pi }).

pi > u)

bi (u + pi , u xi ), so (4.10) is always positive and implies J(u)
By Lemma 7, Hi (u + pi ) > H
first order stochastically dominates H⇤1 (u).
When there is no block, following CDK, the demand for product i 2 N2 is:
Z yi Z x 0
ei2 (yi ).
(1 Hi (max{x0 , yi } + pi )) dH⇤1 (x0 )d H
Di ( p) =
(4.11)
y

i

x0

Comparing (4.11) and (4.8), the demand for product i 2 N2 decreases if consumer search
block-by-block, as J FOSDs H⇤1 and 1 Hi (max{u1 , yi } + pi ) is decreasing in u1 .
The lemma 8 below concludes the comparison of product i’s demand when consumers
search block-by-block (Dki ( p)) and i’s demand without blocks (Di (p)).
10

b and Lemma 6, Pr ({Wi pi > xi } \ {Vi + Zi
By the definition of H
two conditions are exactly the conditions to purchase i 2 N1 if y0 = u.

p1 > u}) = 1

bi (u + p1 , u
H

xi ). The
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Lemma 8 Given a set of products N and any p 2 Rn++ , for any position (N1 , N2 ), if i 2 N1 , then
D1i (p) Di (p), while if i 2 N2 , then D2i ( p)  Di ( p).
Lemma 8 states that the demand for any product increases if its position is in the first block, and
thus sellers have incentives to win the sponsored link position. The intuition behind Lemma 8 is
that: when the search order is distorted, it is possible that product i in block 1 is searched earlier
comparing to the case without blocks. Thus, even if a product j in block 2 has a net e↵ective
value higher than that of i, and therefore has a higher priority to purchase than i without block,
a consumer may end up purchasing i instead of j if the realized match value of product i is large
enough. This is because j is no longer considered when the consumer searches in the second
block if i 2 N1 is found to be good enough.11 Thus, the demand for product i 2 N1 increases,
and the demand for product j 2 N2 decreases, compared to the case without blocks.

4.4

Pricing Equilibrium

Since sellers’ bidding strategy depends on their profits increase from winning the sponsored
link auction, it is crucial to construct the equilibrium profit from price competition. This section establishes the existence and uniqueness of the pure strategy pricing equilibrium under
any product position. Given equilibrium prices, sellers decide their auction bids by comparing equilibrium profits under di↵erent positions resulting from the auction. Optimal bidding
strategy and its e↵ect on pricing strategy are studied in Section 4.5.
Given any position (N1 , N2 ), each seller i chooses the product price pi to maximize the
profit, (pi ci ) Dki ( p). The following three assumptions are needed to establish the existence
and uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium.
Assumption 1 For all i, fi (·) and gi (·) are log-concave.
Assumption 2 For all i, the support of fi (·) has no upper bound (i.e., vi = 1). Moreover, the
variance of Vi is sufficiently large, and either Fi has no lower bound (i.e., vi = 1) or fi (vi ) = 0
for all i.
Assumption 3 For all i, either g0i (zi )  0, or Gi has no upper bound (i.e., zi = 1).
Theorem 10 Under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, for any k 2 {1, 2} and any i 2 Nk , Dki ( p) is logconcave in pi and log Dki ( p) has strictly increasing di↵erences in pi and p j for any j , i. And
there is a unique pure strategy pricing equilibrium for all sellers.
Theorem 10 is proved in Appendix C.3. Log-concavity is a standard assumption in literature
of pricing equilibrium.12 The necessary first-order condition (FOC) for pricing equilibrium is:
1
pi
11

ci

=

dDki ( p)/d pi
Dki ( p)

,

(4.12)

This is the case where vi + min{zi , z⇤i } pi < v j + min{z j , z⇤j } p j but vi + zi pi > v j + z⇤j p j .
12
A comprehensive list of log concave density is given by Quint (2014) [18] and Bagnoli and Bergstrom
(2005) [3]. The latter shows a distribution function is log-concave if it has a di↵erentiable and log-concave
density.
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which is also sufficient given Theorem 10. Assumption 2 guarantees any product has a strictly
positive possibility to be purchased at any price, and eliminates the equilibrium with a zero
demand. The intuition of Theorem 10 is similar to Theorem 2 in CDK and Theorem 1 in Quint
bi (·, q) is log-concave for all i and q > 0. Assumption 1
(2014) [18]. Assumption 1 implies 1 H
and 2 together implies Hi is also log-concave (See the right panel of Figure 4.2 and CDK’s
Proposition 2). All three assumptions together implies J is log-concave. Since log-concavity
in preserved under marginalization (Prékopa-Leindler’s inequality), by the demand functions
in Section 4.3, Dki ( p) is log-concave for any k 2 {1, 2} and i 2 Nk . Log-concavity of Dki (p)
guarantees the right-hand side of (4.12) being monotonically increasing in pi , while the lefthand side is strictly decreasing in pi . So an equilibrium exists. Strictly increasing di↵erence of
log Dki ( p) in pi and p j guarantees the best respond is unique.
Figure 4.2 shows large variance of Vi ensures log-concavity of e↵ective values. In both
panels, Fi (vi ) = 1/(1 + e vi /↵ ), Gi (zi ) is standard normal and si = 1 (z⇤i is approximately 0.9)
for all i 2 N. In the left panel, p1 = 1 and n1 = 3.

bi (wi , 0.5) (right) with
Figure 4.2: log H⇤1 (u) and log J(u) (left), and log Hi (wi ) and log H
di↵erent variances of Vi .
To prove Theorem 10, I take advantage of existing results from Quint (2014). With the
discrete choice formulation of the demand (Theorem 9), Quint (2014)’s Theorem 1 implies it
suffices to show: 1) for any i 2 N1 and j , i, Pr(max{Xi , Y0 } min{Zi , z⇤i + (Y0 Xi )+ } < t)
is log-supermodular in t and p j ; and 2) J(u) is log-supermodular in u and pi for any i 2 N1 .13
Both are proved in Appendix C.3 given Assumptions 1, 2 and 3. In particular, by (4.10),
Q
J(u) = H⇤1 (u) K(u), and H⇤1 (u) = i2N1 Hi (u + pi ) is log-concave provided Hi is log-concave.
I show when the variance of Vi is sufficiently large and the density of Zi is weakly decreasing
13

Quint defines a function is log-supermodular if its log is supermodular. For simplicity, I abuse the notation
by defining J as a single argument function, but pi a↵ects J for any i 2 N1 .
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at the upper bound (Asumption 3), K(u) is spread out and its e↵ect on the shape of log J(u)
vanishes (See the left panel of Figure 4.2). Assumption 3 guarantees there is no spike in J at
the upper bound when the variance of Vi is large, and is relatively weak as it holds under many
log-concave density functions.14

4.5

Sponsored Link Auctions

Since status quo position (N10 , N20 ) is exogenously fixed, with one spot in block 1 been auctioned, only two forms of position exist: 1) If seller i 2 N10 wins the sponsored link auction,
position stays the same as the status quo, i.e., (N1 , N2 ) = (N10 , N20 ); 2) If seller i 2 N20 wins the
sponsored link auction, position becomes (N1 , N2 ) = (N10 + i l(i), N20 i + l(i)).
By Lemma 8, if the product position switches from (N10 , N20 ) (status quo position) to (N10 +
i l(i), N20 i+l(i)) for any i 2 N20 , the demand for product i increases and that for l(i) decreases.
Thus, the sponsored link position has a strictly positive value for sellers in N20 . Seller l(i) 2 N10
thus bids in order to keep the position in block 1. Other sellers in N10 also have incentives to
submit a positive bid if i is a stronger competitor than l(i), and i’s entry decreases the profits of
some sellers in N10 \ {l(i)}.
I treat the sponsored link auction game as a complete information game, since given position (N1 , N2 ) and price (pi )ni=1 , the demand for any product is completely determined by the
priors (Fi )ni=1 and (Gi )ni=1 , known to all sellers. The complete information assumption is also
used by Varian (2007) [20], and Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) [11]. Since sponsored link auctions occur repeatedly and all sellers can update their bids frequently, they can
easily learn the demands and competitors’ bids by experimenting with their bids. Edelman and
Schwarz (2010) [10] provide a detailed rationale to assume complete information.
The sponsored link auction is modelled as the second price auction.15 The platform can
choose between two di↵erent payment rules, fixed payment, and per-transaction payment. The
winner pays the second-highest bid only once under the fixed payment and pays the secondhighest bid whenever his/her product is purchased under the per-transaction payment. Since
sellers’ profits are uniquely determined under any position outcome by Theorem 10, a seller’s
gain from winning the sponsored auction is the di↵erence between the profits under the losing
position and that under the winning position. Same as Börgers et al. [4], I study the pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the bidding game. The bidding equilibrium
exists if no seller has an incentive to revise the bid and switch the position unilaterally under
the equilibrium. The concept is similar to the locally envy-free equilibrium defined in Edelman, Ostrovsky, and Schwarz (2007) [11], given the platform only sells one top position in my
model.
For any i, let bi be the equilibrium bid submitted by seller i, and the vector of bids is
b := {b1 , b2 , . . . , bn }. Denote b i = {b1 , . . . , bi 1 , bi+1 , . . . , bn } as the vector of bids besides i, and
b(1)i = max b i be the maximum bid in b i .
14
15

For example, uniform, normal, logistic, and exponential distributions.
Under complete information, the second price auction is equivalent to the ascending bid auction.
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4.5.1

Fixed payment

Under the fixed payment, if bi = max b, the winner i’s payo↵ is (pi ci )D1i (p) b(1)i .16 Since
b i and pi are in additive separable terms in the payo↵ function, bidding and pricing strategies
do not interact since the FOCs in (4.12) are not a↵ected. Denote ⇡i as the equilibrium profit of
seller i 2 N under status quo position (N10 , N20 ), and ⇡ij as the equilibrium profit of seller i if j
wins the auction. So ⇡ij is the profit of i under the position (N10 + j l( j), N20 j + l( j)) if j 2 N20 ,
and ⇡ij = ⇡i if j 2 N10 .
For any seller i 2 N, let bi be the change of i’s profit from the status quo position (N10 , N20 )
to the position in which i wins the sponsored link auction, under the pricing equilibrium. That
is,
bi := ⇡ii ⇡i ,
which is zero if i 2 N10 . Let bij be the change of i’s profit from j 2 N20 ’s winning position,
(N10 + j l( j), N20 j + l( j)), to i’s winning position, which is (N10 , N20 ) if i 2 N10 and is (N10 + i
l(i), N20 i + l(i)) if i 2 N20 . That is,
bij := ⇡ii ⇡ij .
If i 2 N10 and j 2 N20 , bij is i’s willingness to pay to deter j entering block 1.
Theorem 11 Under the fixed payment, conditional on all sellers setting the equilibrium prices,
a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
Theorem 11 is proved in Appendix C.4. The basic idea is to construct a tâtonnement process
that ends at the equilibrium.

4.5.2

Per-transaction payment

Under the per-transaction payment, the winner pays to the platform when a consumer purchases
the winner’s product, and the winner i’s payo↵ is (pi ci b(1)i )D1i (pi , p i ), where b(1)i is the
runner-up’s bid. Thus, if seller i wins the sponsored link auction, it is equivalent to regard
product i’s marginal cost as ci + b(1)i , with position changed according to the auction rule.
Hence, Theorem 10 applies, and the prices of all products are determined uniquely given the
bid payment b(1)i .
It turns out that with per-transaction payment, there is no di↵erence between using first or
second price auction from the winner’s point of view since under the bidding equilibrium, the
highest bid and the second-highest bid coincides.17 This is because the winner’s optimal price
increases in the marginal cost, which “consists of” the runner-up’s bid. In the complete information game, non-winners benefit from increasing their bids to increase the winner’s marginal
cost.
Lemma 9 The equilibrium demand and profit of seller i increase if the marginal cost of i
decreases, or if the marginal cost of j increases for any j , i.
16
17

Fixed payment here is equivalent to pay-per-impression in marketing literature.
More precisely, the runner-up’s bid is arbitrarily close to the winner’s bid.

4.6. Comparative Statics

65

Lemma 9 follows from Quint’s Theorem 4, which applies because of the log-supermodular
demand structure.18 Thus, all non-winner sellers benefit if the runner-up’s bid becomes closer
to the winner’s bid, regardless of who is the runner-up. This process continues until the runnerup’s bid matches the winner’s bid. Thus, in the rest of the section, I take the auction payment
as a first price auction. The only di↵erence is that the runner-up’s bid must match the winner’s
bid, and the tie-breaking rule is that the runner-up never wins.19 This avoids the empty best
response of the runner-up.
Similar to Section 4.5.1, I define ⇡ij (b) as the equilibrium profit of seller i conditional on j
wins the auction with bid b. In particular, I define the winner’s profit as that net from auction
payments to simplify the notation. That is, if seller i submits the highest bid b, the equilibrium
profit is ⇡ii (b) := (pi ci b)D1i (pi , p i ). The winner always pays his/her bid since the auction
is treated as the first price for the reason discussed above.
To characterize the auction equilibrium, I consider the hypothetical scenario where the
auction winner r, the winning bid b, and the runner-up j are given ex-ante. Under the bidding
equilibrium that r wins with bid b, two conditions must be satisfied. First, no seller finds it
profitable to beat r:
⇡ii (b) ⇡ri (b)  0,
(4.13)
for all i 2 N \ {r}. Lemma 9 states that any seller’s equilibrium profit is decreasing in the
marginal cost and is increasing in a competitor’s marginal cost. Hence the left-hand side
of (4.13) is decreasing in b, which pins down the lower bound of b. Second, it is not profitable for winner r to withdraw the bid and let the runner-up j wins:
⇡rr (b)

⇡rj (b)

0,

(4.14)

for a given j 2 N\{r}, which characterizes the upper bound of b as (4.14) is decreasing in b. The
bidding equilibrium exists if there exist r and j such that the upper bound of b characterized
by (4.14) is larger than the lower bound of b characterized by (4.13).
Theorem 12 Under the per-transaction payment, conditional on all sellers setting the equilibrium prices, a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists.
One special case is where sellers are symmetric (Section 4.6), such that the cycle holds whenever the bid is lower than the equilibrium bid. But once the bid reaches the equilibrium bid, all
strict inequalities in the cycle become equality, so (4.13) is satisfied.

4.6

Comparative Statics

This section shows a set of comparative static results when sellers are symmetric. To be specific, for any i 2 N, let Fi = F, Gi = G, ci = c, si = s. I compare the auction revenue, consumer
surplus, and seller profits between the fixed payment and the per-transaction payment rule.
Assumption 1, 2 and 3 are kept in this section.
18

I do not need Quint’s Assumption 3 since each product only has one component in my model.
Under complete information, the runner-up can submit and retrieve the bid until the tie is broken such that
he/she does not win.
19
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With Theorem 10, equilibrium prices are pinned down by FOCs. Under the symmetric
environment, it is without loss of generality to fix the winner as r 2 N. If the bid payment is
fixed, by Theorem 10, all sellers in block 1 (include the winner r) set the price at p1f and all
sellers in block 2 set the price at p2f , such that p1f and p2f satisfy:
1
pkf

c

=

dDki (p, p f i )/d p
Dki (p, p f i )

,
f
p=pk

for k 2 {1, 2}, where Dki (p, p f i ) is the demand for i 2 Nk conditional on i sets a price p and all
other sellers set the equilibrium price p f i under the fixed payment. If the bid payment is based
on the number of transactions and the winner’s bid is b, the equilibrium is that the winner sets
a price pr , all sellers in N1 \ {r} set price at pt1 , and all sellers in N2 set price at pt2 . And pr , pt1
and pt2 satisfy
pr

1
c

b

=

dDkr (p, pt i )/d p
Dkr (p, pt i )

,
p=pr

1
ptk

c

dDki (p, pt i )/d p

=

Dki (p, pt i )

,
p=ptk

for k 2 {1, 2}, where Dki (p, pt i ) is the demand for i 2 Nk conditional on i set price at p and all
other sellers set the equilibrium price pt i under the per-transaction payment. The proof of the
uniqueness of the equilibrium is provided in Appendix C.6.
For notation simplicity, I denote D1f and D2f as the equilibrium demands for a product
in block 1 and block 2 under the fixed payment. And define Dr (b), D1t (b) and D2t (b) as the
equilibrium demand for the winner’s product, a product in block 1 and block 2 under the pertransaction payment when the winner’s bid is b.
With the notations from Section 4.5.1, we cans show
(
0
if i 2 N10
bi =
,
(p1f c)D1f (p2f c)D2f if i 2 N20
bij

=

(

(p1f
bi

c)D1f

(p2f

c)D2f if j 2 N02 and i = l( j)
.
else

Thus, the auction revenue under fixed payment is (p1f c)D1f (p2f c)D2f .
I use the notations in Section 4.5.2 to find the bidding equilibrium with per-transaction
payment. With the symmetric assumption, the winner r’s net profit is ⇡rr (b) = (ptr c b)Dr (b),
and
( t
(p1 c)D1t (b) if i 2 N10 and i , l( j)
j
⇡i (b) =
.
(pt2 c)D2t (b) else
Because of the “for all” quantifier, (4.13) becomes:
(ptr

c

b)Dr (b)  (pt2

c)D2t (b) and (ptr

c

b)Dr (b)  (pt1

c)D1t (b),

And because of the “there exists” quantifier, (4.14) becomes
(ptr

c

b)Dr (b)

(pt2

c)D2t (b) or (ptr

c

b)Dr (b)

(pt1

c)D1t (b).
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The two conditions in (4.13) and (4.14) together imply, under the equilibrium,

and

(ptr

c

b)Dr (b) = (pt2

c)D2t (b),

(4.15)

(ptr

c

b)Dr (b)  (pt1

c)D1t (b).

(4.16)

Condition (4.15) thus determines the equilibrium bid and the auction revenue is
bDr (b) = (ptr

c)Dr (b)

(pt2

c)D2t (b).

(4.17)

Theorem 13 In the symmetric environment, both consumer surplus and auction revenue are
higher under the fixed payment than under the per-transaction payment; profits of non-winners
are higher under the per-transaction payment than that under the fixed payment.
Proof By the Monotone Selection Theorem of Milgrom and Shannon [15], the product price
of the winner r increases when the payment rule switches from the fixed to the per-transaction
(ptr > p1f ). Since prices are complements in the supermodular game, prices of all products
increase. Lemma 9 implies an increase of winner r’s marginal cost increases the equilibrium
profits of non-winners.
The winner r’s profit, (ptr c)Dr (b), must be weakly smaller. This is because non-winners’
FOCs are the same under the fixed payment and per-transaction payment. If (ptr c)Dr (b) >
(p1f c)D1 (b), winner’s profit under the fixed payment can be increased if the winner switches
the price from p1f to ptr . Contradict p1f is the best response of the winner under the fixed
payment.
These together imply (ptr c)Dr (b) < (p1f c)D1f and (pt2 c)D2t (b) > (p2f c)D2f for any
b > 0. By (4.17), the total bid payment of winner r decreases. The consumer surplus decreases
as the prices of all products increase, i.e., ptr > p1f , pt1 > p1f and pt2 > p2f .
The intuition of Theorem 13 is comparable to the distortion e↵ect of proportional income/consumption tax. The trade-o↵s between using the proportional tax and the lump-sum
tax are efficiency (higher tax income) and redistribution (tax more on high income).20 While
in a sponsored link auction, the trade-o↵ between using the fixed payment and using the pertransaction payment is how to split the total surplus among the platform, buyers, and sellers:
fixed payment leads to higher auction revenue and consumer surplus, and per-transaction payment leads to higher seller surplus. In reality, an online shopping platform may care both
consumer surplus and seller surplus for a long-run objective. Amazon also collects revenue
from Amazon Prime membership subscriptions, which relates to customers’ shopping experience or consumer surplus. The per-click payment used by Amazon is close to a mixture
between the fixed payment and the per-transaction payment since every click has a probability
of converting to a transaction. Theorem 13 thus implies the per-click payment used by Amazon
splits the total surplus from the online transaction between consumers and sellers in a relatively
equal way. While the per-transaction payment used by eBay is a seller-friendly rule.
A recent paper by Ostrovsky (2021) [17] studies choice screen auctions with di↵erent payment methods. Though the underlying mechanisms are di↵erent, he finds a similar result in
20

See Chapter 6 in Kaplow (2008) [14].

68

Chapter 4. Sponsored Link Auctions with Conusmer Search

consumer surplus. The choice screen auction is operated on Android platform smartphones,
and search engine providers compete to place their apps on the screen the first time consumers
use the smartphone to pick a default search engine. Search engine providers can choose the
popularity (demand) of the search engine and the revenue-per-use (product price), which are
negatively correlated. Ostrovsky (2021) shows that “per-install” (per-transaction) payment
distorts the search engine toward extracting as much revenue from its users (higher price and
lower consumer surplus) compared to “per-appearance” (fixed) payment, as the winner has the
incentive to decrease its number of installs (transactions).

4.7

Consumer Optimal Positioning

If the platform aims to improve the users’ experiences for a long-term goal (e.g., attract more
users and more membership subscriptions like Amazon Prime), or if a social planner regulates
the platform, consumer surplus maximization may become a part of the goals the platform
target. This section assumes all sellers commit to product prices before the position allocation.
To maximize consumer surplus, a naive platform may intend to allocate products with
higher expected net true value into block 1. But such a practice may fail to be optimum.
The reason is that under the search environment, the match value zi is unknown a priori, and
consumers, in general, do not purchase the product with the highest net true value (i.e., the
existence of the search friction). As search is costly, consumers’ payo↵s increase from a lower
search cost paid during the search if the purchase decision remains the same. The question
is how the platform should allocate products to minimize the search frictions, which requires
balancing consumers’ payo↵ from the final purchasing and the cost paid during the search.
This section provides a consumer optimal position rule that answers the question.
As consumers pay search costs whenever they visit (click) a product selling page. To
calculate the total search cost, I need to formalize the conditions under which a consumer
clicks i’s link.
Lemma 10 Given (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 , product i 2 Nk for k 2 {1, 2} is clicked if and only if both
conditions below are satisfied.
1. vi + z⇤i

pi > uk 1 ,

2. 8 j 2 Nk \ {i}, v j + min{z j , z⇤j }

p j < vi + z⇤i

pi .

Proof The proof directly follows from the optimal search rule in Lemma 5. The first condition
states the consumer never click a link with a reservation value less than the outside option value,
u0 if searching in block 1 and u1 if searching in block 2. The second condition is: 8 j 2 N1 \ {i}
such that v j + z⇤j p j > vi + z⇤i pi , it has to be v j + z j p j < vi + z⇤i pi . That is, for any product
j that is searched before i according to the optimal search rule, the net realized value of j must
be less than the net reservation value of i. So the consumer continues searching to product i.
For any position (N1 , N2 ), I use the definition of Xi , X0 , Yi , Y0 and U1 as that in Section 4.3.
Since Xi , X0 , Yi , Y0 and U1 purely depend on Vi , Zi and product position, all expectations in
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this section are taken with respect to Vi and Zi for all i 2 N. Under the optimal search rule,
consumer surplus is a function W : (N1 , N2 ) ! R such that
⇥
⇤
W(N1 , N2 ) := E {max{X0 ,Y0 }<u0 } u0
X h
i
⇤
+
E {Xi <Wi pi }\{Y0 <Vi +Zi pi }} (Vi + Zi pi )
s
{Xi <Vi +zi pi } i
i2N

X1 h
+
E
i2N2

{max{U1 ,Yi }<Wi

pi } (Vi + Zi

pi )

{max{U1 ,Yi }<Vi +z⇤i

i
s
pi } i .

(4.18)

The first term in (4.18) is the payo↵ of consumers who pick the outside option eventually. In
the two summations (line 2 and line 3), the first terms are payo↵s of consumers purchasing
product i in block 1 and block 2, respectively, where the indicators incorporate the purchase
conditions from Theorem 9. Lemma 10 says that product i 2 Nk is visited (clicked) if and only
if i’s net reservation value is larger than the highest e↵ective value in Nk . This forms the second
term in the two summations.
Given sizes of the two blocks n1 and n2 , and sellers’ committed prices (pi )ni=1 , the planner
solves the following consumer surplus maximization problem:
maxN1 ,N2 W(N1 , N2 )
s.t.
N1 [ N2 = N, N1 \ N2 = ;
|N1 | = n1 , |N2 | = n2 .

(4.19)

Theorem 14 Given Fi , Gi for all i, and the size of the two blocks n1 , n2 , and if each seller i
commits to a price pi , the problem (4.19) is equivalent to minimizing
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤
W L (N1 , N2 ) := E (Y0 X0 )+ E (Y0 U1 )+ ,
(4.20)
subject to the constraints in (4.19).

Theorem 14 is proved in Appendix C.7, which shows
W(N1 , N2 ) = W

W L (N1 , N2 ),

where W = E [u0 , X0 , Y0 ] is the expectation of the highest net e↵ective value among all products
(including the outside option) and is uncorrelated with product position. W is exactly the
consumer surplus without blocks.21 Notice that W L is non-negative given U1 FOSDs X0 , so the
consumer surplus is indeed lower comparing to the case without blocks (i.e., W  W). W L can
thus be regarded as the welfare loss from the block-by-block search behavior.
To get implications of Theorem 14, rewrite W L as:
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤
W L (N1 , N2 ) = E {U1 Y0 } (Y0 X0 )+ + E {U1 <Y0 } (U1 X0 ) .
(4.21)

Theorem 14 thus tells us that the platform maximizes the consumer surplus under two criteria.
First,
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤
E {U1 Y0 } (Y0 X0 )+ = E {U1 Y0 X0 } (Y0 X0 ) should be small. That is, conditional on consumers purchase from block 1, or U1 Y0 , products with high (low) net e↵ective values should
21

See Corollary 1 of Choi, Dai and Kim (2018) [7]
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⇥
⇤
be placed at block 1 (block 2). Second, E {U1 <Y0 } (U1 X0 ) should also be small. That is,
conditional on consumers purchasing from block 2 (U1 < Y0 ), candidate product in block 1
should have a low search cost. This is because
U1 iX0 := (Zi⇤ z⇤i⇤ )+ , conditional on i⇤ is the
h
candidate product in block 1. By (4.1), E (Zi⇤ z⇤i⇤ )+ = si⇤ .
There are two extreme cases where the loss from block-by-block search, W L (N1 , N2 ), achieves
zero under the optimal positioning. The first case is wi⇤ pi⇤ w j⇤ p j⇤ for any candidate product i⇤ in block 1 and any candidate product j⇤ in block 2 under any realized (vk , zk , pk )2k=1 . That
is, Pr(X0 Y0 ) = 1: any product in block 1 has a net e↵ective value larger than that in block 2.
Under this case, the block-by-block search aligns perfectly the optimal search without blocks,
since products in the second block are never visited. W L = 0 since both terms in (4.20) are
zeros.
⇣
⌘
The second case is Pr (U1 = X0 ) = 1, which is equivalent to Pr Zi⇤ = z⇤i⇤ = 1. Under
this case, the candidate product in block 1 has zero uncertainty in match value and incurs a
zero search cost to click. Thus, although the block-by-block search distorts the optimal search
order, it has no impact on consumer surplus since consumers pay no search cost in the first
block. W L = 0 since the two terms in (4.20) are identical. The two cases mentioned above
have strong requirements on products’ priors (non-overlapping e↵ective value supports and
zero search cost) and are not likely to happen. A consumer surplus maximizing platform needs
to consider both criteria when positioning products.
Notice that the algorithm provided by Theorem 14 requires all sellers to commit to their
prices before the allocation of product positions. If sellers are unable to commit to prices,
a consumer surplus maximizing platform needs complete a much more complicated task by
enumerating and comparing W = W W L under all possible positions with the corresponding
equilibrium prices.

4.8

Conclusion

Internet changes every aspect of economics as a low-cost communication method. Since the
pandemic, more and more people have shifted from in-store shopping to online shopping to
keep social distance. Compared to in-store advertising, advertising a product online is much
more straightforward: a seller can buy a position at the top of the product webpage. Online
shopping platforms use sponsored link auctions to determine who gets the limited number of
positions and how much to pay. A typical online shopping activity is an interaction between
three parties: consumers, sellers, and the shopping platform, with each party a di↵erent objective: consumers maximize the consumption payo↵s from search, sellers maximize the selling
profits, and the platform either maximizes the sponsored link auction revenue or coordinates
on the surplus split between the three parties as a social planner.
By assuming consumers follow a block-by-block searching behavior, this paper formulates consumers’ discrete choice shopping problem and the demand functions. The paper also
establishes pricing and bidding equilibrium and finds how pricing strategy, bidding strategy,
and product position interact in a complete information second price auction. A comparison
between the fixed payment and per-transaction payment in the symmetric environment shows
that consumer surplus and auction revenue are higher under fixed payment. By contrast, sellers’
profits are higher under per-transaction payment. The paper also finds a simple position rule
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to maximize consumer surplus if sellers commit to price before the position allocation. The
demand functions in my model have standard properties, and the discrete choice formulation
may apply to empirical research.
Many interesting questions remain to be answered. A natural question is how results might
change if the platform auctions more than one position in the first block. With more than one
position, the pricing equilibrium exists. Still, the allocative externality complicates bidding
equilibrium as the winner of one position needs to make the bidding decision based on the
identities of other winners. The other is to allow “blind buying” in Chen et al. [6] such that the
consumer need not learn the match value before purchase.
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Appendix A
Appendices to Chapter 2
A.1

Proof of Theorem 1

Let Q : [0, 1] ! R be weakly increasing and market clearing. Denote
c1 := sup{t 2 [0, 1] | Q(t) < 0},
c2 := inf{t 2 [0, 1] | Q(t) > 0}.

(A.1)
(A.2)

Since Q weakly increasing, we have c1  c2 . Furthermore, by the envelope theorem, one
can construct a payment rule p that implements Q such that IC is satisfied and the surplus
cQ(c) p(c) is equal to zero for some c 2 [c1 , c2 ]. With c1  c2 and Q weakly increasing,
tQ(t) p(t) is weakly decreasing on [0, c] and weakly increasing on [c, 1]. Thus (Q, p) also
satisfies IR. The rest of the proof shows that (Q, p) satisfies BB.
First, we claim that (Q, p) satisfies BB if the following condition holds:
t < c1  c2 < t0 =)

p(t)
p(t0 )
 c1  c2 
.
Q(t)
Q(t0 )

(A.3)

By the definitions of c1 and c2 , Q = 0 on (c1 , c2 ). Thus, tQ(t) p(t) = 0 and p(t) = 0 for all
t 2 (c1 , c2 ) by the envelope theorem and cQ(c) p(c) = 0. It follows that
Z 1
Z c1
Z 1
p(t)dF(t) =
p(t)dF(t) +
p(t)dF(t)
0

0

Z

c2

Z 1
p(t)
p(t)
=
Q(t)dF(t) +
Q(t)dF(t)
Q(t)
0
c2 Q(t)
Z c1
Z 1
c1 Q(t)dF(t) +
c2 Q(t)dF(t)
0
c2
!
Z c1
Z 1
c1
Q(t)dF(t) +
Q(t)dF(t)
= 0,

c1

0

c2

where the third line is due to (A.3) and the fact that Q < 0 on [0, c1 ) and Q > 0 on (c2 , 1], the
fourth line due to c2 c1 and Q > 0 on (c2 , 1], and the last line due to market clearing. Thus,
(Q, p) satisfies BB if (A.3) holds.
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To prove (A.3), it suffices to prove that p(t)/Q(t) is a weakly increasing function of t on
[0, c1 ) and (c2 , 1] and
p(t)
p(t)
max
 c1  c2  min
.
(A.4)
t2(c2 ,1] Q(t)
t2[0,c1 ) Q(t)
To prove the monotonicity of p/Q on (c1 , 1] pick any t, t0 2 (c1 , 1] and t > t0 . IC requires
t0 Q(t0 ) p(t0 ) t0 Q(t) p(t)
!
p(t0 )
Q(t) 0 p(t)
0
() t
t
Q(t0 ) Q(t0 )
Q(t)
0
p(t )
p(t)
() t0
t0
,
0
Q(t )
Q(t)
where the second line follows by dividing Q(t0 ) on the both side of inequality. If t0 p(t)/Q(t) 
0 the last line follows directly since t0 p(t0 )/Q(t0 ) 0 by IR and Q(t0 ) > 0. Else, t0 p(t)/Q(t) >
0 and the last line is due to Q(t)/Q(t0 ) 1. We can get the same result for t, t0 2 [0, c2 ) and
t > t0 by
tQ(t) p(t) tQ(t0 ) p(t0 )
!
p(t0 )
p(t)
Q(t0 )
() t

t
Q(t)
Q(t)
Q(t0 )
p(t)
p(t0 )
() t
t
,
Q(t)
Q(t0 )
where the last line is due to Q(t0 )/Q(t)
1 if t p(t0 )/Q(t0 )  0 and follows directly if
t p(t0 )/Q(t0 ) > 0 since t p(t)/Q(t)  0 by IR and Q(t) < 0. Thus, p/Q is weakly increasing
on [0, c1 ) and (c2 , 1].
To complete the proof, we show (A.4). For any t < c1 , IC implies 0 = c1 Q(c1 ) p(c1 )
c1 Q(t) p(t), which implies p(t)/Q(t)  c1 given Q(t) < 0 on [0, c1 ) Analogously, for any
t > c2 , IC implies 0 = c2 Q(c2 ) p(c2 ) c2 Q(t) p(t), which implies p(t)/Q(t) c2 given
Q(t) > 0 on (c2 , 1]. Since c1  c2 , we have (A.4). This completes the proof of the theorem.

A.2

Derivation of the Virtual Surplus Function

While various forms of the routine have appeared numerously in the literature, it is helpful to
formalize it so as to clarify the role of the constraints.
Lemma 11 For any nonempty subset S of R, the problem
R1
max(Q,p) 0 (tQ(t) p(t)) dW(t)
s.t.
Q : [0, 1] ! S is weakly increasing
R t0
p(t0 ) p(t) = t sdQ(s) (8t, t0 2 [0, 1])
R1
pdF 0
0

(A.5)
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is equivalent to

R1
max(Q,p) 0 Q(t)V(t)dF(t)
s.t.
Q : [0, 1] ! S is weakly increasing
R t0
p(t0 ) p(t) = t sdQ(s) (8t, t0 2 [0, 1])
R1
pdF = 0.
0

(A.6)

R1
Proof First, there is no loss of generality to replace the constraint 0 pdF
0 in (A.5) by
R1
R1
pdF = 0: If 0 pdF > 0, we can modify the payment rule by rebating the positive money
0
R1
surplus 0 pdF back to the types uniformly. That enlarges tQ(t) p(t) for all t 2 [0, 1] and
R1
hence enlarges the objective 0 (tQ(t) p(t)) dW(t) because the distribution W assigns a posiR1
tive measure on [0, 1]. Thus, in any optimum, 0 pdF > 0 does not hold.
R1
Second, with 0 pdF = 0, we show that the objective in (A.5) is equal to that in (A.6).1
Denote U(t) := tQ(t) p(t) for all t. By the envelope theorem, dU(t) = Q(t)dt. This coupled
with integration-by-parts gives
Z

1
0

Z

UdF = U(1)

Likewise,

Z

1

0

1
0

Z

FdU = U(1)
Z

UdW = U(1)

0

1

0

1

F(t)Q(t)dt.

W(t)Q(t)dt.

Plug the expression of U(1) from the former equation into the latter equation to obtain
Z

0

1

UdW =

Z

1

Z

1

1

F(t)Q(t)dt
W(t)Q(t)dt
0
Z 1
Z 1
Z 1
W(t) F(t)
=
tQ(t)dF(t)
p(t)dF(t)
Q(t)dF(t)
f (t)
0
0
0
Z 1
=
Q(t)V(t)dF(t),
0

UdF +

Z

0

0

with the last equality due to

A.3

R1
0

pdF = 0 and the definition of V.

Proof of Corollary 2

Given any mechanism (Q, p) in the modified model, a type-t individual’s expected payo↵ from
acting as type t0 is equal to
0

tQ(t )
1

0

p(t ) +

Z

0

1

(t, s)Q(s)dF(s).

We thank the associate editor for suggesting the following short proof. Our previous proof is longer and
suitable to asymmetric models where individuals’ types are drawn from di↵erent distributions.
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The integral, constant to t0 , is immaterial to the incentive constraints. Clearly it does not a↵ect
the market clearing and BB constraints either. Thus we need only to show that the objectives
in the two problems are equivalent. In the modified model, the objective (2.2) is equal to (2.1)
plus
Z Z
1

0

1

0

(t, t0 )Q(t0 )dF(t0 )dW(t).

Switch the order of integration to rewrite this double integral as
Z 1
Z 1
0
Q(t )
(t, t0 )dW(t) dF(t0 ).
0
|0
{z
}
=: (t0 )

Thus, following the same routine of envelope theorem and integration-by-parts that results in
Corollary 1, one can prove
and only if it solves Problem (2.3)
R 1 that an allocation is optimalR if
1
such that the objective 0 QVdF therein is replaced by 0 QṼdF where
Ṽ(t) := V(t) + (t)

for all t 2 [0, 1]. To incorporate the externality, one needs to replace the virtual surplus V(t) by
Ṽ(t).

A.4

Lemmas of Ironing

Define for each s 2 [0, 1]

H(V)(s) :=

Z

0

s

⇣
⌘
V F 1 (r) dr.

(A.7)

e
Denote H(V)
for the convex hull of H(V) on [0, 1] (cf. Myerson [17]). Then the ironed virtual
surplus V : [0, 1] ! R is defined by
V(t) =

d ⇣e ⌘
H(V) (s)
ds
s=F(t)

(A.8)

e
whenever H(V)
is di↵erentiable at F(t), and extended to all of [0, 1] by one-sided continuity.
e
If 0  a < b  1, (a, b) is called ironed interval i↵ H(V)
< H(V) on (F(a), F(b)),
e
e
H(V) (F(a)) = H(V) (F(a)) and H(V) (F(b)) = H(V) (F(b)). That is, an ironed interval is
e (F(·)). As is well-known, on
an inclusion-maximal open interval on which H(V) (F(·)) > H(V)
an ironed interval the monotonicity condition of Q is binding, and V is constant.2
⇣ ⌘
B
Lemma 12 For any a, b 2 [0, 1] such that a  F 1 B+1
 b, if V is constant on (a, b) (unless
(a, b) = ?) and neither a nor b is an interior point of any ironed
(2.5) is an
R 1 interval,R then
1 ⇤
optimal solution for (2.3) and, for any Q that is feasible to (2.3), 0 QVdF < 0 Q VdF in any
of the following three cases:
2

While V is constant on any ironed interval, an interval on which V is constant need not be an ironed interval,
as it is possible that V = V on some interval where V happens to be constant.
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i a  a0 < b0  b, (a0 , b0 ) is an ironed interval, and Q is not constant on (a0 , b0 );
ii Q , Q⇤ on a positive-measure subset S of [0, a) for which V < V

(a,b)

on S ;

iii Q , Q⇤ on a positive-measure subset S of (b, 1] for which V > V

(a,b)

on S .

⇣ ⌘
R1
B
Proof By (2.5), 0 Q⇤ dF = 0. Since a  F 1 B+1
 b, it follows again from (2.5) that Q⇤
is weakly increasing. Thus Q⇤ is feasible to (2.3). To prove that it is optimal for (2.3), use
Myerson’s [17] equation (from (A.7), (A.8), and integration by parts)
Z

1
0

Q(t)V(t)dF(t) =

Z

0

1

Q(t)V(t)dF(t)

Z 1⇣
0

H(V) (F(t))

⌘
e (F(t)) dQ(t)
H(V)

(A.9)

for any weakly increasing function Q on [0, 1]. Observe that the second integral on the righthand side of (A.9) is nonnegative as Q is weakly increasing, and that it is strictly positive if and
only if Q is not constant on some ironed interval. It then follows from the definition of Q⇤ that
the said integral is zero when Q = Q⇤ , because Q⇤ by construction has only a and b as jump
points and, by the hypothesis of the lemma, neitherR a nor b is interior
to any ironed interval.
R1
1 ⇤
⇤
Thus, to prove optimality of Q it suffices to show 0 Q VdF
QVdF for any Q feasible
0
to (2.3). To show that, note
Z 1
Z 1
Z a
Z b
Z 1
⇤
⇤
⇤
Q VdF
QVdF =
(Q Q)VdF +
(Q Q)VdF +
(Q⇤ Q)VdF .
0
0
{z
} |b
{z
}
|0
{z
} |a
Y

X

Z

If (a, b) , ?, let v be the constant
R athat V is equal to on (a, b) by the hypothesis of the lemma;
else let v := V(b). Note: X v 0 (Q⇤ Q)dF because Q⇤ Q = 1 Q  0 and V  v on
Rb
R1
[0, a); Y = v a (Q⇤ Q)dF because either V = v on (a, b) or a = b; and Z v b (Q⇤ Q)dF
because Q⇤ Q = B Q 0 and V v on (b, 1]. Thus,
Z 1
Z 1
Z a
Z b
Z 1
⇤
⇤
⇤
Q VdF
QVdF v
(Q Q)dF +v
(Q Q)dF +v
(Q⇤ Q)dF = 0, (A.10)
0

0

0

a

b

R
R
with the equality due to Q⇤ dF = 0 = QdF. Thus, Q⇤ is optimal for (2.3).
To prove the rest of the
R lemma, pick any Q feasible to (2.3). Then Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, B]
is weakly increasing and QdF = 0. In Case (i), a0 < b0 and Q is not constant on (a0 , b0 ).
Then Q, weakly increasing, is strictly increasing on a positive-measure subset of (a0 , b0 ). Thus,
the distribution induced by Q assigns a positive measure on (a0 , b0 ). This, coupled with the
hypothesis that (a0 , b0 ) is an ironed interval, implies that the second integral on the right-hand
⇤
side of (A.9) Ris strictly positive
given Q. By contrast, theR integral given
R1
R 1 Q is zero. This,
1 ⇤
1
coupled with 0 Q VdF
QVdF proved above, implies 0 V QdF < 0 V Q⇤ dF.
0
In Case (ii), since Q⇤ = 0 on [0, a), the hypothesis Q , Q⇤ on S ✓ [0, a) implies that
⇤
Q
Q < 0 on the positive-measure subsetR S of [0, a). This, combined
with Q⇤ Q  0
Ra
a
on (0, a) and V < V(a)  v on S , implies 0 (Q⇤ Q) VdF > v 0 (Q⇤ Q) dF. Thus the
inequality in (A.10) is strict. Case (iii) is analogous to Case (ii).
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e
Since (A.8) defines V only at t for which H(V)
is di↵erentiable at F(t), let us specify the
extension of V to the two endpoints:
V(1) := sup V(t0 )
t0 "1

and V(0) := inf
V(t0 ).
0
t #0

(A.11)

Lemma 13 V(0) < V(1).
Proof First, we observe that V(0)  0. To see that, note from the definition of ironing that V(0)
is the slope of the supporting line at the point 0 of the epigraph of H(V). Since V(0) = 0 by the
definition of V and V is continuous by the assumption that both f and W are continuous, the
right-derivative of H(V) at point 0 is well defined and is equal to 0. Thus, the slope V(0) of the
supporting line of H(V) at point 0 is less than or equal to 0.
Now that V(0)  0, we need only to show V(1) > 0. Suppose not, then V  0 on [0, 1] by
its monotonicity. Then
0

Z

0

1

e
V(t)dF(t) = H(V)(1)
= H(V)(1) =

Z

0

1

V(t)dF(t),

e
e
where the first equality is due to (A.8), the absolute continuity of H(V)
and H(V)(0)
= 0, the
e
second equality due to H(V) being the
R 1convex hull of H(V) on [0, 1] and H(V)(0) = 0, and the
last equality due to (A.7). Thus, 0  0 V(t)dF(t) and hence, by the definition of V,
Z

1

0

W(t)dt

Z

0

1

tdF(t) +

Z

1

0

F(t)dt = 1,

with the equality due to integration by parts. Since W is a cdf that is supported by [0, 1] and
continuous
on R, W  1 on [0, 1] and strictly so on a positive-measure subset thereof. Thus
R1
W(t)dt < 1 and the above-displayed inequality is impossible, which leads to the desired
0
contradiction.
Lemma 14 V is continuous at the points 0 and 1.
Proof We shall prove that V is continuous at point 1. The case of point 0 is symmetric.
e
If H(V)
= H(V) on (F(1 ), 1] for some > 0, then by (A.8) V = V on (1 , 1], and hence
e
the continuity V at point 1 follows from the continuity of V. If H(V)
< H(V) on (F(1
), 1)
for some > 0, then (1
, 1) is contained in an ironed interval, so V is constant on (1
, 1)
0
and hence supt0 "1 V(t ) is equal to this constant. Then (A.11) implies that V(1) is equal to the
constant; thus again V is continuous at 1.
Thus, suppose that neither of the previous cases hold. That is, there exists an ironed interval
(a1 , b1 ) such that 0  a1 < b1 < 1, there exists another ironed interval (a2 , b2 ) for which
b1  a2 < b2 < 1, and furthermore for any ironed interval (ak , bk ) for which bk < 1, there exists
another ironed interval (ak+1 , bk+1 ) for which bk  ak+1 < bk+1 < 1. Thus, by recursion, [0, 1] is
partitioned by
0  a1 < b1  a2 < b2  a3 < · · ·  ak < bk  ak+1 < · · · < 1
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such that
limk!1 ak = limk!1 bk = 1,
h
i
8k 9vk 2 R : V = vk on (ak , bk ) ,

with the last line due to (ak , bk ) being an ironed interval. Since V is weakly increasing,
v1  v2  v3  · · · vk  vk+1  · · · .
Within this case, to prove the continuity of V at point 1, we start by observing that
lim vk = V(1).

k!1

(A.12)

To show that, for each k pick any tk 2 [bk , ak+1 ]. Then V(tk ) = V(tk ). With V weakly increasing,
v1  V(t1 )  v2  V(t2 )  v3  V(t3 )  · · · .
Thus limk!1 vk = limk!1 V(tk ) = V(1), with the second equality due to tk ! 1 and V being
continuous at 1.
Next, pick any sequence (t0j )1j=1 converging to 1 such that t10  t20  t30  · · · . For each j,
either t0j 2 (ak j , bk j ) for some k j , or t0j 2 [bk j , ak j +1 ] for some k j . In the former case, V(t0j ) = vk j ;
in the latter, vk j  V(t0j )  vk j +1 . Both cases considered,
lim V(t0j ) = lim vk j = V(1),
j!1

j!1

with the second equality due to (A.12). Since (t0j )1j=1 can be any sequence converging to 1
from below, the above equation also implies limt0 "1 V(t0 ) = V(1). Consequently, supt0 "1 V(t0 ) =
limt0 "1 V(t0 ) = V(1). This coupled with (A.11) implies V(1) = limt0 "1 V(t0 ), namely, V is continuous at 1.
Lemma 15 If V(1) > V(t) for all t 2 [0, 1), the followings are true for V:
a. there is no x 2 [0, 1) for which V , V on (x, 1);
b. V(1) = V(1);
c. V(1) > V(t) for all t 2 [0, 1).
Proof Proof of (a): Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an x 2 [0, 1) for which V , V on
e (F(t)) <
(x, 1). Then (x, 1) is contained in some ironed interval say (x⇤ , 1) such that H(V)
e (F(x⇤ )) = H(V) (F(x⇤ )), H(V)
e (F(1)) = H(V) (F(1)),
H(V) (F(t)) for all t 2 (x⇤ , 1), H(V)
e
e (F(t)) < H(V) (F(t)) for all t 2
and H(V)
has a constant slope on [F(x⇤ ), 1]. Since H(V)
(x⇤ , 1), for any t < 1 sufficiently close to 1,
Z 1
1
1
(H(V) (F(1)) H(V) (F(t)))  .
V(s)dF(s) =
1 F(t) t
1 F(t)
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Taking the limit of the inequality as t ! 1 and noting continuity of V at 1, we have V(1)  .
e (F(t)) < H(V) (F(t)) for all t 2 (x⇤ , 1), there exists t0 2 (x⇤ , 1) for which
Meanwhile, since H(V)
the slope of H(V) at F(t0 ) is greater than . That is, V(t0 ) > , which coupled with V(1) 
implies V(t0 ) > V(1), contradicting the hypothesis that V is maximized at 1.
e
Proof of (b): Note, from the proof of Lemma 14, that V(1) = V(1) unless H(V)
< H(V) on
(F(1
), 1) for some > 0, namely, (1
, 1) is contained in an ironed interval. Thus V , V
on (x, 1) for some x 2 (1 , 1), contradicting (a). Thus (b) holds.
Proof of (c): Suppose, to the contrary, that V(1)  V(t0 ) for some t0 2 [0, 1). Then, with V
weakly increasing, V(t) = V(1) for all t 2 [t0 , 1]. By (a), there exists t1 2 (t0 , 1) for which
V(t1 ) = V(t1 ). Since t1 2 (t0 , 1), V(t1 ) = V(1). Then (b) implies V(1) = V(1) = V(t1 ) = V(t1 ),
contradicting the hypothesis that V(1) > V(t) for all t 2 [0, 1).

A.5

Proof of Theorem 2

Recall the definition of ironed interval from Appendix A.4.
Lemma 16 For⇣ any⌘ welfare weight distribution W, the two-tier allocation (2.6) is optimal if
B
and only if F 1 B+1
is not interior to any ironed interval.
Proof If F

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘

is not interior to any ironed interval, then Lemma 12 applies to the case
⇣ ⌘
B
where a = b = F
so that the Q⇤ defined in (2.5) specializes to (2.6), the two-tier alloB+1
cation implemented by the posted-price system. Thus Lemma 12 implies that (2.6) is optimal,
⇣ ⌘
B
and the “if” part of the claim is true. To prove the “only if” part, suppose that F 1 B+1
is
interior to some ironed interval. Then Part (i) in Lemma 12 implies that no optimal allocation
has ⇣a jump
⌘ point in the ironed interval and hence the allocation (2.6), whose jump point is
B
F 1 B+1
, is not optimal.
1

⇣
Lemma 17 If the function V(·) V F
not interior to any ironed interval.

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘⌘

is single-crossing on [0, 1], then F

1

⇣

B
B+1

⌘

is

⇣ ⌘
B
and suppose that V(·) V(m) is a single-crossing function on
Proof Denote m := F 1 B+1
[0, 1]. By the definition of ironing, it suffices to prove that F(m) is a convex point of H(V)
in the sense that at no point below F(m) is H(V) steeper than it is at F(m), and at no point
above F(m) is H(V) less steep than it is at F(m). Since V(·) V(m) single-crossing on [0, 1],
⇣
⌘
⇣
⌘
⇣
⌘
s < F(m) < s0 =) V F 1 (s)  V F 1 (F(m)) = V(m)  V F 1 (s0 ) .
By⇣ (A.7) ⌘the definition of H(V), the derivative of H(V) at any s 2 (0, 1) is D (H(V)) (s) =
V F 1 (s) . Plug this into the above-displayed formula to obtain
s < F(m) < s0 =) D (H(V)) (s)  D (H(V)) (F(m))  D (H(V)) (s0 ).

Thus, F(m) is a convex point of H(V), as desired.
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Proof of Theorem 2 Let a be the infimum, and b the supremum, of
n

⇣
⌘o
t 2 [0, 1] | V(t) = V F 1 (B/(B + 1)) .

(A.13)

Then neither a nor b is interior to an ironed interval, and hence⇣ Lemma
12 implies that the
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
1
allocation (2.5) is an optimal allocation. In the case where V(·) V F
is single-crossing
B+1
on [0, 1], Lemmas 16 and 17 together imply that the two-tier allocation (2.6) is optimal. The
payment rules that the theorem asserts implement (2.5) and (2.6) respectively can be derived
from the allocations according to the envelope formula, as explained in the comments around
the theorem. ⌅

A.6

Proofs of Corollaries 3 and 4

⇣ ⌘
B
Corollary 3 First, consider the case x 0. By a < F 1 B+1
and (2.7), x < B and hence the
allocation (2.5) is weakly increasing. Thus, the allocation can be implemented by a payment
rule. Consider the one that maximizes the planner’s profit among all that implement the allocation. By the envelope formula, one can show that this payment rule is the same as the one
described in Part (i) of the corollary. For instance, an individual of type t b gets the surplus
(b a)x + (t b)B by the envelope theorm and hence needs to deliver a total payment equal to
bB (b a)x for the quantity B of the good. That implies the per-unit
⇣ ⌘ price b (b a)x/B stated
B
in the corollary. Note b (b a)x/B > a (because a < F 1 B+1
). Thus, the profit generated
by this payment rule is greater than
aF(a) + a (F(b)

F(a)) x + a (1

F(b)) B = 0,

with the equality due to the market clearing condition. By the envelope formula, the payment
rules that implement the allocation di↵er from one another only by a constant. Thus, since
the planer would rebate all her profit to the individuals to achieve the optimality of (2.1), the
optimal payment rule that implements (2.5) is the profit-maximizing one among those that
implement (2.5), augmented with a lump sum transfer to the individuals. Since the allocation
restricted to (a, b) is equal to the constant x and 0  x < B, the mechanism entails rationing
on (a, b). Thus the corollary is true in the⇣ case⌘ x 0.
B
The case x  0 is symmetric. By F 1 B+1
< b and (2.7), we have 1 < x and hence (2.5) is
weakly increasing and entails rationing on (a, b). The profit-maximizing payment rule follows
similarly from the envelope formula. Since 1 < x, the per-unit price a (b a)x for the
seller-types in [0, a) is strictly less than b. This coupled with the market clearing condition
implies that the profit generated by the payment rule is positive and hence the optimal payment
rule makes a positive lump sum transfer to the individuals. ⌅
Corollary 4 By Lemmas 13 and 14 (Appendix A.4), the ironed virtual surplus function V is
continuous at both points 0 and 1, and V(0) < V(1). This fact implies that the conditions (ii)
and (iii) in Lemma 12 are true when the egalitarian allocation Q is compared to the optimal
allocation Q⇤ , and hence Q is strictly outperformed by Q⇤ . ⌅
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Proof of Theorem 3

Theorem 3 follows directly from the next lemma, as the non-constancy assumption of V in the
theorem implies the condition (A.14) in the lemma. Recall the definition of ironed interval in
Appendix A.4.
Lemma 18 There exists at most one (modulo measure zero) optimal allocation if
⇣
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
V = V F 1 B+1
on (a, b) , ? =) (a, b) is a subset of an ironed interval.

(A.14)

Proof Denote a0 for the infimum, and b0 the supremum, of the set (A.13) defined in Apendix A.5.
By the condition (A.14) of the theorem, either a0 = b0 or a0 < b0 and (a0 , b0 ) is an ironed interval. Thus, by Lemma 12, the allocation Q⇤ defined by (2.5) such that a = a0 and b = b0 is an
optimal allocation. By the definition of the set (A.13), any type below a has a lower V-value,
and any type above b has a higher V-value. This, coupled with the fact that (a0 , b0 ) is an ironed
interval unless a0 = b0 , implies that the conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) in Lemma 12 hold for any
feasible allocation Q that di↵ers from Q⇤ by a positive measure. It follows that any feasible
allocation Q is strictly outperformed by Q⇤ . Thus the optimal allocation is unique.

A.8

Proof of Theorem 4

Lemma 19 In any optimal mechanism where the allocation is the three-tier
⇣ ⌘ (2.5) that rations
B
a quantity x—defined by (2.7)—on some (a, b) for which 0 < a < F 1 B+1
< b < 1:
a. the surplus for type zero is equal to a + (b
b. the surplus for type one is equal to (1

a)(B

b)B + (b

x) (1

F(b));

a)(1 + x)F(a).

Proof To prove Claim (a), consider first the case where x 0. Recall from Corollary 3 for
the payment rule in this case. The surplus for type zero is equal to a (the revenue the type
receives from selling his one unit endowment) plus the (per-capita) lump sum rebate from the
planner. The lump sum rebate is equal to the planner’s profit from implementing (2.5) through
the profit-maximizing payment rule. Note that the planner cannot profit from selling the good
to the types in (a, b), as the per-unit revenue extracted from them is equal to a, the per-unit cost
from procuring the good (from the seller-types in [0, a)). Thus, the planner can profit only from
the sales to the buyer-types in (b, 1]. The per-unit profit is the price di↵erence b (b a)x/B a
between the price b (b a)x/B o↵ered to (b, 1] and the price a to the seller-types. Since the
amount of sales to (b, 1] is (1 F(b))B, the profit is equal to
(b

(b

a)x/B

a) (1

F(b)) B = (b

a)(B

x) (1

F(b)) .

(A.15)

Thus the surplus for type zero is equal to a plus the above expression, as in Claim (a).
Next consider the other case, x < 0. Again recall from Corollary 3 for the payment rule
in this case. The planner can profit only from the quantity she procures from the seller-types
in [0, a). The per-unit profit from this quantity is the price di↵erence b (a (b a)x) between
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the sales price b and the procurement price a (b a)x. The quantity is equal to the mass F(a)
of [0, a). Thus the profit is equal to
(b

(a

(b

a)x)) F(a).

(A.16)

Note that the revenue a type zero receives from selling his one unit of the good is equal to
a (b a)x. Therefore, the surplus for type zero is equal to
a

(b

a)x + (b

(a

(b

a)x)) F(a) = a (b
= a + (b

a)x + (b a)(1 + x)F(a)
a)(B x) (1 F(b)) ,

where the second line is equivalent to (2.7), the definition of x. Thus the surplus for type zero
in the case x < 0 is also equal to the expression in Claim (a). Hence Claim (a) is true.
To prove Claim (b), consider first the case x < 0. Given the payment rule characterized in
Corollary 3 for the mechanism of (2.5), type one buys the quantity B of the good at the price b
per unit and receives a lump sum rebate, which has been shown to be equal to (A.16) in the
proof of Claim (a). Thus, the surplus for type one given (2.5) is equal to
(1

b)B + (b

(a

(b

a)x)) F(a)

when x < 0, as asserted by Claim (b).
Next consider the other case, x 0. Given the payment rule characterized in Corollary 3
for the mechanism of (2.5), type one buys the quantity B of the good at the price b (b a)x/B
per unit and receives a lump sum rebate, which has been shown to be equal to (A.15) in the
proof of Claim (a). Thus, the surplus for type one given (2.5) is equal to
(1
= (1
= (1

(b (b a)x/B)) B + (b a)(B x) (1 F(b))
b)B + (b a)x + (b a)(B x) (1 F(b))
b)B + (b a)(1 + x)F(a),

with the last line equivalent to (2.7), the definition of x. Thus, the surplus for type one in the
case x 0 is also equal to the expression asserted by Claim (b). Hence Claim (b) is true.
Proof of Theorem 4 Claim (a) is intuitive. By Corollary 3, the mechanism of allocation (2.5)
transfers
⇣ ⌘a (strictly) positive lump sum rebate to all types, and hence the surplus for the
⇣ type
⌘
B
B
1
1
F
given
allocation
(2.5)
is
positive.
By
contrast,
the
surplus
for
the
type
F
is
B+1
B+1
equal to zero in the mechanism of the allocation (2.6): By the envelope theorem, one readily sees⇣ that⌘ the surplus function given allocation (2.6) attains its minimum at the type equal
B
to F 1 B+1
. Meanwhile, it is easy to show that any payment rule that implements a marketclearing two-tier allocation such as (2.6) generates zero
for the planner and hence zero
⇣ profit
⌘
B
1
lump sum rebate to the individuals. Thus type F
gets zero surplus under the alloca⇣ B+1
⌘
B
tion (2.6). It follows that the surplus for type F 1 B+1 given allocation (2.5) is greater than
that given (2.6). By continuity of
as a function of types, this strict inequality extends
⇣ surplus
⌘
B
1
to types sufficiently near to F
, and hence Claim (a) is true.
B+1
To prove Claims (b) and (c), note from (2.7), the definition of x, that
F(a) + B(1

F(b)) + x(F(b)

F(a)) = 0,

A.8. Proof of Theorem 4
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or equivalently,

B
1+x
B x
=
F(a) +
F(b).
(A.17)
B+1 B+1
B+1
Since (1 + x)/(B + 1) and (B x)/(B + 1) are between zero and one and sum up to one, B/(B + 1)
is a convex combination between F(a) and F(b). When F is convex on (a, b), F 1 is concave
on (F(a), F(b)) because F is strictly increasing by assumption. Thus, a simple application of
Jensen’s inequality implies:
F

1

✓ B ◆
B+1

1+x
B x
B x
(b
a+
b=a+
B+1
B+1
B+1

a) .

(A.18)

By Lemma 19.a, the surplus for type zero under the optimal mechanism of the rationing allocation (2.5) is equal to
a + (b

a) (B

x) (1

B x
F(b)) < a + (b a)
✓ B ◆B + 1
 F 1
,
B+1

where the first inequality follows from F(b) > B/(B+1), and the second inequality from (A.18).
Thus, since the surplus for type⇣ zero
⌘ given the optimal mechanism of allocation (2.6) is equal to
B
1
the market-clearing price F
, type zero is worse-o↵ in the rationing mechanism of alloB+1
cation (2.5) than in the mechanism of the allocation (2.6). Since the allocations (2.5) and (2.6)
are identically equal to 1 for all types in [0, a), the envelope theorem implies that in both
allocations, the surplus decreases at the same rate 1 when the type increases from zero to a.
Consequently, Claim (b) of the theorem follows.
Similarly, when F is concave on (a, b), F 1 is convex on (F(a), F(b)). Thus
F

1

✓ B ◆ 1+x
B x

a+
b=b
B+1
B+1
B+1

1+x
(b
B+1

a) .

(A.19)

By Lemma 19.b, the surplus for type one under the optimal mechanism of the rationing allocation (2.5) is equal to
!
F(a)
(1 b)B + (b a)(1 + x)F(a) = B B b (1 + x)(b a)
B
!
1+x
(b a)
< B B b
B+1
✓
✓ B ◆◆
1
 B 1 F
,
B+1
where the first inequality follows from F(a) < B/(B+1), and the second inequality
from
(A.19).
⇣
⇣ ⌘⌘
B
1
Thus, since the surplus for type one given allocation (2.6) is equal to B 1 F
, type
B+1
one is worse-o↵ in the allocation (2.5) than in the allocation (2.6). Since the allocations (2.5)
and (2.6) are identically equal to B for all types in [0, a), the envelope theorem implies that in
both allocations, the surplus increases at the same rate B when the type increases from b to 1.
Consequently, Claim (c) of the theorem follows. ⌅
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Proof of Theorem 5

Denote V for the
surplus function given W, and V⇤ the virtual surplus function given W⇤ .
⇣ virtual
⌘
B
1
Also m := F
.
B+1

Part (a) By the definition of ironing (Appendix A.4), m is interior to an ironed interval
e (F(m)) < H(V) (F(m)), which in turn holds if and only if there
given W if and only if H(V)
exist a, b 2 [0, 1] for which F(a) < B/(B + 1) < F(b) and
F(m) F(a)
(H(V)(F(b)) H(V)(F(a))) ,
F(b) F(a)
F(b) F(m)
F(m) F(a)
=
H(V)(F(a)) +
H(V)(F(b)).
F(b) F(a)
F(b) F(a)
⇣ ⌘
B
The above condition is equivalent to that, for some a < m < b (m = F 1 B+1
),
H(V)(F(m)) > H(V)(F(a)) +

F(b) F(m)
F(b) F(a)

Z

a

m

V(s)dF(s)

F(m) F(a)
F(b) F(a)

Z

b

m

V(s)dF(s) > 0,

which one can simplify, by dividing (F(b) F(m))(F(m) F(a))/(F(b) F(a)), to
Z m
Z b
1
1
V(s)dF(s)
V(s)dF(s) > 0.
F(m) F(a) a
F(b) F(m) m
It follows that m is not interior to any ironed interval given V if and only if, for any a 2 [0, m)
and any b 2 (m, 1],
Z m
Z b
1
1
V(s)dF(s)
V(s)dF(s)  0.
(A.20)
F(m) F(a) a
F(b) F(m) m
By the hypothesis in the theorem that the posted-price system is optimal given W, Lemma 16
implies that m is not interior to any ironed interval given V, and hence (A.20) holds for any
a 2 [0, m) and any b 2 (m, 1]. Now let W⇤ be any spread of W away from m, namely, W⇤ W
on [0, m) and W⇤  W on (m, 1]. Then, by (2.4) the definition of virtual surplus,
(
W(t) W⇤ (t)  0 if t 2 [0, m)
V⇤ (t) V(t) =
0 if t 2 (m, 1].
f (t)
Thus, when the V in (A.20) is replaced by V⇤ , the inequality (A.20) remains to be true for
any a 2 [0, m) and any b 2 (m, 1]. In other words, m is not interior to any ironed interval
given W⇤ . Then Lemma 16 applied to the case of W⇤ implies that the posted-price system is
optimal given W⇤ .
Part (b) Let ✏ > 0. Let
a := inf{t 2 [0, m) | W(t) > W(m) ✏/2},
b := sup{t 2 (m, 1] | W(t) < W(m) + ✏/2}.

A.10. Unbounded Acquisition
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Since welfare weight distributions are assumed continuous on R, W(a) < W(m) and there is a
positive-measure subset of (a, m) on which W > W(a). For any t 2 R define
8
>
W(t) if t < a
>
>
>
>
>
< W(a) if a  t < m
W⇤ (t) := >
>
>
W(b) if m  t < b
>
>
>
: W(t) if t b.

By the construction of W⇤ and the monotonicity of W, W⇤ is a cdf, W⇤  W on [0, m), W⇤ W
on (m, 1], and kW⇤ Wkmax  W(b) W(a)  ✏. Since W⇤ has a jump at t = m, the virtual surplus
function V⇤ given W⇤ , by (2.4), has a drop at t = m. Thus one can modify W⇤ into a continuous
function (just to satisfy our assumption that welfare weight distributions are continuous) by
replacing the jump at t = m with a sufficiently steep affine segment, so that V⇤ after modification
remains to be decreasing strictly at t = m. It follows from the definition of ironing that m
is interior to an ironed interval given W⇤ (with or without the continuity modification of the
jump). Then Lemma 16 implies that no optimal allocation given W⇤ can be implemented by
the posted-price system.

A.10

Unbounded Acquisition

The main model assumes that the upper bound B for acquisition quantity per type is finite. Here
we consider an extension where B = 1. This case reflects a world with severe inequalities and
insatiable demands for the good. For example, it could be an exchange economy where the
endowment is an individual’s initially acquired tract of land when a group of colonists arrive at
a new, unoccupied place, or one’s own private information in digital format that can be traded
o↵ for convenience, or a citizen’s initial voting power in a fledging republic say the early
Roman Republic. The following extension sheds light on the tendency that such resources are
concentrated to a tiny few of the society.
Now that there is no upper bound on the quantity that a type is allowed to acquire, the
buyer-types in this case should only be those types that maximize the ironed virtual surplus V—
selling the good to any type with lower V-value would be a waste—and all other types should be
sellers. The outcome in this case is therefore intuitive. Either the ironed virtual surplus V attains
its maximum at a unique point (the highest type, as V is weakly increasing by construction),
or V is maximized by multiple points, which constitute an upper interval in the type space. In
the former case, all members of the society supply the good to the single, highest type. In the
latter case, the optimal allocation entails two tiers, the “haves” consisting of the V-maximizers,
and the “have-nots” consisting of all the other types.
The former case, the utmost form of inequalities, needs to be formalized because the corresponding optimal allocation is not a real function. We say that the optimal allocation is singular
n
i↵ there exists a sequence (Qn )1
n=1 of functions Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, 1), each weakly increasing
and market clearing (and hence budget balancing by Theorem 1, which remains intact when
B = 1), such that Qn converges pointwise to the extended-real function Q1 defined by
(
1 if t 2 [0, 1)
1
Q (t) :=
(A.21)
1 if t = 1
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and, for any function Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, 1) that is weakly increasing and market clearing (and
hence budget-balancing), there exists N for which Qn outperforms Q in terms of the design
objective in Section 2.2 for all n
N. Then one can prove (Appendix A.11) the following
characterization of the optimal allocation.3
Theorem 15 When B = 1:
a. if V(1) > V(t) for all t 2 [0, 1), then the optimal allocation is singular;
b. else then there exists an optimal allocation and it is a two-tier allocation defined by
(
1
if 0  t < c⇤
⇤
⇤
Q (t) :=
(A.22)
F(c )
if c⇤ < t  1,
1 F(c⇤ )
where
⇤

!

c := inf arg max V .
[0,1]

Clearly, rationing is needed to implement the optimal allocation (A.22) in case (b). Such
necessity of rationing among the “haves” makes sense realistically: unchecked concentration
begets social upheavals. Nonetheless, case (a) in a sense corresponds to the optimality of
the posted-price system: Since V(1) > V(t) for all t 2 [0, 1), one can construct a sequence
n
1
n
(Bn , Qn )1
n=1 such that Q ! Q pointwise, Bn !n 1, and for each n, Q is the optimal allocation in the
⇣ B basic
⌘ model given upper bound Bn , implemented by posting the market-clearing
1
n
price F
. Since Qn in the sequence attains the optimality given Bn , Q1 can be viewed
Bn +1
as the limit of the optimum-implementing posted-price system when the acquisition cap rises
without bound.
A sufficient condition to rule out the singularity case in Theorem 15 is that V be strictly
decreasing at 1, which means 2 < w(1) if w is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of the welfare
weight distribution W with respect to F. Intuitively speaking, had the optimal allocation been
singular, the surplus for a type-1 player, whose type is the highest, would be infinitesimal,
since the price for the good converges to one. But if the designer rations the quantity to an
interval (c, 1], the trading price is c < 1, and so the type-1 player gets a strictly positive surplus.
Thus if the welfare weight density on type one is sufficiently large, the optimal allocation is to
ration the good to some interval (c⇤ , 1].

A.11

Proof of Theorem 15

Lemma 12 remains intact except that the allocation Q⇤ defined in (2.5) is modified into
8
>
1 if 0  t < a
>
>
<
⇤
x
if a < t < b
Q (t) := >
(A.23)
>
>
: y
if b < t  1
for any 1  x  y that satisfies market clearing, and the Q that is compared against Q⇤
modified to any Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, y]. Theorem 1 remains the same.
3

With a condition similar to (A.14), one can also establish a uniqueness claim of the optimal allocation.

A.11. Proof of Theorem 15
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Claim (a) Assume the premise of this claim, that V(1) > V(a) for all a 2 [0, 1). To satisfy
the condition for singularity, we start by constructing a sequence of allocations that converges
1
to Q1 . Since V is monotone, for any x 2 R the inverse image V (x) is a nondegenerate interval
if it contains more than one point. There are at most countably many such nondegenerate
intervals. Thus, either V = V and is strictly increasing on [0, 1], or [0, 1] is partitioned by a
K
sequence (⌧k , ✓k )k=1
, for some K 2 {1, 2, 3, . . .} [ {1}, such that
0  ⌧1 < ✓1  ⌧2 < ✓2  ⌧3 < ✓3  · · ·  1,
for each k there is vk 2 R for which V = vk on (⌧k , ✓k ), and k < j ) vk < v j . Note that any
ironed interval is contained in [⌧k , ✓k ] for some k. For any n = 2, 3, 4, . . ., define
(
1
if 0  F(t) < 1 1/n
n
Q (t) :=
n 1 if 1 1/n < F(t)  1.

For each n, Qn is weakly increasing and market clearing by construction and hence is also
1
budget balancing by Theorem 1. Clearly (Qn )1
n=2 converges to Q pointwise. We shall extract
n 1
an infinite subsequence of (Q )n=2 whose jump points do not belong to the interior of any
ironed interval, which is contained by [⌧k , ✓k ] for some k. Start with the smallest n for which
F 1 (1 1/n) 2 (⌧k , ✓k ) for some k. Replace the jump point F 1 (1 1/n) for Qn by ✓k , and raise
the level of Qn on (✓k , 1] to F(✓k )/(1 F(✓k )) to preserve market clearing. Remove all the Qm
in the original sequence such that
F 1 (1

1/(n

1)) < F 1 (1

1/m) < ✓k .

Since V(1) > V(a) for all a 2 [0, 1) by hypothesis, ✓k < 1 (Lemma 15.a), thus there exists an
integer M that is the largest among such m. Then, starting from Q M+1 , modify the sequence
n 1
nj 1
n 1
(Qn )1
n=M+1 as we do (Q )n=2 . By recursion, we obtain an infinite subsequence (Q ) j=1 of (Q )n=2
nj
such that for any j and any k the jump point of Q does not belong to (⌧k , ✓k ).
Pick any feasible allocation Q. We shall prove that Q is outperformed by the Qn j in (Qn j )1j=1
for all sufficiently large j. Since the elements in the sequence are both
and
R market clearing
R
budget balancing, it suffices, as in the proof of Lemma 12, to prove that Qn j VdF > QVdF.
To that end, recall from Lemmas 14 and 15 that V is continuous at t = 1 and
8t < 1 : V(t) < V(1) = V(1).

(A.24)

This coupled with V(1) = 1 > 0, implies
9 > 0 : 8t 2 (1

, 1] : V(t) > 0.

(A.25)

Since the range of Q is contained in [ 1, 1), the market clearing condition implies that Q > 1
on a positive-measure subset of [0, 1]. Consequently, with Q weakly increasing,
✓ := inf {t 2 [0, 1] | Q(t) > 1} < 1.
Since the range of Q is [ 1, 1) and Q is weakly increasing, max[0,1] Q = Q(1) < 1. Thus there
exists J such that for any j J we have
!
1
1
max{✓, 1
}<F 1
and n j 1 > Q(1).
nj
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For any j
J, denote the jump point of Qn j by x j . Then either x j = F 1 (1 1/n j ),
or x j = ✓k such that ✓k is the right endpoint of the interval (⌧k , ✓k ) to⇣ which F 1 (1⌘ 1/n j )
belongs. Let v := V(x j ). Thus, 1 > xk
F 1 (1 1/n j ) and v
V F 1 (1 1/n j ) . Since
⇣
⌘
1
< F 1 1 1/n j , (A.25) implies v > 0. With V weakly increasing, V(t)
v for all
h
i
t 2 x j , 1 . Furthermore, (A.24) implies V(1) > v; since V is continuous at t = 1, there exists
h
i
a positive-measure subset E of x j , 1 such that V(t) > v for all t 2 E. This, coupled with the
fact Qn j n j 1 > Q on (x j , 1] (by the construction of Qn j and the choice of J), implies that
Lemma 12.b.iii applies to the case where Q⇤ = Qn j , with x j here playing the role of a and b
nj
there and,
R 1 by construction
R 1 of Q , not interior to any ironed interval. Thus, Lemma 12.b.iii
implies 0 Qn j VdF > 0 QVdF, as desired.
Claim (b) Since V is weakly increasing, arg max[0,1] V is an interval [c⇤ , 1] or (c⇤ , 1] for some
c⇤  1. Since V(1)  V(a) for some a < 1, c⇤ < 1. Thus, the allocation Q⇤ is well-defined
by (A.22). It is a a two-tier allocation because c⇤ > 0 due to the fact V(0) < V(1) (Lemma 13).
By (A.22), Q⇤ is market clearing.
It is also budget balancing by Theorem 1. Thus, it suffices to
R1
⇤
show that Q maximizes 0 QVdF among all weakly increasing Q : [0, 1] ! [ 1, 1) subject
to the market clearing condition. Thus pick any such Q. Note that Q⇤ corresponds to the
special case of the Q⇤ defined in (A.23) where a = c⇤ and b = 1. By the definition of c⇤ , c⇤
is not interior to any ironed
R 1 interval. Thus
R 1 Lemma 12 (modified according to the start of this
⇤
proof) applies, and hence 0 Q VdF
QVdF, as desired.
0

Appendix B
Appendices to Chapter 3
B.1

A Binary Example

?? Suppose that there are two players, each having a type equal to either 1 or 6 with equal
probabilities, and that the the welfare weights are w(1) = 12/7 and w(6) = 2/7.
For simplicity of illustration within this example, let us consider only symmetric mechanisms. First, let us find out the constrained optimum subject to the restriction that the bad be
never assigned. Given any incentive feasible symmetric revelation mechanism, let Qt denote a
player’s expected probability of getting the good given his type being t, and let Pt denote the
expected value of the money transfer from him to others. Incentive compatibility (IC) for both
t 2 {1, 6} means
6Q6
Q1

P6
P1

6Q1 P1 ,
Q 6 P6 .

Ex post budget balancing (BB), combined with symmetry of the mechanism and equal probabilities of the two types, implies that P1 + P6 = 0. This, coupled with the IC conditions
displayed above, implies
(Q6 Q1 ) /2  P6  3 (Q6 Q1 ) .
This implies Q6 Q1 0 and hence P6 0 and P1 = P6  0. That means the individual
rationality (IR) constraint for type 1, Q1 P1 0, is non-binding. The IR for type 6, 6Q6 P6
0, is also non-binding due to the above-displayed inequality. Thus, it is necessary for any
constrained optimum that P6 = 3(Q6 Q1 ). Hence the social welfare is
!
!
1
2 1
12
12 7
3
2 (6Q6 P6 ) · + (Q1 P1 ) ·
=
Q6
Q1 ,
2
7 2
7
7 2
2
which is maximized when Q6 is maximized and Q1 minimized. Thus following is an optimum
among symmetric mechanisms that do not assign the bad at all:
a. When both players report the high type, allocate the good randomly to one of them with
equal probability and make no money transfer.
b. If both players report the low type, make no allocation and no money transfer.
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c. If one player reports the high type and the other reports the low type, assign the good to
the high-type player and have him transfer to the other player an amount equal to
0
1
BBB
CCC
BBB
C 9
3(Q6 Q1 ) ÷ (1/2) = 6 BB(1/2)(1/2) + 1/2 0CCCC = .
|{z}
|
{z
}
@
A 2
Q6

Pr(t i =1|ti =6)

Thus, given that the bad is never assigned, the optimal social welfare is equal to
0
1
BBB
C
12 BB 7
3 CCCC 9
BBB ((1/2)(1/2) + 1/2)
· 0CCC = .
{z
} 2 A 2
7 @2 |
Q6

By contrast, consider another symmetric mechanism that assigns the bad sometimes. It
stipulates the same rule as the previous mechanism except—
c*. If one player reports the high type and the other reports the low type, allocate the good
to the high-type player and the bad to the low-type player, and have the high-type player
transfer an amount of money equal to 6 to the low-type player.
It is easy to verify incentive feasibility of this mechanism. The social welfare becomes larger:
1
2

B.2

!2

!
2
12
33
6) · + ( 1 + 6) ·
= .
7
7
7
{z
}

2 1
6 · + (6
7 2
|

di↵erent types

Proof of (3.9): An Integration-by-Part Routine

Pick any t0 2 [0, 1]. Since (Q, P) is IC, (3.5) implies
Z

1

0

!
Pi dW =
ti Qi (ti )
Qi (s)ds Ui (t | Q, P) dW(ti )
0
t0
Z 1
Z 1 Z ti
0
=
ti Qi (ti )dW(ti ) Ui (t | Q, P)
Qi (s)ds dW(ti ).
Z

Z

1

ti

0

0

t0

0

Decompose the last double integral and use Fubini’s theorem to obtain
Z 1Z
0

ti
t0

Qi (s)ds dW(ti ) =
=

Z

t0

0

Z

=

0

t0

ti

t0

0

Z

Z
Z

0

t0

s

Qi (s)ds dW(ti ) +
Qi (s)dW(ti )ds +

Qi (s)W(s)ds +

Z

Plugging the second multiline formula into the first one for

1

t0

R

Z 1Z
t0

Z 1Z
t0

s

Qi (s) (1

Ti

ti
t0
1

Qi (s)ds dW(ti )

Qi (s)dW(ti )ds
W(s)) ds.

Pi dW, we get (3.9).
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B.3

Details of Theorem 6

B.3.1

The Joint Constraint for IC, IR and BB

Lemma 20 For any allocation (Qi )ni=1 such that Qi is weakly increasing on [0, 1] for any i,
there exists a payment rule (Pi )ni=1 with which (Qi )ni=1 constitutes an IC, IR and BB mechanism
if and only if (3.17) is true.
Proof Applying (3.13) to the case G = F for all players i and summing the equations thereby
obtained across i, we get the total expected money surplus from any IC mechanism (Q, P):
XZ
i

0

1

Pi dF =

XZ
i

1

0

Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +

X
i

X

hQi : ⇢(F)|

i

min Ui (·|Q, P).
[0,1]

(B.1)

P R1
Thus, BB ( i 0 Pi dF 0), IR (min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, P) 0 for all i) and IC together imply (3.17).
Conversely, suppose (3.17). With Qi weakly increasing, pick ti0 2 [0, 1] for which Qi (ti ) 0
for all ti 2 (ti0 , 1] and Qi (ti )  0 for all ti 2 [0, ti0 ). With such ti0 , construct Pi via (3.5) so that
Ui (ti0 |Q, P) = 0 for all i. This, with Qi weakly increasing, implies IC. Since Pi is constructed
via (3.5), the derivative of Ui (·|Q, P) is equal to Qi and hence, by the choice of ti0 , Ui (·|Q, P)
attains its minimum at ti0 . Hence IR obtains by construction of P. Now that (Qi , Pi )ni=1 is IC,
P
(B.1) holds. Then (3.17) coupled with i min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, P) = 0 implies BB.

B.3.2

The Social Welfare with Optimal Lump Sum Rebate

Lemma 21 Given (Q, P), the value of (3.6) subject to IC, IR and BB is equal to that of (3.16).
Proof Let (Q, P) be any mechanism subject to IC, IR and BB. By IC, (3.10) holds for all i.
Plug (3.10) into (3.7) and apply the two-part operator notation to see that the social welfare (3.6) generated by (Q, P) is equal to
X
X
min Ui (·|Q, P)
(B.2)
hQi : ⇢(W)| .
i

P R1
By (B.1) and BB ( i 0 Pi dF
X
i

[0,1]

0),

min Ui (·|Q, P) 
[0,1]

i

XZ
i

0

1

Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +

X
i

hQi : ⇢(F)| .

(B.3)

The right-hand side of (B.3) can be attained by a payment rule that implements (Qi )ni=1 :
Construct a payment rule PiQ via (3.5) such that min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, PQ ) = 0 for all i. With (Q, P)
IC, Qi is weakly increasing for each i. This coupled with the construction of PiQ implies
P R1
that (Qi , PiQ )ni=1 is IC. Thus i 0 PiQ dF is equal to the right-hand side of (B.1) with the role of P
P R1
there played by PQ here. Consequently, since min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, PQ ) = 0, i 0 PiQ dF is equal to
the right-hand side of (B.3). Then define P⇤ to be the payment rule that combines (PiQ )ni=1 with
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P R1
the lump sum transfer back to the players in the amount equal to i 0 PiQ dF. With P := P⇤ , the
P R1
left-hand side of (B.3) is equal to i 0 PiQ dF. It follows that P⇤ satisfies (B.3) as an equality.
P
Thus, given any implementable Q, the maximand of i min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, P) is equal to the
P
right-hand side of (B.3). Substitute the right-hand side of (B.3) for the i min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, P)
in (B.2) to see that the social welfare (3.6) generated by an optimal (Q, P) is equal to
XZ
i

=

XZ
i

1
0

Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +

X
i

1
0

Qi (ti )ti dF(ti ) +

X
i

hQi : ⇢(F)|

X

hQi : ⇢(F)

⇢(W)| ,

i

hQi : ⇢(W)|

with the equality due to linearity of ' 7! hQi : '|. The right-hand side of the above equation,
by (3.11), is equal to (3.16).

B.3.3

Convexity of Qmon

Let 2 [0, 1] and Q, Q̂ 2 Qmon . Since Q 2 Qmon , it is generated by a (qiA , qiB )ni=1 with
P
P
all i. Likewise, Q̂ =
i qiA (·)  1 and
i qiB (·)  1 via (3.3), and Qi is weakly increasing for P
n
n
(Q̂i )i=1 is generated by a (q̂iA , q̂iB )i=1 with each Q̂i weakly increasing. Then i ( qiA + (1
)q̂iA ) 
P
1 and i ( qiB + (1
)q̂iB )  1; furthermore, for each i, Qi + (1 )Q̂i satisfies (3.3) with respect to ( qiA + (1
)q̂iA , qiB + (1
)q̂iB ), and is weakly increasing because both Qi and Q̂i
are so. Thus ( Qi + (1
)Q̂i )ni=1 2 Qmon .

B.3.4

Concavity of Two-Part Operators

P
Lemma 22 (Qi )ni=1 7! i hQi : ⇢(F)| is a concave functional on Q. Furthermore, for any
Q, Q0 2 Q, if Qi (ti )Q0i (ti ) < 0 for all ti in a positive-measure subset of [0, 1] for some i and if
↵ 2 (0, 1), then
X
X
X⌦
↵ hQi : ⇢(F)| + (1 ↵) hQ0i : ⇢(F)| <
↵Qi + (1 ↵)Q0i : ⇢(F) .
(B.4)
i

i

i

Proof It suffices to prove, for each i, that hQi : ⇢(F)| is a concave functional of Qi , and strictly
so if Q+i , 0 on a positive-measure subset of [0, 1]. By (3.11), the definition of ⇢(F), ⇢+ (F) <
⇢ (F) on [0, 1]. By the definition of two-part operators and the fact Qi = Q+i Qi ,
hQi : ⇢(F)| =
=

Z

0

Z

0

1

1

Q+i (ti )⇢+ (F)(ti )dti
Qi (ti )⇢ (F)(ti )dti +

Z

Z

1

0
1

0

Qi (ti )⇢ (F)(ti )dti

⇥
Q+i (ti ) ⇢+ (F)(ti )

⇤
⇢ (F)(ti ) dti .

On the second line, the first integral is linear in Qi ; the second integral is concave in Qi because
Qi (ti ) 7! Q+i (ti ) is convex, ⇢+ (F) ⇢ (F)  0 on [0, 1], and hence Qi (ti ) 7! Q+i (ti ) (⇢+ (F)(ti ) ⇢ (F)(ti ))
is concave for all ti 2 [0, 1]. Thus hQi : ⇢(F)| is concave in Qi . To prove the second statement

B.4. Proof of Corollaries 5, 6 and 7

95

of the lemma, note that the convex mapping x 7! x+ is strictly convex for those x, y 2 R such
that xy < 0 in the sense that xy < 0 implies
↵x+ + (1

↵)y+ > (↵x + (1

for all ↵ 2 (0, 1). This coupled with the fact ⇢+ (F)
↵Q+i + (1

↵)(Q0 )+i (⇢+ (F)

↵)y)+

⇢ (F) < 0 on [0, 1] implies that

⇢ (F)) < ↵Qi + (1

↵)Q0i

+

(⇢+ (F)

⇢ (F))

on the subset of [0, 1] where Qi Q0i < 0. Thus, if this subset, denoted by E, is of positive
measure, the above strict inequality is preserved by integration on E. When the integration
domain extends from E to [0, 1], the strictly inequality is again preserved because Qi (ti ) 7!
Q+i (ti ) (⇢+ (F)(ti ) ⇢ (F)(ti )) is concave for every ti 2 [0, 1]. Thus (B.4) follows.

B.3.5

Existence of Interior Solutions for (3.17)

Let (Qi )ni=1 be the allocation of auctioning o↵ the good through an expected-revenue-maximizing
auction (cf. Myerson
[17]) and never assigning the bad at all. Hence Qi is never negative,
R1
hQi : ⇢( f )| = 0 Qi (s)⇢+ (F)(s)ds, and so the left-hand side of (3.17) is equal to
XZ
i

1

0

Qi (ti ) ti

1

!
F(ti )
dF(ti ),
f (ti )

which, by Myerson [17], is equal to the expected value of the pointwise maximum among the
nonnegative ironed virtual utilities of the good. Since F has no gap in [0, 1], this expected
value is strictly positive. Thus (3.17) is satisfied strictly.

B.4

Proof of Corollaries 5, 6 and 7

Corollary 5

Use (3.20) and integration-by-parts to obtain
Z ti
Z ti
V(r)dF(r) = ti F(ti ) ti W(ti ) +
rdW(r)
0
0
Z ti
= ti F(ti )
(ti r)w(r) f (r)dr
0

for any ti 2 [0, 1], with the second line due to (3.8). For each ti 2 [0, 1], define
Z ti
R(ti ) :=
(ti r)w(r) f (r)dr,
0
Z ti
e i ) :=
R(t
(ti r)e
w(r) f (r)dr.
0

By this definition and the above calculation, (3.22) is equivalent to “ti F(ti ) < R(ti ) for some
ti 2 (0, 1).” By hypothesis, the bad is allocated with a strictly positive probability given welfare
density w, thus the “only if” part of Theorem 7 implies that ti F(ti ) < R(ti ) for some ti 2
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(0, 1). The “if” part of the theorem implies that the bad is also allocated with a strictly positive
e i ) for some ti 2 (0, 1). Thus, we complete the proof by
e if ti F(ti ) < R(t
probability given w
e R on (0, 1]. To show that, pick any ti 2 (0, 1]. We have:
showing that R
e i)
R(t

R(ti ) =
=

Z

0

Z

0

ti

ti

(ti

r) (e
w(r)

w(r)) f (r)dr

⇣
e
r) d W(r)

(ti

⌘
W(r)
Z ti ⇣
e
W(r)

⇣
⌘
e
ti W(0)
W(0)
0
Z ti ⇣
⌘
e
=
W(r)
W(r) dr,
=

⌘
W(r) d(ti

r)

0

e is second-order stochastically dominated by W.
which is nonnegative by (3.23), as W

⌅

Corollary 6 By Theorem 7, it suffices to prove (3.22). By (3.20) and di↵erentiability of f
at 0, the derivative of V at 0 is equal to 2 w(0), which is negative by the hypothesis of the
corollary. Thus, with V(0) = 0 by (3.20), (3.22) holds for some ti near 0. ⌅
Corollary 7 By Corollary 5, it suffices to prove that the bad is not needed when the welfare
weight distribution is F. Given such welfare weight distribution, V(ti ) = ti for all ti 2 [0, 1]
by (3.20). Hence (3.22) does not hold. By Theorem 7, the bad is not needed. ⌅

B.5

Details of Theorem 7

Proof of Lemma 2 Since Qi 0 by hypothesis, hQi : ⇢( f )| =
left-hand side of (3.17) is equal to
XZ
i

0

1

Qi (s) (s f (s)

(1

F(s))) ds =

XZ
i

0

1

R1
0

Qi (s)⇢+ (F)(s)ds, and so the

Qi (s)d ( s(1

F(s))) .

With integration by parts,
Z

0

1

Qi (s)d ( s(1

F(s))) =

Z

1
0

s(1

F(s))dQi (s).

Since s(1 F(s)) > 0 for all s 2 (0, 1), and Qi weakly increasing, the above integral is nonnegative for all i. Hence (3.17) is satisfied. Furthermore, the above integral is strictly positive
unless Qi is constant a.e. on [0, 1]. Thus, the proof is complete if it is impossible to have a
solution (Qi )ni=1 to problem (3.16) such that, for each i, Qi is equal to a nonnegative constant
a.e. on [0, 1]. To that end, let Q be such an allocation: for each i, Qi = ai a.e. on [0, 1] for some
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ai 2 [0, 1]. Then, by (3.3),
X

ai =

i


=
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XZ 1Z
i

0

[0,1]n

1

i

0

[0,1]n

1

XZ 1Z
Z

[0,1]n

 1.

X
i

(qiA (ti , t i )

qiB (ti , t i )) dF i (t i )dF(ti )

qiA (ti , t i )dF i (t i )dF(ti )

qiA (t1 , . . . , tn ) dF(t1 ) · · · dF(tn )

Given this allocation, the objective in problem (3.16) is equal to
0
1
Z 1
Z 1
X Z 1
BBBX CCC Z 1
ai
V(ti )dF(ti ) = BB@ ai CCA
V(ti )dF(ti ) 
V(s)dF(s) =
V(s)dF(s),
i

0

0

i

0

0

(B.5)

with the last “=” due to the definition of ironing, (3.24)—(3.25). By contrast, consider the
allocation that never allocates the bad and allocates the good hierarchically according to the
ironed copy V of V (cf. Section 3.4.1). Never allocating the bad, this allocation satisfies (3.17)
by the previous reasoning; since V is weakly increasing by definition, this allocation belongs
to Qmon . Thus the allocation is feasible. Furthermore, given this allocation, which chooses the
largest nonnegative V(ti ) almost surely, the objective in problem (3.16) is equal to
Z
✓
◆
+
max V(ti ) dF(t1 ) · · · dF(tn ),
[0,1]n i=1,...,n

which is larger than (B.5). Thus (Qi )ni=1 = (ai )ni=1 (a.e.) cannot be a solution to (3.16).

B.6

Details of Theorem 8

B.6.1

Proof of Lemma 4

⌅

Claim (a): Since Q is convex, the proof of Theorem 6 remains valid when Qmon is replaced
by Q, so the saddle point characterization applies to any solution to problem (3.34).
P R1
Claim (b.i): Plug = 0 into (3.14) to see that the L (Q, 0) is equal to i 0 Qi (s)V(s)dF(s),
a linear functional on the convex domain Q. Thus, maximization of L (·, 0) on Q is a linear
programming, hence any solution Q⇤ thereof entails a hierarchical allocation of the good according to V, and a hierarchical allocation of the bad according to V. Thus, for almost all
ti , ti0 , V(ti ) > V(ti0 ) ) Q⇤i (ti ) > Q⇤i (ti0 ).
Claim (b.ii): Suppose, to the contrary, that Q⇤i (s)Q⇤j (s) < 0 for all s on a positive-measure
subset of [0, 1]. Let Q0 2 Q be the same as Q⇤ except that Q0i = Q⇤j and Q0j = Q⇤i . Then (B.4)
holds. By > 0 and (3.14), it follows that, for any ↵ 2 (0, 1),
L ↵Q⇤ + (1

↵)Q0 ,

> ↵L (Q⇤ , ) + (1

↵)L (Q0 , ) = L (Q⇤ , ),
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where the equality comes from the fact that the permutation “Q0i = Q⇤j and Q0j = Q⇤i ” renders
L (Q0 , ) = L (Q⇤ , ) since the players’ types are symmetrically distributed by F and weighed
by the same W. Thus, Q⇤ does not maximize L (·, ) on Q, contradiction.
Claim (b.iii): Suppose, to the contrary, that V (x) > 0 for some x 2 (0, ci ), with V continuous due to (3.19), there is an interval (a, b) ✓ (0, ci ), with a < x < b, on which V > 0. Perturb Q⇤ by the reservation operator Ri,T such that T = {(tk )nk=1 2 [0, 1]n | ti 2 (a, b)}, namely, reserve both items from player i when i’s type belongs to (a, b). By Lemma 3, Ri,T (Q⇤ ) 2 Q(Q⇤ , c)
and we can apply (3.26) to both Q⇤ and Ri,T (Q⇤ ) to obtain
Z b
⇤
⇤
L (Q , ) L (Ri,T (Q ), ) =
Q⇤i (ti )V (ti )dF(ti ) < 0,
a

where the strictly inequality follows from Q⇤i < 0 on [0, ci ) (a, b) and V > 0 on (a, b). Thus
we have another allocation in Q that generates larger Lagrangian than Q⇤ given , contradicting
the hypothesis that Q⇤ maximizes L (·, ) on Q. ⌅

B.6.2

Lemma 24 and 25: The Perturbation Method

We need to introduce two additional kinds of sign-preserving perturbations:
A
Reservation Ri,T
of the good: This is the same as Ri,T (Section 3.4.2) except that the only
modification of the original ex post allocation (qkA , qkB )nk=1 is to set q̃iA (t) := 0 for any
t 2 T without altering the allocation of item B. That is, when T occurs, the planner keeps
the good to herself if the original allocation would award the good to i.

Merge Mi,k,T : For any two distinct players i and k, any T ✓ [0, 1]n , and for any Q 2 Q that is
the reduced form of an ex post allocation (qlA , qlB )nl=1 , define Mi,k,T (Q) to be the reduced
form of the ex post allocation (q̃lA , q̃lB )nl=1 that is the same as (qlA , qlB )nl=1 except that, for
any t 2 T , q̃iB (t) := qkB (t) + qiB (t) and q̃kB (t) := 0. Namely, when T occurs, award the
bad to player i whenever it is originally allocated to players i or k.
Recall that ⇡i denotes the projection from Rn onto the ith dimension. The next lemma
A
follows directly from the definitions of Ri,T
and Mi,k,T and hence we omit its proof.
Lemma 23 For any Q 2 Q with crossing point c := (cl )nl=1 2 [0, 1]n , any players i and k
A
with i , k, and any T ✓ [0, 1]n for which ⇡i (T ) ✓ [0, ci ], denote Q0 := Ri,T
(Q) and Q00 :=
A
Rk,T Mi,k,T (Q) . Then:
a. Q0 2 Q(Q, c), Q0i = Qi on [0, 1] \ ⇡i (T ), and Q0k = Qk on [0, 1] for all k , i;
b. if ⇡k (T ) ✓ [0, ck ], then Q00 2 Q(Q, c), Q00i = Qi on [0, 1]\⇡i (T ), Q00k = Qk on [0, 1]\⇡k (T ),
and Q00l = Ql on [0, 1] for all l < {i, k}.
Recall from Section 3.4.2 the definitions of crossing point and Q(Q⇤ , c). As explained
around (3.35), any solution to the relaxed problem (3.34) is also a solution to (3.36). The
next two lemmas characterize any solution to (3.36), where the V corresponds to the g in
the lemmas. Since the objective in the problem (3.36) is a linear functional of the reduced
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form Q when Q ranges in Q(Q⇤ , c), the intuition of these lemmas is to perturb Q toward the
direction of V (or that of g here). However, the perturbation needs to be ex post feasible—
obeying (3.3)—and remain within Q(Q⇤ , c). The key of the proof is to guarantee such conditions with the sign-preserving perturbations defined earlier.
Lemma 24 For any integrable g : [0, 1] ! R, any (ci )ni=1 2 [0, 1]n and any Q⇤ 2 Q, denote
Ei := {ti 2 [0, ci ] | g(ti ) > 0}
for each player i, and suppose:
i. c := (ci )ni=1 is a crossing point of Q⇤ , and
P R ci
ii. Q⇤ maximizes i 0 Qi (s)g(s)dF(s) among all (Qi )ni=1 2 Q(Q⇤ , c).

Then each of the following sets is of zero measure for any players i and k with i , k (where
(q⇤lA , q⇤lB )nl=1 denotes the ex post allocation the reduced form of which is Q⇤ ):
n
o
a. T i := (ti , t i ) 2 Ei ⇥ [0, 1]n 1 | q⇤iA (ti , t i ) > 0 ;
n
o
P
b. Zi := (ti , t i ) 2 Ei ⇥ [0, 1]n 1 | nk=1 q⇤kB (ti , t i ) < 1 ;
n
o
c. Oik := (ti , tk , t (i,k) ) 2 Ei ⇥ (ck , 1] ⇥ [0, 1]n 2 | q⇤kB (ti , tk , t (i,k) ) > 0 ;
n
o
d. S ik := (ti , tk , t (i,k) ) 2 Ei ⇥ Ek ⇥ [0, 1]n 2 | g(ti ) > g(tk ), q⇤kB (ti , tk , t (i,k) ) > 0 .
Proof Category (a): Suppose that T i for some i is of positive measure. Then perturb Q⇤ by the
A
A
A
reservation operator Ri,T
of the good. Denote Q := Ri,T
(Q⇤ ). By definition of Ri,T
, Q is the
i
i
i
⇤
same as Q except that, for all ti 2 ⇡i (T i ),
Z
Z
(3.3)
(3.3)
⇤
Qi (ti ) =
qiB (ti , t i ) dF i (t i ) <
q⇤iA (ti , t i ) q⇤iB (ti , t i ) dF i (t i ) = Q⇤i (ti ).
[0,1]n

1

[0,1]n

1

Since ⇡i (T i ) ✓ Ei ✓ [0, ci ] by definition, Q also has c as a crossing point, namely, Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c).
But
Z
X Z ck
X Z ck
⇤
Qk (s)g(s)dF(s)
Qk (s) g(s)dF(s) =
Q⇤i (s) Qi (s) g(s)dF(s)
k

0

k

0

⇡i (T i )

is positive because the measure of ⇡i (T i ) is positive and because g > 0 and Qi < Q⇤i on ⇡(T i ).
This, with Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c), contradicts hypothesis (ii).
Category (b): Suppose that Zi for some i has a positive measure. Let (qkA , qkB )nk=1 be the ex
post allocation that is the same as (q⇤kA , q⇤kB )nk=1 except that
qiB (t) := q⇤iB (t) + 1

n
X

q⇤kB (t)

k=1

for all t 2 Zi . That is, if Zi occurs, allocate the bad to player i if the original allocation would
reserve it from all players. Denote Q for the reduced form of (qkA , qkB )nk=1 . Clearly Q is the
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same as Q⇤ except that (by (3.3)) Qi < Q⇤i on ⇡i (Zi ). As in Category (a), Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c) and
P R ck
P R ck ⇣ ⇤ ⌘
Qk (s) g(s)dF(s), again a contradiction to (ii).
k 0 Qk (s)g(s)dF(s) >
k 0
Category (c): Suppose that Oik is of positive measure for some i , k. Let tk 2 ⇡k (Oik ). By
the supposition,
Z

[0,1]n 1

Z

q⇤kB (tk , t k )dF k (t k )

⇡ k (Oik )

q⇤kB (tk , t k )dF k (t k ) > 0,

where ⇡ k denotes the projection (tl )nl=1 7! (tl )l,k . By definition of Oik , tk 2 (ck , 1]. This coupled
with c being a crossing point of Q⇤ implies that Q⇤k (tk ) 0. Thus, by (3.3),
Z

[0,1]n

1

Z

q⇤kA (tk , t k )dF k (t k )

Thus there exists O⇤ (tk ) ✓ {t
Z

O⇤ (tk )

k

[0,1]n

2 [0, 1]n

1

1

O :=

⇡ k (Oik )

q⇤kB (tk , t k )dF k (t k ).

| q⇤kA (tk , t k ) > 0} such that

q⇤kA (tk , t k )dF k (t k )

Denote

Z

q⇤kB (tk , t k )dF k (t k )

[

=

tk 2⇡k (Oik )

Z

⇡ k (Oik )

q⇤kB (tk , t k )dF k (t k ).

(B.6)

({tk } ⇥ O⇤ (tk )) .

A
Now perturb Q⇤ by the merge operator Mi,k,Oik together with the reservation operator Rk,O
of
item A. That is, allocate the bad to player i instead of k in the event of Oik , and reserve the good
A
from player k in the event of O. Denote Q := Rk,O
Mi,k,Oik (Q⇤ ) . By (B.6), the perturbation
⇤
leaves Qk (tk ) unchanged for every tk 2 ⇡k (Oik ), namely, Qk = Q⇤k on ⇡k (Oik ). Thus, Ql = Q⇤l on
(cl , 1] for all players l, Ql = Q⇤l on [0, cl ] for all l , i, Qi = Q⇤i on [0, ci ] \ ⇡i (Oik ), and Qi < Q⇤i
on ⇡i (Oik ). Hence Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c). But

XZ
l

0

cl

Ql (s)g(s)dF(s)

XZ
l

0

cl

Q⇤l (s)

g(s)dF(s) =

Z

⇡i (Oik )

Q⇤i (s)

Qi (s) g(s)dF(s)

is positive, as in Category (a). Again we have a desired contradiction to (ii).
Category (d): Suppose that S ik for some k , i is of positive measure. Perturb Q⇤ by the
A
merge operator Mi,k,S ik together with the reservation operator Rk,S
of the good. Denote Q for
ik
A
⇤
the outcome of the perturbation, i.e., Q := Rk,S
M
(Q
)
.
That
is, in the event S ik , assign
i,k,S ik
ik
the bad to player i whenever it is originally allocated to players i or k, and reserve the good
from player k. Let (qlA , qlB )nl=1 be the ex post allocation the reduced form of which is Q. By
definition of the perturbation, qiB (t) = q⇤iB (t)+q⇤kB (t) and qkB (t) = qkA (t) = 0 for all t 2 S ik . Since
⇡i (S ik ) ✓ Ei ✓ [0, ci ] and ⇡k (S ik ) ✓ Ek ✓ [0, ck ], Lemma 23.b implies that Q also has c as a
A
crossing point, namely, Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c). By the definitions of Rk,S
and Mi,k,S ik and the notations
ik
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F n (t) := F(t1 ) · · · F(tn ), q⇤l (t) := q⇤lA (t) q⇤lB (t) and ql (t) := qlA (t) qlB (t),
X Z cl
X Z cl
Ql (s)g(s)dF(s)
Q⇤l (s) g(s)dF(s)
l

=
=
=

XZ
Zl
Z

S ik

S ik

=

Z

S ik

0

cl

0

Z

[0,1]n 1

l

ql (tl , t l ) + q⇤l (tl , t l ) g(tl )dF l (t l )dF(tl )
qk (t) + q⇤k (t) g(tk ) dF n (t)

qi (t) + q⇤i (t) g(ti ) +

q⇤kB (t)g(ti ) + q⇤kA (t)
q⇤kB (t) (g(ti )

0

q⇤kB (t) g(tk ) dF n (t)

g(tk )) + q⇤kA (t)g(tk ) dF n (t)

> 0,

where the first equality is due to the definition of Ql (and (Q⇤l ) ) and (3.3), the second and third
A
equalities are due to the definitions of Rk,S
and Mi,k,S ik , and the inequality due to the fact that
ik
g(ti ) > g(tk ) > 0 on S ik and the hypothesis that S ik is of positive F n -measure. Again we obtain
a contradiction to the hypothesis (ii), as desired.
Lemma 25 For any integrable g : [0, 1] ! R, any (ci )ni=1 2 [0, 1]n and any Q⇤ 2 Q, denote
⇢

E := s 2 0, min ci g(s) > 0
i=1,...,n

and suppose:

i. c := (ci )ni=1 is a crossing point of Q⇤ , and
P R ci
ii. Q⇤ maximizes i 0 Qi (s)g(s)dF(s) among all (Qi )ni=1 2 Q(Q⇤ , c).

Then for any player i and almost every ti , ti0 2 E, g(ti ) > g(ti0 ) ) Q⇤i (ti ) < Q⇤i (ti0 ).
Proof For any player i and any ti 2 E, define:
8
⇢
>
Y
>
<
Bi (ti , ) := >
(t ) 2
[0, ck ] g(ti ) > max 0, max g(tk )
>
: k k,i
k,i
k,i
8
⇢
>
Y
>
<
Bi (ti , ⇠) := >
(t
)
2
[0,
c
]
g(t
)
=
max
0, max g(tk )
k
i
>
: k k,i
k,i
k,i

and Bi (ti ) := Bi (ti , ) [ Bi (ti , ⇠). We have
Z
⇤
Qi (ti ) =
q⇤iB (ti , t i )dF i (t i )
n
1
Z[0,1]
=
q⇤iB (ti , t i )dF i (t i )
n
1
Z[0,c⇤ ]
=
q⇤iB (ti , t i )dF i (t i ),
Bi (ti )

9
>
>
=
,
>
>
;
9
>
>
=
,
>
>
;
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with the first line due to (3.3) and Lemma 24.a, the second line due to Lemma 24.c, and the
third line Lemma 24.d. Also observe that, for almost every ti 2 E,
q⇤iB (ti , ·) = 1 a.e. on Bi (ti , ).
(B.7)
P
That is because q⇤iB (ti , t i ) = nk=1 q⇤kB (ti , t i ) for almost all t i 2 Bi (ti , ) by Lemma 24.d, and
Pn ⇤
S
ti 2E ({ti } ⇥ Bi (ti , )) by Lemma 24.b. Thus, for almost every
k=1 qkB (t) = 1 for almost all t 2
0
0
ti , ti 2 E such that g(ti ) > g(ti ), which means Bi (ti0 ) ( B(ti , ) and, because F has no gap in
[0, 1], B(ti , ) \ Bi (ti0 ) is of positive measure, we have
Z
Z
⇤
qiB (ti , t i )dF i (t i )
q⇤iB (ti , t i )dF i (t i )
Bi (ti )
ZBi (ti , )
=
dF i (t i )
Bi (ti , )
Z
>
dF i (t i )
Bi (ti0 )
Z
q⇤iB (ti0 , t i )dF i (t i ),
Bi (ti0 )

with the second line due to (B.7), and the third line due to B(ti , ) \ Bi (ti0 ) having positive
measure. Thus, Q⇤i (ti ) < Q⇤i (ti0 ), as asserted.

B.6.3

Lemma 26: The Indeterminacy Case of the Relaxed Problem

Lemma 26 For any > 0, c⇤ 2 (0, 1) and Q⇤ 2 Qmon , if (Q⇤ , ) is a saddle point with respect
to (L , Q), Q⇤i < 0 on a positive-measure subset of [0, c⇤ ] for some i, and c := (ci )ni=1 with
ci := c⇤ for all i is a crossing point of Q⇤ , then
8
9
>
>
X Z c⇤
>
>
<
=
⇤
(s
Q
2
Q(Q
,
c)
Q
(s)
f
(s)
+
F(s))
ds
=
z
(B.8)
>
>
i
>
>
:
;
0
i

contains a continuum.

Proof Since > 0 and (Q⇤ , ) is a saddle point with respect to (L , Q), the constraint (3.17)
in the relaxed problem (3.34) is binding for Q⇤ . This, combined with (3.37) and the hypothesis
that c is a crossing point of Q⇤ , means
X Z c⇤
Q⇤i (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) ds = z.
(B.9)
i

0

Note that Q(Q⇤ , c) is a convex set and the mapping
X Z c⇤
:Q7 !
Qi (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) ds
i

0

is linear on Q(Q⇤ , c). Denote 0 for the element of Q(Q⇤ , c) that assigns zero to Qi (s) for all
s 2 [0, c⇤ ] and all i. Note that (0) = 0.
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⇣ ⌘
First we claim z > minQ(Q⇤ ,c) . By hypothesis, Q⇤i > 0 on a positive-measure subset
of [0, c⇤ ] for some i, it follows from (B.9) that z > 0. Thus the claim follows from the fact that
0 = (0) and 0 2 Q(Q⇤ , c).
Second,
we claim z < maxQ(Q⇤ ,c) . Otherwise, z = maxQ(Q⇤ ,c) . Then by (B.9) Q⇤ maxiP R c⇤
mizes i 0 Qi (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) ds among all Q 2 Q(Q⇤ , c). Let g(s) := s f (s) + F(s) for all
s 2 [0, 1] and apply Lemma 25. Note that the set E in Lemma 25 is (0, c⇤ ] here. Thus, for every
player i and almost every s, s0 2 (0, c⇤ ], s f (s) + F(s) > s0 f (s0 ) + F(s0 ) ) Q⇤i (s) < Q⇤i (s0 ). Note
that s f (s) + F(s) is equal to 0 when s = 0 and strictly positive when s > 0. Thus, by di↵erentiability of f , there exists an interval I ✓ [0, c⇤ ] on which s f (s) + F(s) is strictly increasing in s.
Hence Q⇤i (s) is a strictly decreasing function of s almost everywhere on I. But then Q⇤ < Qmon ,
contradiction. Thus z < maxQ(Q⇤ ,c) .
Third, there exist at least two distinct elements of the set (B.8). Let Q be a maximizer of
on Q(Q⇤ , c). Thus,
0 = (0) < z = (Q⇤ ) < (Q).
⇣ ⌘
Since s f (s) + F(s) > 0 for all s 2 (0, 1], Qi > 0 a.e. on (0, c⇤ ] for all i. For any ✓ 2
[0, c⇤ ] and for any player i, let T i✓ := {(tk )nk=1 2 [0, 1]n | ti 2 [0, ✓]} and perturb Q iteratively
by R1,T1✓ , R2,T2✓ , . . . , Rn,Tn✓ . That is, let
⇣ ⇣
⇣
⌘⌘ ⌘
Q>✓ := Rn,Tn✓ · · · R2,T2✓ R1,T1✓ (Q⇤ ) · · · ,

which results from modifying Q⇤ by reserving both items from any player whose type is
in [0, ✓]. Then Q>0 = Q, Q>c⇤ = 0, and
(Q>✓ ) =

P R c⇤ ⇣
i ✓
>c⇤

0 = (Q

⌘
Qi (s) (s f (s) + F(s)) ds,

) < z = (Q⇤ ) < (Q>0 ).

(B.10)

By continuity of the integration
there exists a ✓⇤ 2 [0, c⇤ ] for which (Q>✓⇤ ) = (Q⇤ ).
⇣ operator,
⌘
Furthermore, for any i, since Qi > 0 a.e. on (0, c⇤ ], Ineq. (B.10) implies 0 < ✓⇤ < c⇤ . Note,
⇣
⌘
⇣
⌘
⇤
⇤
for any i, that Q>✓
= 0 on [0, ✓⇤ ] and Q>✓
> 0 on (✓⇤ , c⇤ ].
i
i

Analogously, for any ⌧ 2 [0, c⇤ ] and any i, perturb Q iteratively by the reservation operators
that reserve both items from any player whose type belongs to [⌧, c⇤ ]. By the same reasoning
as above,
exists a ⌧⇤ 2 (0,⇣c⇤ ) and
a Q<⌧⇤ 2 Q(Q⇤ , c) for which (Q<⌧⇤ ) = (Q⇤ ) and, for
⇣ <⌧ there
⌘
⌘
⇤
all i, Qi ⇤ > 0 on [0, ⌧⇤ ) and Q<⌧
= 0 on [⌧⇤ , c⇤ ].
i
>✓⇤
<⌧⇤
Finally, note that Q and Q are two distinct elements of the set (B.8). Since the set is
convex, any convex combination between the two elements also belongs to the set. Thus, the
set (B.8) contains a continuum of elements, as asserted.

B.6.4

Proof of Corollary 8

Given any ( f, w) such that the bad is needed, according to the proof of Theorem 8, the only
case where the relaxed problem (3.34) admits an optimal mechanism as a solution is V = 0
W(s)
on (0, c⇤ ) for some c⇤ 2 (0, 1) and some > 0. By (3.19), that means F(s)+s
= 1 + for all
f (s)
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s 2 (0, c⇤ ), with W derived from w by (3.8). Thus, this case means

!
d
W(s)
9c⇤ 2 (0, 1) : 8s 2 (0, c⇤ ) :
ln
= 0.
ds
F(s) + s f (s)

(B.11)

This condition can be violated with slight perturbations of f or w at points near 0. Thus one
can formalize the space of ( f, w) such that the contrary of (B.11) is generic. ⌅

B.7

Generalization to ex ante Asymmetric Players

Here we sketch how to generalize the saddle point characterization (Theorem 6), and briefly indicate generalization of the other two theorems, to the asymmetric-player model: each player i’s
type is independently drawn according to a commonly known, possibly player-specific, cdf Fi
with density fi positive on its support [0, 1]; and player i is weighed in the social welfare function according to a possibly player-specific welfare distribution Wi : R ! R+ , which is a
weakly increasing function generated by a Radon measure, such that the social welfare from a
mechanism (Q, P) is equal to
XZ
i

0

1

Ui (ti | Q, P)dWi (ti ).

(B.12)

There is no loss of generality to assume (B.12) as the social welfare, because any interim Pareto
optimal mechanism in this environment is a maximizer of (B.12) subject to IC, IR and BB, for
some profile (Wi )ni=1 of distribution functions across players.1
Given the general model, it is easy to generalize (3.9) to
Z

1

0

Z

Pi (ti )dWi (ti ) =

1
0

Qi (ti )ti dWi (ti ) +

Wi (1)Ui (ti0 |Q, P),

Z

ti0

0

Qi (ti )Wi (ti )dti

Z

1

ti0

Qi (ti ) (Wi (1)

Wi (ti )) dti

where Wi (1) need not be equal to one for all i, because the welfare distributions (Wi )ni=1 may
assign di↵erent average weights to di↵erent players. It is also easy to generalize (3.17) to
XZ
i

0

1

Qi (ti )ti dFi (ti ) +

X
i

hQi : ⇢(Fi )|

0.

(B.13)

The first nontrivial di↵erence due to the generalization is that the optimal social welfare (3.16) becomes the following nonlinear functional of the allocation Q:
XZ
i

0

1

Qi (ti )ti d (!Fi (ti )) +

where ! := maxi Wi (1).
1

The proof is in Zheng [24], available upon request.

X
i

hQi : ⇢(!Fi )

⇢(Wi )| ,

(B.14)
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First,. we observe nonlinearity of (B.14). By the definition of two-part operators, (B.14) is
linear in Q if and only if hQi : ⇢(!Fi ) ⇢(Wi )| is linear in Qi for each i, and the latter is linear
if and only if ⇢+ (!Fi ) ⇢+ (Wi ) = ⇢ (!Fi ) ⇢ (Wi ). By (3.11), that means Wi (1) = 1 for all i,
which is not necessarily true when Wi is a distribution but not a cdf.
Second, we explain why (B.14) is true for the generalization of Lemma 21. Mimicking
the proof of Lemma 21, one readily sees that the social welfare (B.12) generated by any IC
mechanism (Q, P) is equal to
X
i

X

Wi (1) min Ui (·|Q, P)
[0,1]

i

hQi : ⇢(Wi )| ,

(B.15)

and BB implies
X
i

✓
◆X
Wi (1) min Ui (·|Q, P)  max Wi (1)
min Ui (·|Q, P)
[0,1]

[0,1]

i

i
✓
◆ 0BX Z
B
 max Wi (1) BBB@
i

0

i

1

Qi (ti )ti dFi (ti ) +

X
i

1
CC
hQi : ⇢(Fi )|CCCA .

By the reason analogous to the proof of Lemma 21, the above-displayed weak inequality holds
as equality when P is optimally chosen among those that implement Q: Let (PiQ )ni=1 be the payment rule that implements Q with min[0,1] Ui (·|Q, P) = 0 for all i. The ex ante expected revenue
P R1
P
generated by (PiQ )ni=1 is equal to i 0 Qi (ti )ti dFi (ti ) + i hQi : ⇢(Fi )|. Thus, combining (PiQ )ni=1
P R1
P
with distributing i 0 Qi (ti )ti dFi (ti ) + i hQi : ⇢(Fi )| to any member of arg maxi Wi (1) as lump
sums, we obtain a payment rule with which
X
i

✓
◆ 0BX Z
B
Wi (1) min Ui (·|Q, P) = max Wi (1) BBB@
[0,1]

i

i

0

1

Qi (ti )ti dFi (ti ) +

X
i

1
CC
hQi : ⇢(Fi )|CCCA .

Plug this equation into (B.15) and set ! := maxi Wi (1) to get (B.14).
Thus, due to asymmetric welfare weights across players, the lump sum transfer in an optimal mechanism is not rebated to players indiscriminately, but rather distributed only to those
players whose ex ante expected welfare weights, Wi (1), are largest among all.
Based on the reasoning sketched above, any interim Pareto optimal mechanism is a solution of maximizing (B.14) among Q 2 Qmon subject to (B.13). As in the proof of Theorem 6,
the set of Q 2 Qmon subject to (B.13) is convex and contains an interior point. The only
di↵erence from that proof is that the objective (B.14) is nonlinear in general. However, the
objective (B.14) one can prove is a concave functional on Qmon , hence the conditions corresponding to those in Luenberger [15, Corollary 1, p219] are met, and so the saddle point
condition is necessary and sufficient for any solution to this constrained optimization problem.
To prove concavity of the objective (B.14), it suffices to prove that hQi : ⇢(!Fi ) ⇢(Wi )|
is a concave functional of Qi for each i. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 22. By the
definition of two-part operators, we need only to show ⇢+ (!Fi ) ⇢+ (Wi )  ⇢ (!Fi ) ⇢ (Wi )
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on [0, 1] for all i: for any ti 2 [0, 1], by (3.11),
(⇢+ (!Fi )) (ti )

(⇢+ (Wi )) (ti ) =
=

=

! ( 1 + Fi (ti )) ( Wi (1) + Wi (ti ))
!Fi (ti ) Wi (ti ) (! Wi (1))
!Fi (ti ) Wi (ti )
! (⇢ (Fi )) (ti ) (⇢ (Wi )) (ti ),

with the inequality due to ! = maxi Wi (1).
In sum, in the general asymmetric model, any interim Pareto optimal mechanism is a solution of maximizing (B.14) among Q 2 Qmon subject to (B.13), and hence satisfies the saddle
point condition with respect to the Lagrangian
L (Q, ) :=

XZ
i

=

1

0

Qi (ti )ti d (!Fi (ti )) +

0 Z
BBX
+ BBB@
XZ
i

i

1

0

i

1

0

defined for all Q 2 Q and all

X

Qi (ti )ti dFi (ti ) +

hQi : ⇢(!Fi )

X
i

1
CC
hQi : ⇢(Fi )|CCCA

Qi (ti )ti d ((! + )Fi (ti )) +

X
i

⇢(Wi )|

hQi : ⇢ ((! + )Fi )

⇢(Wi )| , (B.16)

2 R+ .

Remark This saddle point characterization is also a necessary and sufficient condition for
any interim Pareto optimal mechanism in the partnership dissolution IPV environment where
player i’s initial share is ✓i . To see that, interpret the xiA xiB in (3.1) as player i’s net gain in i’s
share of the partnership, and hence (3.1) is i’s net payo↵ from acquiring a net amount xiA xiB
of shares and paying an amount yi of money. (This payo↵ is net in the sense that if player i
vetoes the dissolution plan then i keeps i’s initial share ✓i thereby getting the payo↵ ✓i ti .). The
only modification on the model is to define an ex post allocation as a function (qi )ni=1 : [0, 1]n !
Q
✓i ] such that qi (t) is player i’s net gain in shares given realized type profile t, with
i [ ✓i , 1
P
the feasibility condition (3.2) replaced by i qi (t) = 0 to reflect the market clearance condition
on the net trades of shares. This modification, however, has no e↵ect on the saddle point
characterization.
The “if” part of Theorem 7 can also be generalized. The reasoning is analogous to that in
Section 3.4.1. For simplicity of exposition, assume that the welfare distributions Wi are all absolutely continuous in Fi with density wi so that Wi (1) = 1 for all i. Suppose that the bad is not
allocated at all in an optimal mechanism. Then the generalized saddle point characterization
implies that = 0 and so the Lagrangian (B.16) is reduced to (B.14). As noted previously,
the assumption Wi (1) = 1 for all i implies that (B.14) is a linear functional of Q and hence
the proof of the “if” part of Theorem 7 can be easily extended. Thus, any optimal mechanism
allocates the bad with a strictly positive probability if
!
Z ti
Wi (s) Fi (s)
s
dFi (s) < 0
fi (s)
0
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for some ti 2 (0, 1) and some player i. One can see that this condition is satisfied if wi (0) >
2 for some player i, which is hence sufficient for the bad to be allocated sometimes given
asymmetric players. Thus Corollary 6 is generalized. In the more general case where Wi (1)
need not be equal to one for all i, the Lagrangian (B.16) remains to be a nonlinear functional
of Q. The argument in that case is much more involved. Nevertheless, one can obtain in that
case a sufficient condition for the bad to be allocated sometimes by any optimal mechanism:
wi (0) > 2 maxk Wk (1) for some player i.
The “only if” part of Theorem 7, as well as Theorem 8, relies on conditions necessary for
all—rather than only for some—optimal mechanisms. These conditions we obtain through
the perturbation method presented in Appendix B.6.2. There, Lemmas 24 and 25 allow for
reduced-form allocations whose cuto↵s ci between positive and negative domains to be di↵erent across players i. In addition, one can generalize the two lemmas so that the function g there
is player-specific. Thus it is possible that both theorems are generalizable.

Appendix C
Appendices to Chapter 4
C.1

Proof of Lemma 6

Proof When xi y0 , Ineq. (4.3) is wi pi > xi , which guarantees the purchase of i. It thus
suffices to show when y0 > xi , i is purchased if and only if
vi + min{zi , z⇤i + y0

xi }

pi > y0 .

(C.1)

Sufficiency: By Theorem 9, when y0 > xi , the consumer purchases i if and only if:
1) wi

pi > xi , so i is the candidate product in block 1.

2) vi + zi

pi > y0 , so the consumer cannot find a product better than i in block 2.

Let’s call the two conditions condition 1 and condition 2 respectively.
• Suppose zi  z⇤i + y0
– If zi

z⇤i , wi

xi . By (C.1), condition 2 is satisfied.
pi = vi + z⇤i

pi

>0 by (C.1)

satisfied.
– If zi < z⇤i , Ineq. (C.1) implies wi
satisfied.

vi + zi pi
|
{z

pi = vi + zi

y0 +xi > xi . So condition 1 is
}

p0 > y0 > xi . So condition 1 is

• Suppose zi > z⇤i + y0 xi . This combined with y0 > xi implies zi > z⇤i . Ineq. (C.1)
implies wi pi =⇣ vi + z⇤i p⌘i > xi . So condition 1 is satisfied. When zi > z⇤i + y0 xi ,
vi + zi pi > vi + z⇤i + y0 xi pi > y0 , where the second inequality follows from (C.1).
So condition 2 is satisfied.
Necessity: Since y0 > xi , if vi + min{zi , z⇤i + y0 xi } pi < y0 , either zi  z⇤i + y0 xi , so
vi + zi pi < y0 (condition 2 is violated), or zi > z⇤i + y0 xi (thus, zi > z⇤i by y0 > xi ), so
wi pi = vi + z⇤i pi < xi (condition 1 is violated). That is, if (C.1) is violated, the consumer
does not purchase product i in block 1.
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Derivation of (4.9)

The probability of x0 2 [u0 , s] is:
H⇤1 (s)

H⇤1 (u0 )

=
=

Y

i2N
Z 1s

i2N1

=
=

(xi =w)

d

Hi (u0 + pi )

i2N1

Y

Hi (w
i2N1
XZ s Y
u0

=

Y

Hi (s + pi )

u0 j2N \{i}
1

+ pi )

H j (w + p j )dHi (w + pi ),

2
3
Z s
X 666
Y
777
666H 1 (s) H 1 (u0 )
777 , (C.2)
H
(w
+
p
)d
H
(w
+
p
)
i
i
j
j
⇤
⇤
4
5
u
0
i2N1
j2N1 \{i}
#
X "Z s
1
e
Hi (s + pi ) Hi (xi + pi )d Hi (xi ) ,
i2N1

u0

where the third equality follows from factorial decomposition, the fourth equality comes from
e1 . Namely, H
e1 (xi ) have
integration by parts and the last line is follow
i
R u by the definition
R u of Hi Q
e1 (x) =
a mass at xi = u0 : for any function f , u f (x)d H
f
(x)d
H
(x
+ p j )) +
j
j2N
\{i}
i
1
u0
0
1
e (u0 ).
f (u0 )H
i

C.3

Proof of Theorem 10

Under Assumption 1, Theorem 1 and 3 in Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005) [3] imply for all i,
Fi (·), Gi (·), 1 Fi (·) and 1 Gi (·) are log-concave. With Assumption 1 and 2, Proposition 2 in
CDK shows both 1 Hi (·) and Hi (·) are log-concave. Since for k 2 {1, 2}, i 2 Nk and x u0 ,
eik (x) =
H

Y

H j (x + p j ),

(C.3)

j2Nk \{i}

ek (·) and H⇤k (·) are log-concave.
and log-concave is preserved under product operations, both H
i
That is, the distribution of xi , yi , x0 and y0 are log-concave.
Demand in block 1 By Lemma 6, D1i ( p) is the probability of
Vi + min{Zi , z⇤i + (Y0

Xi )+ }

pi > max{Xi , Y0 }.

If two independent random variables have distributions with increasing hazard rates, so does
their sum. Since Vi , Zi , Xi and Y0 are independent from each other, a sufficient condition of
log-concavity of D1i (p) in pi is that Pr(max{Xi , Y0 } min{Zi , z⇤i (Y0 Xi )+ } < t) is log-concave
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in t. Under assumption 2, for any t > u0 , the probability can be transferred to:
Pr max{Xi , Y0 } min{Zi , z⇤i + (Y0 Xi )+ } < t
= Pr max{Xi z⇤i , Xi Zi , Y0 Zi } < t ,
= Pr Xi < t + min{Zi , z⇤i } \ {Y0 < t + Zi } ,
Z zi
ei1 t + min{zi , z⇤i } H⇤2 (t + zi ) dGi (zi ),
=
H
zi

=

Z

zi

zi

Y

j2N1 \{i}

⇣
⌘Y ⇣
⌘
H j t + min{zi , z⇤i } + p j
H j t + zi + p j dGi (zi ),

(C.4)

j2N2

where the first equality follows from exploring the cases that Xi Y0 and Xi < Y0 separately,
e1 and H⇤2 . Since min{zi , z⇤ } is a concave
and the last equality comes from the definition of H
i
i
function in zi , and log-concavity is preserved under multiplication, the integrand of (C.4) is
log-concave in t, zi and p j . By Prékopa-Leinder inequality, log-concavity is preserved under
integration. This, coupled with gi is log-concave (Assumption 1), implies (C.4) is log-concave
and log-supermodular in t and p j for any j , i, as both t and p j are additive seperatble terms in
H j in (C.4).1 Quint (2014) [18]’s Theorem 1 applies and D1i (p) is log-supermodular in pi and
p j for any i , j. 2
Demand in block 2

D2i ( p) is the probability of
Wi

pi > max{U1 , Yi }

I show J(·) is log-concave under Assumption 1, 2 and 3, the result then follows by the same
arguments as that for block 1 demand. By (4.10),
J(u) = H⇤1 (u)

K(u).

Q
Since H⇤1 (u) = i2N1 Hi (u + pi ) is log-concave in both u and pi , it suffices to prove the sign of
(log(H⇤1 (u) K(u)))00 is the same as the sign of (log H⇤1 (u))00 when the variance of Vi is large
enough.
Lemma 27 For any u

u0 , K(u) defined in (4.10) can be written as:
XZ u
ei1 (xi )(1 Gi (z⇤i + u xi ))dFi (xi + pi
K(u) =
H
i2N1

u0

z⇤i ).

(C.5)

z⇤i ).

(C.6)

And the derivative is

X
dK(u)
ei1 (u) 1 Gi (z⇤i ) fi (u + pi z⇤i )
=
H
du
i2N1
XZ u
ei1 (xi )gi (z⇤i + u xi )dFi (xi + pi
H
i2N1

1
2

u0

By Quint’s definition, a function is log-supermodular if its log is supermodular.
In specific, one can replace G2 (t) in the proof of Quint’s Theorem 1 by (C.4).
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e1 ,
Proof By (4.10), and the definition of H
i
K(u) =

X "Z
i2N1

u

u0

bi (u + pi , u
H

Hi (u + pi )

# Y
xi ) d
H j (xi + p j )
j2N1 \{i}

+

Xh

Hi (u0 + pi )

i2N1

bi (u + pi , u
H

i
ei1 (u0 ),
u0 ) H

e1 (xi ) = Q j2N \{i} H j (xi + p j ) on [u0 , u], equals
which by integration by parts and H
i
1
Z
X u
h
i
ei1 (xi )d x H
bi (u + pi , u xi ) Hi (u + pi ) ,
K(u) =
H
i2N1

=

i2N1

bi (u + pi , u
where d x H

u0

XZ

u

u0

ei1 (xi )d x H
bi (u + pi , u
H

xi ) is the derivative with respect to xi , which is

d b
Hi (u + pi , u
dxi

xi ) =

⇤
d ⇥
(1 Gi (z⇤i + u xi ))Fi (xi + pi z⇤i )
dxi
Z z⇤i +u xi
d
+
Fi (u + pi zi )dGi (zi ),
dxi zi

= (1
if z⇤i + u

xi ),

Gi (z⇤i + u

xi  zi , and equals zero otherwise. Thus
XZ u
ei1 (xi )(1 Gi (z⇤i + u
K(u) =
H
i2N1

u0

xi )) fi (xi + pi

xi ))dFi (xi + pi

z⇤i ),

z⇤i ).

The derivative, by Leibniz rule, is exactly (C.6).

Let Vi = Vi with distribution Fi (v) = Fi (v/ ), and Wi = Vi + min{Zi , z⇤i }. Denote the
e1 ) . By Lemma 27, K with V can be written as:
distribution of max j2N1 \{i} W j as (H
i
i
Z
X u
ei1 ) (xi ) 1 Gi (z⇤i + u xi ) dFi (xi + pi z⇤i ).
K (u) =
(H
i

u0

Denote bi := Fi (u + pi z⇤i ), ai := Fi (u0 + pi z⇤i ), and ri := Fi (xi + pi z⇤i ), by change of
variable:
X Z bi
⇣
⌘
ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (ri ) + z⇤i pi ) 1 Gi (z⇤i + (Fi ) 1 (bi ) (Fi ) 1 (ri )) dri .
K (u) =
(H
ai

i

With Fi (vi ) = Fi (vi / ), we have (Fi ) 1 (r) = Fi 1 (r), fi ((Fi ) 1 (r)) = fi (Fi 1 (r))/
( fi )0 (Fi 1 (r)) = fi (Fi 1 (r))/ 2 . Thus,
X Z bi
⇣
⌘
ei1 ) ( Fi 1 (ri ) + z⇤i pi ) 1 Gi (z⇤i + (Fi 1 (bi ) Fi 1 (ri )) dri ,
K (u) =
(H
i

ai

and
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e1 ) is bounded between zero and one, given F 1 (bi ) > F 1 (ri ), K converges to zero
Since (H
i
i
⇣
⌘ i
⇤
1
1
when explodes as 1 Gi (zi + (Fi (bi ) Fi (ri )) goes to zero.
The derivative of K (u) is
X
dK (u)
ei1 ) (u) 1 Gi (z⇤i ) fi (u + pi z⇤i )
=
(H
du
i2N1
XZ u
ei1 ) (xi )gi (z⇤i + u xi )dFi (xi + pi z⇤i ).
(H
(C.7)
i2N1

u0

Rewrite the above expression in terms of ai , bi and ri :
X
⇣
⌘
ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤i pi ) 1 Gi (z⇤i ) fi (Fi ) 1 (bi )
(H
i2N1

XZ

bi

ai

i2N1

ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (ri ) + z⇤i
(H

pi )gi (z⇤i + (Fi ) 1 (bi )

(Fi ) 1 (ri ))dri ,

where the first term converges to zero when explodes since fi ((Fi ) 1 (bi )) = fi (Fi 1 (bi ))/
e1 ) is bounded between zero and one. The second term is negative as all terms in its
and (H
i
integrand has non-negative value. That is, the first order derivative of K is non-positive when
is large enough.
Similarly, we can express the second order derivative of K as:
X⇣
⌘0
d2
ei1 ) (u) (1 Gi (z⇤i )) fi (u + pi z⇤i )
K
(u)
=
(
H
du2
i2N1
X
ei1 ) (u) 1 Gi (z⇤i ) ( fi )0 (u + pi z⇤i )
+ (H
i2N

X1
i2N1

ei1 ) (u)gi (z⇤i ) fi (u + pi
(H

XZ
i2N1

u

u0

ei1 ) (xi )g0i (z⇤i + u
(H

z⇤i )

xi )dFi (xi + pi

z⇤i ),

which, in terms of ai , bi and ri is:
X⇣
⌘0
d2
ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤i pi ) (1 Gi (z⇤i )) fi ((Fi ) 1 (bi ))
K
(u)
=
(
H
du2
i2N1
X
ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤i pi ) 1 Gi (z⇤i ) ( fi )0 ((Fi ) 1 (bi ))
+ (H
i2N

X1
i2N1

ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤i
(H

XZ
i2N1

u

u0

pi )gi (z⇤i ) fi ((Fi ) 1 (bi ))

ei1 ) ((Fi ) 1 (ri ) + z⇤i
(H

pi )g0i (z⇤i + (Fi ) 1 (bi )

(Fi ) 1 (ri ))dri ,

where the second and third term converges to zero when is large enough as fi ((Fi ) 1 (b)) =
e1 ) is bounded between zero and one.
fi (Fi 1 (b))/ and ( fi )0 (Fi 1 (b)) = fi (Fi 1 (b))/ 2 and (H
i
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The first term is zero as Hi (wi + pi ) converges to either zero or Fi (wi z⇤i + pi ) (shown by CDK
⇣
⌘0
e1 ) ((F ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤ pi ) is either converges to zero or
in the supplementary material). So (H
i
i
i
X Y
Fk ((Fi ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤i pi z⇤k + pk ) f j ((Fi ) 1 (bi ) + z⇤i pi z⇤j + p j ),
j2N1 \{i} k2N1 \{i, j}

which converges to zero since for any q 2 R,
1

Fk ((Fi ) (bi ) + q) = Fk

Fi 1 (bi ) + x

!

! Fk (Fi 1 (bi )),

!1

which is finite, and
1

f j ((Fi ) (bi ) + q) =

1

fi

Fi 1 (bi ) + x

!

! 0.

!1

The last term is non-negative as g0i (z⇤i + (Fi ) 1 (bi ) (Fi ) 1 (ri )) converges to g0i (zi ) when
explodes by Assumption 3 (either g0i (zi )  0 or zi = 1).
Putting all things together, we have K (u) converges to zero, K (u)0 is non-positive and
K (u)00 is non-negative when is large enough. Thus,
⇣
⌘2
((H⇤1 ) (u) K (u))00 ((H⇤1 ) (u) K (u)) (H⇤1 ) (u)0 K (u)0
lim (log J(u))00 = lim
,
!1
!1
(H⇤1 ) (u) K (u) 2
⇣
⌘2
(H⇤1 ) (u)00 (H⇤1 ) (u) (H⇤1 ) (u)0
 lim
,
!1
(H⇤1 ) (u) 2
= lim (log H⇤1 (u))00 ,
!1

which is negative. Thus,
ei2 (t),
Pr(max{u1 , Yi } < t) = J(t)H
Y
= J(t)
H j (t + p j )
j2N2 \{i}

is a product of two log-concave functions, and is thus log-concave. Log-supermodular of
demand follows the same arguments before.

C.4

Proof of Theorem 11

Proof To prove the theorem, I provide a tâtonnement process that reaches an equilibrium:
1. Seller j 2 N20 submits bid b j . Fix any j0 2 arg max j2N20 b j .
0

2. Seller i 2 N10 submits bid bij .
– If maxi bij

0

b j0 , the auction ends. The stable position is (N10 , N20 ).
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– Else, proceed to step 3:
0

3. Seller j 2 N20 \ { j0 } submits b jj .
0

– If b j0
b jj for all j 2 N20 , the auction ends. The stable position is (N10 + j0
l( j0 ), N20 j0 + l( j0 )).
0

– Else, let j00 := arg max j2N20 \{ j0 } b jj and repeat step 2 and 3 by replacing j0 with j00 .
The above process eventually reaches an equilibrium since it stops if and only if the winner’s
bid exceeds all other sellers’ willingness to pay for the 0sponsored link position under the current
position. The equilibrium exits because whenever b jj > b j0 in step 3, the current highest bid
0
strictly increases (from b j0 to b jj00 ). So it is impossible to have an infinite loop in steps 2-3, as
all sellers have finite profits.

C.5

Proof of Theorem 12

Proof The bidding equilibrium exists if there exits the winner r and the runner-up j, and the
winning bid b, such that (4.13) and (4.14) are satisfied. The proof is constructive to find r, j
and b. First, there exists r 2 N10 and j 2 N20 such that r = l( j) and (4.14) holds with sufficiently
small b > 0. This is because r’s position is moved from block 1 into block 2 if j wins. And
in the extreme case where b ! 0, seller r can get the sponsored link for free and is strictly
better o↵ to win the auction. Now, with (4.14) holds for some r, j and b, the equilibrium is
constructed by the following process:
1. If (4.13) also holds for r and b then the equilibrium exists in which r wins with bid b.
2. Else, violation of (4.13) means there exists another j0 such that
0

⇡ jj0 (b)

⇡rj0 (b) > 0,

(C.8)

which is (4.14) under strict inequality. Since the left-hand side of (C.8) is decreasing in
b, there exists b0 > b such that (C.8) holds with equality.
0

3. Since ⇡ jj0 (b0 ) ⇡ij0 (b0 ) = 0. Let j0 be the current winner who submit a bid b0 and r be the
runner-up: replace j by r, r by j0 and b by b0 . So (4.14) holds with equality. Then go
back to step 1.
An equilibrium is constructed following the 3-step procedure above. Every time step 3 is
activated, the current standing bid increases. Whenever the process stops, we find r, j and b
such that (4.13) and (4.14) are satisfied, so an bidding equilibrium exists.
The only case that an equilibrium does not exist is that the three-step process above forms
a loop that never ends. That is, there is a sequence of sellers (i1 , i2 , . . . , im ) and a corresponding
sequence of bids (b1 , b2 , . . . , bm ) such that ⇡iiss (b s 1 ) > ⇡iiss 1 (b s 1 ) for any 2  s  m, and
⇡ii11 (bm ) > ⇡iim1 (bm ), so there is a cyclic relation in (C.8).
However, since b s are adjusted in the way that ⇡iiss (b s ) = ⇡iiss 1 (b s ) for any s 2 {2, . . . , m},
and ⇡ii11 (b1 ) = ⇡iim1 (b1 ), monotonicity of the left-hand side of (C.8) in b implies b s > b s 1 for
s 2 {2, . . . , m} and b1 > bm . A contradiction.

C.6. Pricing Equilibrium with Symmetric Sellers

C.6

115

Pricing Equilibrium with Symmetric Sellers

Under the fixed payment, the price equilibrium in Section 4.6 is that all sellers in block 1 set
an identical price at p1f and all sellers in block 2 set an identical price at p2f .
Suppose not. There exists seller j 2 N1 such that p j , p1f and all other sellers following the
equilibrium price. Let p be the corresponding vector of prices, then Theorem 10 implies
1
p1f

c

=

dD1i (p, p i )/d p
D1i (p, p i )

,

(C.9)

.

(C.10)

f
p=p1

for any i 2 N1 \ { j} and
1
pj

c

=

dD1j (p, p j )/d p
D1j (p, p j )

p=p j

However, (C.9) and (C.10) cannot hold simultaneously. This is because by Theorem 10, for
any i , j and k 2 {1, 2}, @2 log Dki (p)/@pi @p j > 0. If p j > p1f and pi = p1f for any i 2 N1 \ { j},
then
dD1i (p, p i )/d p
<
D1i (p, p i )

dD1j (p, p j )/d p
D1j (p, p j )

,

for any p, since p i contains p j > p1f , while p j only contains p1f . Since the right-hand sides
of both FOCs are increasing in p and 1/(p c) is decreasing in p, the solution of the FOCs
implies p j < p1f . A contradiction.
Similarly, p j > p1f can never hold. So all sellers in block 1 charge the same price. Sellers in
block 2 charge the same price by the same reason. The uniqueness of the pricing equilibrium
under per-transaction follows from the same arguments and is thus omitted.

C.7

Proof of Theorem 14

Theorem 14 is proved by separating consumer surplus in (4.18) into two parts. One is independent of product position and the other depends on product position. The latter one turns out to
be (4.20).
Step 1: reformulate the first sum in (4.18): I use ^ to denote
of sets and _ to
⇣ the intersection
⌘+
⇤
⇤
denote the union of sets. By definition of zi in (4.1), si = E[ Zi zi ]. The first sum in (4.18)
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can be rewritten as:
X h
E
i2N

X1 h⇣
=
E

{{Xi <Wi pi }^{Y0 <Vi +Zi pi }} (Vi
{{max{Xi ,Y0 }<Wi

i2N1

{Xi <Wi pi }

X h⇣
=
E

Zi

z⇤i

{max{Xi ,Y0 }<Wi pi }

X h
=
E
i2N1

i

+

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 }

pi )

{Xi <Vi +z⇤i pi }

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 <Vi +Zi pi }

(Vi + Zi

pi )

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 <Vi +Zi pi }

⌘

(Vi + Zi

pi )

,
+

{{Xi <Wi pi }^{Y0 Wi pi }}

⌘

i X h
pi ) +
E

z⇤i +

Zi

z⇤i

Zi

⌘

{{max{Xi ,Y0 }<Wi pi } (Wi

X h
E
i2N1

+

{{max{Xi ,Y0 }<Wi pi }

i2N1

⇣

pi } +

+ Zi

i2N1

i

Zi

z⇤i

+

i

+

i

,

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 <Vi +Zi pi } (Vi

i
pi )

+ Zi

,

(C.11)

where the first equality comes from:
{Xi < Wi pi } ^ {Y0 < Vi + Zi pi }
= {max{Xi , Y0 } < Wi pi } _ {Xi < Wi pi  Y0 < Vi + Zi
and

{Xi <Vi +z⇤i pi }

⇣
Zi

z⇤i

⌘+

=

{Xi <Wi pi }

⇣
Zi

pi },

⌘+
z⇤i .3

Step 2: reformulate the second sum in (4.18): Similarly, by si = E[max{0, zi
second sum in (4.18) can be rewritten as:
X h
E
i2N2

=

X h
E
i2N2

=

X h⇣
E
i2N2

{max{U1 ,Yi }<Wi

pi } (Vi + Zi

{max{U1 ,Yi }<Wi

pi } (Wi

{max{X0 ,Yi }<Wi pi }

pi )

{max{U1 ,Yi }<Vi +z⇤i

i
pi )
{{X0 Wi pi U1 }^{Yi <Wi pi }}

⌘

(Wi

Zi

pi }

z⇤i

+

z⇤i }], the

i

i
pi ) ,

(C.12)

where the first equality uses the fact that
{max{U1 ,Yi }<Vi +z⇤i pi }

Zi

z⇤i

and the second equality uses the fact that u1

+

=

{{max{U1 ,Yi }<Wi pi }

z⇤i

+

,

x0 for any realization of (vk , zk )2k=1 and p.

Step 3: rearrangement: Since (4.18) is equal to E
3

Zi

⇥

{max{X0 ,Y0 }<u0 }

⇤

u0 plus (C.11) plus (C.12),

If zi  z⇤i , both terms equal zero. If zi > z⇤i , wi = vi + z⇤i , the indicators are the same. The logic is borrowed
from CDK (2018).
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consumer surplus can be expressed as W = W W L , where
X h
i
W L :=
E {Xi <Wi pi Y0 <Vi +Zi pi } (Vi + Zi pi )
i2N

X1 h
+
E
i2N1

W := E

⇥

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 }

{max{X0 ,Y0 }<u0 }

X h
+
E
i2N2

⇤

Zi

z⇤i

+

X h
u0 +
E
i2N1

i

+

X h
E
i2N2

{max{X0 ,Yi }<Wi pi U1 } (Wi

{{max{Xi ,Y0 }<Wi pi } (Wi

i
pi )

{max{X0 ,Yi }<Wi pi } (Wi

= E [max{u0 , X0 , Y0 }] .

i
pi ) ,

We can further simplify W L into an expression of X0 , Y0 and U1 :
X h⇣
⌘
WL =
E {Xi <Wi pi Y0 }
{Xi <Wi pi Vi +Zi pi Y0 } (Vi + Zi
i2N

X1 h
+
E
i2N

X 1h
=
E
i2N1

Zi

z⇤i

{Xi <Wi pi Vi +Zi pi Y0 } (Vi

0
BBBX h
BBB E
@
i2N2

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 }

{max{U1 ,Yi }<Wi pi } (Wi

+

i

+

X h
E
i2N2

+ Zi

i
pi )

i
pi )

{max{X0 ,Yi }<Wi pi U1 } (Wi

X h
E
i2N1

X h
E
i2N2

i
pi )

{Xi <Wi pi Y0 } (Wi

{max{X0 ,Yi }<Wi pi } (Wi

i
pi ) ,

i
pi ) ,

i
pi )

1
iCCC
pi ) CCCA ,

= E[ {U1 Y0 } U1 ] E[ {X0 Y0 } X0 ] E[ {U1 Y0 } Y0 ] E[ {X0 Y0 } Y0 ] ,
= E[ {X0 Y0 } (Y0 X0 )] E[ {U1 Y0 } (Y0 U1 )],
⇥
⇤
⇥
⇤
= E (Y0 X0 )+ E (Y0 U1 )+ ,
(C.13)
⇣
⌘+
where the first equality comes from Wi pi = Vi + Zi pi Zi z⇤i and the fact that
{max{X0 , Yi } < Wi

pi } = {max{U1 , Yi } < Wi

pi } ^ {max{X0 , Yi } < Wi

pi  U 1 } ,

as u1 > x0 under any realization, and the third equality follows from interchanging sum and
expectation in a linear operator and the definitions of X0 , Y0 and U1 .
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